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The Notion of Meaning and Salvation in Religious Studies. 
An Abstract. 
As an exercise in hermeneutics this study explores 
the relation between various concepts of evil and their 
associated forms of salvation. A definition of salvation 
is offered in terms of that aspect of the sociology of 
! 
knowledge which might be called plausibility theory. 
The maJor academic traditions of history,sociology, 
phenomenology, and anthropology of religion are shown to 
have been concerned with the question of 'meaning' and 
it is proposed that a general paradigm of meaning has now 
replaced the nineteenth century evolutionary paradigm. 
This approach eliminates the necessity of having to adopt 
theological terms from one religious tradition when 
studying other traditions. To show that the distinction 
between world religions and primitive religions is 
misleading some comparative study and analysis of 
some African tribal religions, the Sikh, and Mormon 
religions is presented in terms of the paradigm of 
meaning. A philosophical consideration of the nature 
of man is employed throughout the argument to suggest 
the appropriate level of analysis that each discipline 
should adopt, and to evaluate the methodological issue 
of reductionism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It might appear to the layman that studies in the history of 
religion devote as much time to discussing what ought to be done as 
to actually doing it. This academic self-consciousness is, however, 
no erudite obscurantism, rather it is born of the profound awareness 
of the complexity of those religious phenomena constituting its subject 
matter, coupled with the fear of reductionist explanations advanced by 
disciplines of a more distinctive and established position. l 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the problem of method, 
and in particular with the contributions made by anthropclogy, sociology, 
phenomenology and history of religion to understanding the major themes 
of religious thought on evil and salvation. It seeks to identify the 
underlying similarity of these apparently diverse perspectives and in so 
doing to provide something of a unified view of the phenomenon of evil 
and of processes of salvation. This is not an attempt to merge theories 
but to show that they have been concerned, each in its own way, with very 
similar phenomena. Theories of evil and salvation may thus be seen to 
bear a family resemblance to each other even when they are drawn from 
widely differing academic traditions. Throughout the discussion 
attention is drawn to issues which relate directly to theology, or which 
involve questions requiring theological consideration, but at the same 
time care is taken to avoid the use of technical terms from one religion 
in the analytical study of another. One aim of this study is to offer 
theoretical frameworks for interpreting some central issues in religion 
by developing and applying concepts from the social sciences to them. 
This involves a consideration of data at a high level of generalization 
as well as at a much more pragmatic level. Indeed, one of the hazards 
1. Eliade, Mircea and J.M. Kitagawa 1959. 
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facing modern studies of religion is that of erring too much in the 
direction of either over-generalization or too specific concern with 
a restricted case. Consequently the present study seeks to relate 
theoretical speculation to actual studies of religion whenever possible; 
some of the ethnographic material is drawn from the general anthropological 
corpus but most of the data on Sikh and Mormon religious traditions come 
from the writer's own researches. 
This attempt at an interdisciplinary study of salvation and evil 
is open to the fundamental criticism that it is not sufficiently 
rigorous in terms of each specific discipline. While such a comment 
is likely to be true it may, nevertheless, be countered by the fact 
that the degree of insight which a new perspective adds to already 
familiar material is worth the risk of not demonstrating a theory to 
the requirements of a purist. More than this, it is the case that 
when more than one tradition is brought to bear upon a body of facts 
certain elements become visible in novel ways. It is also true that 
theoret,ical perspectives of one discipline require of another that it 
reconsider certain of its otherwise unquestioned assumptions. Such 
mutual criticism can serve a positive function seeing that questions 
arise from their very interaction which might otherwise not be asked. 
An example of this is provided in a discussion of the idea of mission 
in both Sikh and Mormon traditions, which shows that the real issue is 
one of self and group identity and not one of the proclamation of 
religious truth. 
Another advantage of an interdisciplinary approach lies in the 
fact that the data themselves cannot in any simple way dictate the 
manner in which they are analysed. The case of Ernst Troeltsch and 
his notion of 'sect' provides an interesting example of what can happen 
2 
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within an unwary and established way of looking at a problem. l He 
used the term 'sect' to describe an institution of antithetic character 
to the 'church'. This 'church-sect' dichotomy gained the status of 
sociological orthodoxy such that many subsequent studies followed the 
same idea applying it to cases for which it possessed but little 
applicability and hence little validity. It was in order to avoid the 
essentially Christian restrictions associated with such a typology that 
Bryan Wilson adopted Weber's notion of a religious group's orientation 
and response to the world, which enabled him to engage in an analysis of 
I 
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non-christian and non-western religious movements. A similar 
reconsideration of apposite features of a phenomenon may be found in the 
very definition of religion offered by John Bowker which is discussed 
3 later. The creative aspect of interdisciplinary study consists largely 
in this kind of shift of emphasis from the normal, traditional or 
customary manner of viewing ideas or phenomena to one made possible by a 
new theoretical perspective. 
since in this study no specific theological or philosophical stance 
has been adopted in an a priori fashion, and since several disciplines 
are drawn into the discussion it has been as necessary as it is desirable 
to examine the presuppositions of arguments encountered within each 
tradition of scholarship. When it has been found necessary to ignore the 
established categories and assumptions of a tradition the reasons have 
been adduced at some length since the very fact that such a change has 
been merited usually indicates the presence of some interesting point 
hitherto obscured or unseen. A good example of this is provided in the 
discussion of the relationship between preliterate religions and those of 
developed societies, where itis argued that no difference of kind ought 
1. Troe1tsch, E. 1931. 
2. Wilson, B. 1973 :17. 
3 . Bowker. J. 1978 : 244. 
" 
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to be marked between them as is usually done in studies of salvation 
and in the lesser acknowledged areas of evil. The inclusion of an 
extended study of African witchcraft reinforces this point of the 
essentially similar processes of religion in societies of differing 
technological status. 
The fact that a certain consensus of perspectives emerges as this 
study develops will be discussed in the conclusion, here it suffices 
to say that the kind of general communication theory adopted is one 
which appeared to demand acceptance in order to make sense of the 
complexity of material rather than being one artificially imposed from 
the outset. Before going any further, however, some validation must 
be sought for adopting this perspective as an attempt at introducing 
an orderly approach to the near bewildering complexity of religious 
phenomena. 
Theoretical Developments 
The fact that the study of religion is located within so many 
disciplines presents significant problems for any discussion of the 
theoretical development of religious studies. Many authors merely 
enunciate the variety of perspectives by listing scholars along with 
their contributions, as for example E.J. Sharpe in his history of 
comparative religion. He demonstrates fundamental divergences of 
approach by means of an accurate and detailed consideration of the 
many positions adopted in the history of religions, phenomenology, 
anthropology and psychology of religion. This volume is instructive 
for another reason also inasmuch as it very largely avoids the 
sociological tradition and is itself bounded by the concerns of those 
who are members of the International Association for the History of 
Religions. Here there is no escaping the fact that a certain 
professionalism, by which we mean Sharpe's association with a particular 
4 
learned society, has markedly directed his discussion. This is no 
damning criticism for no writer is freed from restraints of such 
association, whether of the personal or intellectual friends he keeps. 
Sharpe, for example, spends a limited time on Durkheim, only a few 
paragraphs on Max Weber and practically nothing on the subsequent 
sociological tradition of religious study in the west; and he admits 
that 'developments in sociology lie outside present objectives,.l 
This means that Peter Berger on the general theoretical side, Glock 
and Stark and many others on the more statistical side of American 
J 
studies, and even Martin and Wilson with their British contributions 
to the great themes of secularization, are omitted. 2 This particular 
comment on Sharpe has been introduced to illustrate a process in 
theoretical transformations which must be considered before proceeding 
to the main task of the thesis in analysing the processes of perceiving 
evil and responding thereto by means of institutions of salvation. 
Some help in elucidating this somewhat confused area of methodology 
in religious studies may be gained from Thomas S. Kuhn's work on the 
structure of scientific revolutions. Firstly Kuhn's general theme of 
paradigms. In the second edition of his influential volume Kuhn sought 
to clarify his use of the term paradigm in order to distinguish between 
the general notion of the intellectual consensus of a group over a 
particular subject and a more specific meaning in terms of particular 
3 theories or principles used by that group. These two problems are 
obviously closely related. In terms of specific theories we may say 
that scholars in the last quarter of the mneteenth century applied the 
idea of evolution to religious phenomena; at least a significant number 
1. Sharpe, E.J. 1975, pp.82-86, and 177-78 respectively. 
2. Berger, P. 1969. Glock, C.Y. and Stark. R, 1965, 1967. 
Martin, D. 1969, 1978. Wilson, B.R. 1966. 
3. Kuhn, T.S. 1970. 
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of anthropologists, historians, philologists, philosophers and 
some theologians did so. What might be called the study of religion 
in the later nineteenth century was thus basically influenced by the 
evolutionary paradigm which was used to explain many kinds of religious 
phenomena. The debate of primitive mentality was a case in point where 
conceptions of spirits and gods presupposed a mental development leading 
to increasingly complex and abstract notions of god. From the idea of 
mana, through taboo to beliefs in spirits, pantheons and finally 
monotheism there was postulated a developing idea emerging under 
evolutionary principles, and this could be exemplified in the work of 
numerous Victorian anthropologists and others. l 
The abandoning of evolutionary models in the more pragmatic studies 
of fieldwork anthropology in the early twentieth century was due in large 
measure to the rise of the new functionalist paradigm, and one important 
consequence of this was the growing divergence between anthropological 
interests and those of philologists, philosophers and historians of 
religion. The field of sociology was also experiencing transformation 
in a growth of survey. and statistical methods focusing on the somewhat 
abstract notion of society. Again, the emergence of psychology with its 
own paradigm of mental structure and operation, especially that of Freud, 
which, despite its tenuous links with evolutionary schemes was firmly 
located in contemporary activity, led to a broadening of interest in 
religious phenomena. In the light of these developments it may be 
suggested that the decline of the evolutionary paradigm marked the end 
of a unified study of religion. If this is an accurate assessment of 
the historical changes we may go on to note one aspect of the study of 
religion which has largely been ignored, namely, that in the late 
1. Davies, D.J. 1975. 
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nineteenth century there was, to all intents and purposes, a unified 
study of religion. 
One possible reason why this phase of study has been misidentified 
is that academic events and expectations ran contrary to each other as 
the twentieth century entered its first two decades. The expectation 
of academic communities is of a cumulative development in theory rather 
than of significant and disruptive advances in thought. Such expectations 
and processes have been adequately discussed by Kuhn and, as he suggests, 
they ought to be seen to be as much a part of the qevelopment of the 
h .. f h . 1 umanltles as 0 t e SClences. This is certainly true for religious 
studies, for instead of a further growth of Victorian intellectualism 
there was a rapid decline in power of the evolutionary model with a 
concurrent adoption of not one, but a series of models each serving a 
growing apart tradition, of anthropology, psychology, 
sociology, philology and linguistics without mentioning history and 
philosophy. The hopes expressed in the eighteen seventies and eighties 
for a unified science of religion might be regarded as self-fulfilling 
2 in the work of scholars of the calibre of Max Muller and F.B. Jevons. 
What was certainly the case, however, is that their kind of comprehensive 
analyses of religions became impossible after the turn of the century so 
that J.G. Frazer's later work is something of an anachronism as is that 
3 
of R.R. Marett. 
It is in the light of these considerations that Kuhn's second major 
1. Ibid,p.180. 
2. Muller, M. 1882, 1889. Jevons, F.B. 1896, 1908. 
3. Frazer, J.G. 1922. Marett, R.R. 1909. 
Some comment on the influential negative criticism of many nineteenth 
century scholars of religion made by E.E. Evans-Pritchard in his 
Theories of Primitive Religion published in 1965 might be apposite. 
It suffices to say that caution is required in accepting all his 
criticism especially when some of the positive contributions of these 
scholars is lost amidst denials of the validity of evolutionary ideas. 
contribution becomes significant. In this he argues the importance of 
the scholarly community in determining the kind of theory which is 
acceptable as the basis for its endeavour. The essential point has 
already been made as far as religious study is concerned inasmuch as 
new groups of scholars entered the field and thereby subdivided it. A 
variety of paradigms now became available and heralded half a century 
of intensive and detailed scholarship. To look upon the twentieth 
century simply as one of methodological confusion is to fail in seeing 
the possibility of creativity which followed the diversification of the 
study of religion. It is, perhaps, an instructive 1 thought to see that 
it is those scholars who have maintained something of the universalist 
stance of the nineteenth century who most lament methodological variation 
and who spend much time devoted to its potential restoration. This 
generalization can be made clearer by reference to the International 
Association for the History of Religions. 
One reason for mentioning Sharpe's omission of sociological sources 
was to point out his own membership in this Association and to show how 
this had influenced the material he regarded as worthy of consideration. 
The International Association for the History of Religions, which quite 
significantly has its own history retold in Sharpe's final chapter, was 
founded in 1950 and provides an arena for discussion for those more 
interested in the historical, philological and philosophical aspects of 
religion than in anthropological, sociological or psychological ones. 
It might be said to consist of those actuated by an academic liberal 
humanism focused upon the essential nature or spirit of man. Even a 
generalization of that order will not completely satisfy the case for 
there are those like Rudolph Otto and Friederich Heiler who have exerted 
much influence and who stress the necessity of studying the essential 
religiosity of man. Indeed, if paradigms were being sought for the 
8 
Association that which regards man as Homo religiosus would be among 
the chief contenders. It is, perhaps, significant that the very term 
Homo religiosus which has gained wide currency in religious studies 
itself, originated in Marett's Gifford Lectures of 1932, and marks his 
closer association with the unified perspective of the nineteenth 
century, desired by many modern historians of religion, than with 
contemporaryanthropologists. l The desire to establish a single 
characteristic of man identifying him as religious appears to be a 
major concern of this tradition and is closely associated with the 
issue of a growing unity between world religions. I Another question 
of no small import follows from this and asks whether the history of 
religions is, essentially, a religious endeavour? Sharpe is deeply 
aware of this point as an aspect of religious studies and refers to 
it as 'the perennial choice, the either/or which has faced the 
comparative study of religion from the very beginning. Scholarship 
has had the choice of being 'pure', striving after a historical and 
analytical understanding of religion as a human phenomenon; or of 
channelling all its energies into its own religious quest, thus 
becoming an 'applied' science almost to the verge of soteriology,.2 
The problem of methodology in the history of religions remains 
intransigent for precisely these reasons which Sharpe has clearly 
outlined, and shows how much care needs to be taken in discussing 
the presuppositions of any study in the field of religious studies. 
Not least important is the intricate and intriguing question of how 
academic groups are organized in relation to specific problems, and 
of how it cannot be avoided as though all arguments and ideas were 
ideal abstractions existing in isolation from human minds and groups. 
Because of the influence of such underlying factors particular 
1. Marett, R.R. 1933. 
2. Ibid'p.268. 
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attention is given throughout this thesis to the relation between the 
object of study and the mode of study. In the remainder of this 
introductory chapter a more immediate and necessary argument must be 
advanced which will provide the basis for later discussions on the 
particular contributions and perspectives of the variety of disciplines 
considered, while also enabling them to be related to a common theme. 
The real issue 1S whether a unified study of religion is again possible 
as a result of the acceptance of a new paradigm. 
The Choice of Paradigms 
Despite the fact that the notion Homo religiosus holds an established 
position in the history of religions especially for those like Eliade, 
Otto and Heiler who emphasize the individual perception of the sacred, it 
remains impossible to adopt it as a general paradigm in religious studies 
for two reasons. Firstly, it affords major difficulties to scholars who 
are themselves non-religious, and who see it as presupposing some kind of 
deity, so that if history of religions wishes to be included in a faculty 
IC 
of arts such a theistic presupposition would be hard to justify. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the term is not easy to explain in terms of specific 
belief systems, so that Christian and Buddhist scholars, for example, might 
well differ over the significance attributed to the essential nature of man, 
and this would make the term awkward to use in a department of theology. 
This is a reminder that the precise intellectual location of a study 
must be related to the methodology adopted, including the status of its 
presuppositions, which means that while a history of religions could be 
constructed according to the theological presuppositions of say a Christian, 
Islamic or Sikh theology, which would make it a confessional analysis, it is 
also possible to adopt a non-credal basis as the starting point of discussiol 
Where no specific theological stance is adopted it is difficult to see what 
precise content can be given to the notion of human religiosity if this 
involves either implicitly or explicitly an acceptance of the ~ x i s t e n c e e
of a god as a necessary aspect of religion, or as the subject ir relation 
to which human religiosity is the object. This is not to say that the 
assumption of a divine factor in human religiosity is unwarranted, but 
11 
that if such a view is taken then its status should be carefully considered 
to see whether or not the entire exercise is one of a theological type. 
This point has been laboured because scholars of religion are often 
churchmen while the canons of academic thought are seldom specifically 
theistic. 
Because this thesis is not, primarily, a confessional and theological 
study it does not presume the existence of a divinity as a necessary 
precondition for analysing human religious behaviour. In accord with 
basic phenomenological method such an existence is not brought into 
question; this also means, of course, that the existence of the deities 
who occur throughout the thesis is not discounted, but is merely treated 
as an irrelevance. The level of analysis which has been adopted 
necessitates that all religious claims have equal status and be treated 
in the same way. It is precisely such an equality of evaluation which 
it is difficult, if not impossible to carry out within a theological study. 
If this means that the paradigm of Homo religiosus is unacceptable might 
there not be another which would both serve asaunifying focus for the 
study of religion and also be theoretically appropriate in terms of a 
non-credal perspective? 
The Paradigm of 'Meaning' 
This thesis attempts to describe just such a different paradigm, and 
this on two rather different levels corresponding to Kuhn's two senses of 
the term paradigm. The first applies to a general perspective already 
alluded to as a 'general communication theory', and which can be called 
the paradigm of meaning, while the second is more specific and might be 
identified as plausibility theory.l Scholars of religion seeking a 
general view of religious activity as but one aspect of human behaviour 
are increasingly concerned with the former, while the latter notion 
specifices processes operative in bringing about man's intention of 
understanding and of acting in the world. 
A fundamental criticism of this position is that it is too general, 
saying nothing specific about man or the processes at work within him. 
While this may be largely true for the general expression of the paradigm 
as an orientation of a group of scholars towards certain phenomena, it is 
completely untrue inasmuch as it can be applied to man as the creator 
and integrator of various systems present in his environment. This 
point is elaborated towards the close of the thesis ln the light of 
General Systems Theory. On the more specific side of plausibility 
theory it will be possible to demonstrate the utility of this approach 
through concrete examples, such as those of phenomena of evil in both 
Sikh and Mormon religion, as well as in cases of African religiosity. 
While it would be improper to talk in terms of a revolution of 
theoretical perspective in religious studies in recent decades it would, 
nevertheless, be true to say that a positive and general trend has been 
witnessed. As well as abstracting a general character of this trend 
from various contributors this thesis advocates a specific theory of 
plausibility in relation to phenomena of evil and processes of salvation. 
The rationale of the following chapters might be explained if we 
take as an analogy recent anthropological interest in structuralism. 
As a strict theory structuralism is hard to define, and while reference 
can be made to its origin in linguistics or to that structure of mind 
which operates by means of binary opposition grounded in an essential 
1. Davies, D.J. 1978:89. 
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category distinction between nature and culture and extending to all 
aspects of human endeavour from myth-making to meal-eating, it is 
nevertheless in the actual application and analysis of things that its 
utility can be seen. In this sense structuralism is more a method than 
a theory. This corresponds to Kuhn's general notion of a paradigm as a 
shared perspective, and is of more than a passing interest ln the present 
context since structuralism itself has gained wide popularity ln a 
variety of disciplines including architecture, psychology, and even to a 
limited extent in theology. Indeed, structuralism might be thought of 
! 
as a suitable alternative paradigm in religious studies since its heuristic 
power is extensive, as the present writer has shown in the case of old 
testament sacrifice. l The main reason for not so elevating it lies in 
the fact that structuralism finds easy inclusion as a sub-type of meaning 
construction process. So it is that this thesis adopts the procedure of 
studying particular cases in the hope that such concrete applications of 
the basic paradigm of plausibility theory will ultimately demonstrate its 
validity, and further establish the potentially unifying approach of the 
general paradigm of meaning. 
Before going on to consider the emergence of the meaning paradigm 
it will be useful to identify more clearly the difference between the 
more anthropological perspective of this thesis and the more common 
perspective of the history of religions. J.A. Saliba has aptly described 
this kind of difference when he contrasted the 'descending' approach of 
the historian of religion with the 'ascending' approach of the anthropologist. 
Historians of religion assume the existence of the sacred and of the divine 
process of revelation, whereas anthropologists accept, for the purpose of 
analysis, only the reality of man and of men's reported experience and 
. f 2 belle s. 
1. Davies, D.J. 1977. 
2. Saliba, d . A . ~ 9 7 6 6 :41. 
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Saliba himself holds the opinion that the history of religions 
can serve as a discipline mediating between anthropology, with jts 
conceptual basis ln social science, and theology and philosophy with 
their background of speculative thought. But this is not likely to 
be a fruitful way of understanding the task of the history of religions. 
If there is ever to be any final and all embracing argument it is more 
likely to be found within a theological or philosophical system which 
possesses firm a priori assumptions than as a conclusion of a discipline 
composed of many traditions. Evidence presented by the historian of 
religions, and this would include the meaning paradigm argued in this 
thesis, may well be taken and utilized according to some theological 
or philosophical scheme; but in itself it is only a partial explanation, 
even though it may be sufficient as far as a particular discipline is 
concerned. In other words, final assertions about ultimate truth 
pertain to religious systems. This does not mean that systematic 
theologians and scholars of religion ought to have no dealings with 
each other: on the contrary, the very fact of difference of method, 
as of the variety of religious phenomena itself, can serve the theologian 
in his task of self-criticism, just as it can enable the anthropologist 
to resist those wilder speculations which the religious believer can temper 
by means of his own internal observer's model. 
Paul Tillich offers an interesting example of a theologian who saw 
the implications of studies of non-Christian religions for Christian 
theology itself. For him, the essential act of self-judgment in which, 
paradoxically, the Christian religion has to condemn the pagan religiosity 
of itself, can be facilitated through a knowledge of the history of 
.. 1 
rellglons. Similarly Charles Davis points out the debt owed by Christian 
mysticism to teachings of other religions, and it might be added as a 
1. Til1ich, P. 196 3:93 
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comment on his work in Christ and the World Religions that Christology 
itself is the one doctrinal area which has benefitted from the challenge 
f th 1 ·· 1 o 0 er re 19lons. The theological influence upon anthropology, by 
contrast, has been less marked, though as Evans-Pritchard showed in the 
conclusion of his Theories of Primitive Religion the question of the 
existence of God does raise significant issues as to the level of 
anthropological explanation which can be accepted as satisfactory.2 A 
similar constraining factor will be seen in Berger's argument as also 
in that of Bowker. 
The fundamental difference of approach between these two 
identifiable traditions can be clearly seen in the notions of projection 
and revelation. For if the idea of a revelation of the divine or sacred 
be said to characterize the history and phenomenology of religion, then 
the functionally equivalent notion in the social scientific approach 
would be that of projection. An outline history of the use of this term 
in a variety of non-theological disciplines will make this point clearer 
and will also help to pose the questions which arise for theological 
study in the light of the meaning paradigm lying at the heart of projection 
processes. 
Projection 
The idea of projection has almost attained the status of a category 
in twentieth century discussions of knowledge. Not only does it relate to 
the means of knowledge or the method of generating ideas, but it also 
involves the question of the status and validity of that knowledge. It is 
in respect of the former, origin of knowledge, that projection is a concern 
of sociology and anthropology, and of the latter, validity of knowledge that 
1. Davis, C. 1970:128. 
2. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1965:120. 
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it enters the field of philosophy and theology. 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the clearest exponents of the 
projectionist thesis was the theologian Ludwig Feuerbach. His critique 
of religion required that a philosophical anthropology should r€place 
theology since the essence of theology was merely a projected idea of 
man. By a mechanism he never explained Feuerbach believed that the 
mystery of religion consisted in the fact that 'man projects his being 
into objectivity and then makes himself an object to this projected image 
of himself thus converted into a subject,.l Because of this psychological 
theory Feuerbach could argue that 'religion 1S man's earliest and most 
indirect form of self knowledge', the apparent object of knowledge, the 
divine being, is in fact 'nothing else than the human being freed from 
the limits of the individual, made objective,.2 While this kind of 
study was, clearly, an exercise in demythologizing, of interpreting 
supernatural statements in terms of the natural and rational, it may 
be seen to serve the additional function of providing a way of talking 
about man's self-knowledge. In one sense it was a theory of meaning, even 
though Feuerbach's intention was basically polemical. As far as he was 
concerned the ordinary man had deceived himself with respect to the true 
nature of his discourse and needed the higher level of criticism of the 
philosopher in order to understand the real significance of religious 
language. This denial of any supernatural reality with a corresponding 
" emphasis upon man resembles the later argument of Emile Durkheim in his 
sociological theory of knowledge. The advantage of Durkheim's position 
lies in the provision of an explanation of the mechanism by which mental 
categories were constructed from man's experience of social life, and this 
1. Feuerbach, L. 1957:29. 
2. Ibid., p.14. 
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also provides a sounder basis for the idea of consensus in the notion 
of God. The shift which takes place between these two men is one from 
an individualist to a social origin of thought. While Feuerbach speaks 
of man his prime concern is with the individual rather than the social 
group even though his argument applies to mankind as a whole. Durkheim's 
scheme is more acceptable within the rationalist tradition simply because 
he lS able to provide an explanation of how the act of projection works. 
It is not the self but society which is projected as the notion of God. 
Evil beings too 'are nothing other than collective states objectified: 
1 they are society itself seen under one of its aspects'. Not only in 
his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life published in 1915 but also 
in an earlier work with Marcel Mauss entitled 'Primitive Classification' 
he was engaged in showing how the ordering and classifying activities of 
man, which result in ideal schemes, are based on social experience and 
social facts. 2 
In 1913, when Primitive Classification was published, another 
author produced a volume arguing a specifically psychological theory 
of projection. Some care is required in interpreting this contribution 
of Sigmund Freud for he uses the notion of projection in both a specific 
and general sense though both are related. Generally speaking man 'turns 
his emotional cathexes into persons, he peoples the world with them and 
meets his internal mental processes again outside himself', so it was that 
primitive man 'transposed the structural conditions of his own mind into 
3 the external world'. This usage might, for clarity's sake, be called 
the process of exteriorization. The other, more specific usage, Vlews 
, 
1. Durkheim, E. 1976:412. 
, 
2. Durkheim, E. and Marcel Mauss, 1963. 
3. Freud, S. 1960:92. 
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projection as a transferring of personal hostilities onto other persons. 
In a more specifically religious sense Freud's Future of an Illusion 
makes the same point that the idea of God is a personification of human 
wish-fulfilment, and just as Feuerbach questioned the validity of 
theological statements so Freud saw no future for truth statements 
which, in essence, were mere wish fulfilments. l 
These brief comments on Feuerbach, Durkheim and Freud serve to 
show how the human attribute of ascribing reality to verbalized and 
other symbolic constructs has occupied an important position in the 
intellectual treatment of religion for the last century and more and 
this in a wide variety of academic circles. Not only philosophers, 
sociologists and psychologists but also philologists and historians of 
religion such as Max Muller have seen the process of ascribing an 
independent reality to human ideas as a central issue in understanding 
the nature of religion. It might even be suggested that along with 
the e v ~ l u t i o n a r y y paradigm that of projection constituted the fundamental 
methodology of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and that 
whereas the evolutionist notion fell into disuse that of projection was 
maintained and its use made more sophisticated. In the following chapters 
the notion of projection itself is considered as one aspect of meaning 
construction and is, thus, subordinated to the general meaning-paradigm. 
1. Freud, S. 1973. 
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Chapter One The Sociology of Knowledge 
The debate on the problem of knowledge, which has actively 
engaged the attention of anthropologists and sociologists in the 
twentieth century, is of particular interest to historians and 
phenomenologists of religion inasmuch as it is directly related to the 
structure and function of religious systems, and not least to the idea 
of salvation. This chapter traces the emergence ~ f f social scientific 
concern with religions as meaning systems, and provides a working 
definition of salvation at a high level of generalization expressed in 
terms of plausibility theory. This abstract notion is then utilized in 
subsequent chapters as the basis for concrete consideration of phenomena 
in both preliterate and world religions. 
Whilst epistemology had largely been the object of philosophical 
and theological concern, the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid growth 
in anthropological interest in the question of how men thought. The rise 
of anthropology as a significant intellectual endeavour and the fascination 
with the thought processes of exotic societies cannot be separated, and 
even when the evolutionary presuppositions of the nineteenth century 
argument on the nature of primitive mentality were abandoned the substantial 
. f . 1· 1 issue remalned, albeit in the form of the nature 0 ratlona lty. 
The obvious diversities in culture which the ever increasing 
exploration of Africa and the colonies brought to light provided the 
basis for questioning whether all men, 'civilized and uncivilized', were 
essentially similar in their thought processes. Under the sustained 
influence of evolutionary principles it was presumed by many, and Lucien 
1. Wilson, B. R. 1970, a. 
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Levy-Bruhl is usually singled out as the advocate of the idea that 
primitive man possessed a 'pre-logical mentality', one that resembled 
the thought processes of civilized children but not that of adult 
european rationalists._ As one has shown elsewhere he reflected a trend 
of opinion, but he was never firmly convinced as his later writings 
make clear. l The significant point is that while early anthropologists 
viewed man and society as dynamically evolving entities they paid but 
little attention to the interaction between individuals and their 
social groups in the present. Though Karl Marx was indeed one exception 
to this generalization, emphasizing as he did the dialectical relation 
between social group and mode of thought, his approach gained but little 
attention among anthropologists. Acknowledgement of the interrelation 
between individual, society and environment with respect to structures 
of thought was not to occur until the opening decades of the twentieth 
century when Bronislaw Malinowski and E.R. Radcliffe-Brown established 
the functionalist method based in intensive fieldwork studies. But even 
this period did not focus in a methodologically appropriate way on the 
issue of meaning, it merely emphasized the contemporary nature of social 
analysis as it eschewed any form of evolutionary conjecture. The notion 
of the individual almost vanished from consideration while the emphasis 
was placed upon the rather abstract concept of social institution. The 
transition from this functionalist perspective to what might be called 
the 'weak' version of structuralism took place in Britain through the 
work of E.E. Evans-Pritchard and grew out of his Sudanese fieldwork. His 
interest in the work of L'Annee Sociologique ought not to be forgotten 
1. Davies, D.J. 1975. 
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as a major influence upon his thought, especially when it is recalled 
,/ 
that both Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss had already published a 
significant work on the structure of human thought and conceptual 
t . 1 ca egorles. The change in emphasis in Evans-Pritchard's work was 
away from the function of institutions to the significance and 
meaning of actions for actual people set amidst their particular value 
and belief systems. 
! 
In the second of his maJor studies, The Nuer, published in 1940 
some three years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande 
which will be discussed in the third chapter, Evans-Pritchard described 
Nuer society in terms of their own linguistic usage. He regarded it as 
an 'exploration of ideas' and as a descriptive interpretation of Nuer 
ideas and practices, a methodology which became more explicit and 
directly related to religious questions in Nuer Religion published 
in 1 9 5 6 ~ ~ In this latter book he was not content merely to compare 
certain Nuer words and ideas with apparently equivalent western notions, 
but he presents a full reconstruction of the Nuer world-view as a totality 
and as a means of expressing the Nuer conception of kwoth or spirit. 
At the descriptive level this work is perhaps the first anthropological 
treatise which could in any sense be deemed phenomenological, even though 
it neither claims to be such nor does it explicitly use such a terminology. 
Despite Evans-Pritchard's contribution to the problem of knowledge 
the anthropologist who is generally regarded as having established the 
area of man's mental relation with his social and natural environments 
as a primary topic of study is Claude Levi-Straus. In his earlier work 
1. Douglas, M. 1970:xv. 
2. Evans-Pritchard,E.E. 1937; 1940; 1951; 1956:143. 
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Les Structures ~ l e m e n t a i r e s s de la p a r e n t ~ , , in which he considered the 
value of kinship structures as systems of communication, and in the 
later volumes on mythology, his dominant interest lies in the dialectical 
process existing between mind and s o c i e t y ~ ~ This form of 'structuralist' 
approach to anthropological material, which presupposes a theory of mind 
involving a process of binary analysis of phenomena, has been utilized 
by many scholars including Edmund Leach, Mary Douglas, and Rodney Needham 
among British thinkers some of whose work is considered later. 2 Despite 
a general intellectual interest in structuralism, with its implicit 
theme of human creativity in the constructing of cultural systems of 
meanlng, something of a dichotomy based to a certain extent upon academic 
insularity has been maintained between anthropological and sociological 
concerns with the problem of meaning. The former have tended to restrict 
their study to specific cultural groups whereas the latter have focused 
more upon western man within the same cultural tradition as the scholar. 
This i ~ e v i t a b l y y meant that the problem of meaning was understood 
differently by both and means of analysing areas of interest were chosen 
accordingly. Added to this is the fact that British anthropology,largely 
influenced by Durkheimian assumptions, emphasized the significance of 
group activity in ritual and religion, while sociologists either focused 
on individual activity or else engaged in rather high level theorizing 
with respect to religious sects and the wider society. 
Durkheim, who has already been mentioned as a significant 
influence on Evans-Pritchard, is particularly worthy of comment inasmuch 
as his theory of religion is inextricably associated with the notion of 
human nature and with the systems of knowledge generated by man from 
1. Levi-Strauss, C. 1949; 1955; 1963; 1964. 
2. Douglas, M. 1966;1970. Leach, E. 1967;1976. Needham, R. 1972. 
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his social experience. In the opening section of 'The Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life' he discusses what he calls the theory of knowledge 
arguing that the very categories of thought originate not in some 
innate human understanding but are derived from social experience itself. 
For Durkheim, and here his position is fundamentally different from that 
of the nineteenth century intellectualists like E.B.Tylor, J.G.Frazer 
and Andrew Lang, religion was 'a permanent aspect of humanity' essential 
I to the very nature of man. It was no mere passipg phase and it was not 
grounded in errors of judgement or logic. While Durkheim did not argue 
any thesis which emphasized meaning as an explicit drive in man (for in 
his day this way of expressing the problem had not emerged) yet his 
fundamental interest lies in how man comes to understand and express the 
forces and apparent realities impinging upon his life. A major distinction 
introduced by Durkheim was that the reasons given by the faithful and 
the actual state of affairs discovered by the scientist for religious 
phenomena were often very different. This indicates the two levels of 
meaning which are involved in religion for Durkheim and which might 
still be argued within the paradigm of meaning; for while the faithful 
may act towards the ultimate expression of truth as to a divinity the 
analyst might assert that such a deification of validating systems is 
merely a natural human process, or as Durkheim would have expressed it 
a social one. This dichotomy will be raised again in the context of 
presuppositions appropriate to scholars of religion respecting ultimate 
entities. The fact that Durkheim makes his method quite clear is 
instructive with respect to subsequent scholars and the way the tradition 
of scholarship has developed, especially in the anthropological dimension, 
and specifically in terms of projection processes. 
, 
1 . Durkheim, E. 1976:2. 
24 
Within the specifically sociological tradition the question of 
meaning had, even before Durkheim, been of paramount importance in the 
manner in which it was advocated by Karl Marx. Yet his view that man's 
perception of life was inextricably associated with and derived from 
his precise social location, in terms of social class and involvement 
with the mechanisms of production, was of minor significance in the 
development of the study of religion in Britain. This was due perhaps 
to the political implications of his theory of dialectical materialism. 
In any event, his level of analysis was not sufficiently rigorous with 
respect to its own presuppositions to appreciate the problem of meaning 
implicit in religious phenomena. 
In terms of the sociology of knowledge it was Karl Mannheim who 
helped make such issues clear and developed theoretical and more 
philosophical arguments for this purpose. Mannheim did not think that 
Marx had achieved a satisfactory sociology of knowledge despite his keen 
awareness of the relation existing between members of capitalist society 
and the mechanisms of its operation in respect of structure of 
consciousness. For Mannheim the Marxist failure in theory lay in its 
inability to see that its own ideology was also related to specific 
social factors as though there was an unconscious reluctance to admit 
the relativity of all ideas. He was committed to the importance of 
acquiring a sense of historical and social perspective as a pre-condition 
for the sociology of knowledge, yet he did not direct his attention solely 
to a form of historical or social relativity. By contrast he urged a 
form of relational perspective which did not assert any 'static ideal of 
eternal unperspectivistic truths independent of the subjective experience 
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of the observer'. The role of the individual thinker in relation to 
styles of thought and objects of thought he had learned from Husserl 
and Scheler. Even so Mannheim's work, as to a certain extent is also 
true for Karl Popper's answering argument, has remained at a fairly 
high level of generalization with little relevance to the more pragmatic 
studies of religion in sociology and anthropology.2 
A similar point can be made, with reservations, concerning 
Max Weber's sociological work on the relation b e ~ w e e n n idea systems 
and the resulting action engaged in by religious believers. His concern 
does embrace the meaning of a religion for a practitioner but more in 
the sense of a motive for action than as a reason for living. A 
qualification is necessary; for, as will be shown later, his discussion 
of types of salvation does indicate an awareness of the variety of 
meanings sought by different categories of persons. Yet his intention is 
rather different from that of Alfred Schutz, for example, whose work 
facilitated an application of Husserlian phenomenology to sociology. 
This can be seen more clearly if we consider Schutz's achievement. 
The work of Alfred Schutz was enormously important in the 
development of the study of religion. In the first place, he was 
one of Berger's intellectual mentors and Berger in his turn has been 
so very influential over the broad field of religious studies. Secondly, 
and this is more important, Schutz offers a distinctive perspective 
upon the question of meaning as such. This view of meaning has to do 
with the level of self-awareness manifested by a subject and this, we 
might argue, is different for the phenomenologist and for the person he 
observes. Nevertheless this distinction should not be allowed to obscure 
1. 
2. 
Mannheim, K. 
Popper, K. 
1966:271. 
1966. 
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an underlying similarity between the meaning construction which is 
fundamental to all human activity, and that which is deployed at the 
level of phenomenological analysis. It is precisely these two levels, 
both of which involve processes of meaning construction, which requne 
clarification before the paradigm of meaning can be seen in its full 
heuristic strength in the study of religion. 
The ordinary person inhabiting his life-world participates 
naively in many finite universes of meaning, and Little self-reflection 
need be involved in this. Schutz does discuss what he calls the 'in 
order to', and the 'because motives', maintained by ordinary subjects 
as part of the routine of social interaction, but these also need not 
involve any self-reflective attitude. There is, then, a fundamental 
distinction to be drawn between the 'wide awake' state in which 
attention de la vie lS at its most intense and the subject most 
active in the world, and the reflective attitude of the phenomenologist 
set at a distance from the behaviour of others. 
The phenomenologist sets himself apart from those he observes, 
in Schutz's terms his actio or action in progress, is directed towards 
f h ub " 1 the actum or the performed act 0 t e s ]ect. Meaning for Schutz 
results from the phenomenologist's actio as it seeks to understand both 
the nature of the interior activity and the intersubjective action of 
subjects set within the life-world. The operational structures of the 
life-world are accepted as normative for philosophical analysis but with 
the proviso of an addition of self-reflection at a high level of 
abstraction. One significant aspect of the difference between the ordinary 
inhabitant of the life-world and its critical analyst lies in the fact 
1. Schutz, A. 1973:214. 
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argued by Schutz that 'I can look at my own self only modo praeterito 
and then grasp merely a partial aspect of this my past self, myself 
1 
as a performer of a role'. What this means for the methodological 
difference between Schutz and Berger is that the non-reflective actor 
lives permanently within an entirely plausible system, which Berger 
documents at length, while the phenomenological analyst, and he is the 
concern of Schutz, engages in an act essentially different from any 
performed in the ordinary life-world. Being aware!of these issues 
Schutz represents the stance of the ordinary man in terms of the 
'epoche of the natural attitude' in which no doubt is thrown upon 
the reality of the structure of everyday life. By contrast, the 
phenomenologist utilizes the notion of epoche in a formal and 
self-conscious way.2 
The significance of this difference ought not to be undervalued 
for it relates directly to the important concept of 'meaning' ln 
Schutz" s work and also underlies much of the argument contained in the 
following chapters. The basis of the difference consists in what might 
be called the locus of meaning which varies from phenomenologist to 
layman, and will become clearer if we expand upon Schutz's use of the 
term 'meaning'. 
Schutz abandoned William James's use of the concept sub-universe 
of reality because it implied an ontological reality, or we might say 
an external locus of meaning, which confronts an individual in the 
process of perception. He preferred the term 'finite province of 
meaning' in order to reflect the subjective locus of reality, 'because 
1. Ibid, p.221. 
2. Ibid, p.229. 
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it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure 
of objects which constitutes reality,.l So meaning in the sense of 
'how man, in the natural attitude of daily life and common sense, can 
understand another's action at all, is the primary concern for Schutz 
and he analyses it in terms of structures of self-knowledge and its 
relation to others as generated in the inter-subjectivity of social life. 
Meaning is thus a term descriptive of the taken for granted outlook 
present to and gained within everyday life. 
While the activity of the phenomenologist is different from 
that of the layman, as indicated by the terminology of actio and actum, 
there remains an underlying similarity, a point which Schutz stresses 
when he discusses the theoretical justification of the social sciences. 
For he argues that despite the disparity in levels of self-awareness 
between layman and phenomenologist, both are concerned with meaning 
structures and it is because of this that 'the empirical social sciences 
will find their true foundation not in transcendental phenomenology 
but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude,.2 This 
means that the phenomenologist realizes that he is engaged in the same 
enterprise as the ordinary person, but that he is aware of his activity. 
So while the task of phenomenological analysis of behaviour can be seen 
to resemble the phenomenon itself the fact of self-conscious awareness 
and reflection at a higher level of abstraction serves to differentiate 
between a man naively engaged in the epoche of the life-world and one 
formally adopting the outlook of epoche as a methodological procedure. 
1. Ibid, p.230. 
2. Ibid, p.149. 
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To speak of a paradigm of meaning is thus to identify an 
aspect of social reality which lies absolutely central to the 
phenomenological enterprise. The following chapters seek to show how 
religious phenomena also exemplify the process of meaning construction 
and care is taken to establish the two levels at which the notion of 
meaning may be seen to operate, on the one hand as agiven aspect or 
characteristic of human life, and on the other as a specific method 
of analysis. The paradigm of meaning might thus be viewed as a 
discussion of meta-meanings, as a study in the meaning of meaning in 
religious phenomena. 
In collaboration with Thomas Luckmann, Berger developed Schutz's 
phenomenology in a study entitled 'The Social Construction of Reality' , 
which was conceived as a contribution to the sociology of knowledge. l 
It sought to explain how individuals and groups attained a sense of 
meaning and security by analysing the processes which lead to the 
establishment of objective and subjective systems of identity. Central 
to the argument was the notion of legitimation defined as a kind of 
second-order objectivation of meaning. It is a function of religious 
and perhaps also philosophical paramount universes of meaning and 
serves to 'integrate meanings already attached to disparate institutional 
processes,.2 Such legitimation processes which produce a sense of 
certainty and plausibility about how things are and should be in the 
world, vary from the implicit legitimations effected by the very 
language used by a group, through the level of folk-beliefs, proverbs 
and general maxims to more explicit propositions of a scientific and 
1. Berger, P.L. and Thomas Luckmann, 1966. 
2. Ibid, p.llO. 
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philosophical kind which finally are embraced by theological or other 
ultimate kinds of philosophical schemes. Berger and Luckmann see the 
entirety of human existence as involving a search for meaning and set 
about identifying the social processes which constitute the mechanics 
of the endeavour. In so doing they provide an application of Schutz's 
phenomenology of everyday life, which centres upon the notion of 
legitimation. The ordered sense of reality emerging from legitimation 
processes they identify as the 'nomic function' and this may be said 
to represent and express the central use of the term 'meaning' in Berger 
and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge. l 
Berger continued this general form of argument in 'The Social 
Reality of Religion' which developed one aspect of the earlier and joint 
work away from Luckmann's perspective. While Berger views religious 
phenomena as similar but not identical to the general human activity 
of meaning construction, Luckmann argued that religion is but one 
aspect of the ordinary human enterprise of transcending biological 
nature through cultural systems. Berger can be seen to follow the more 
tradkional perspective of religionswissenschaft in identifying the 
sacred, a category embracing ultimate explanatory systems by referring 
to a supernatural dimension, as the category which enables religious 
phenomena to be differentiated from other systems of meaning. One reason 
for his adopting this category as a distinctive feature lies in the fact 
that Berger sees Luckmann's identification of religious systems and other 
systems as involving the loss of any heuristic power in specific explanatory 
categories. 
Following Rudolph Otto, and to a certain extent Mircea Eliade, 
Berger interprets the sacred as 'a quality of mysterious and awesome 
1. Ibid, p.llS. 
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power other than man and yet related to him, which is believed to reside 
in certain objects or experience' 1 It is the perception of this quality 
of experience as associated with schemes of legitimation which invests 
legitimation with 'an ultimately valid ontological status', as can be 
seen in the Egyptian idea of ma'at , the eastern notions of Tao and rita, 
and the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 2 One of the major 
contributions of religion to the mental development of man, according to 
Berger, was the way it facilitated the process of symbol construction. 
The ability to form mental constructs and abstractions was thus part of 
the development of religious thinking and, as far as Berger is concerned, 
was also a necessary step in all thought processes. This rather 
evolutionary argument, which is similar to some of the points already 
raised in discussing projection, is but conjectural; since it does not 
bear significantly upon the rest of his argument its particular weakness 
may be ignored for present purposes. 
Throughout The Social Reality of Religion Berger presented a 
heavily sociological analysis of the nature and function of religion 
combining the Durkheimian emphasis upon the social structure and its 
determination of conceptual categories with the phenomenological 
understanding of socialization and world building derived from Husserl 
and Schutz. The reSUlting picture of man seemed to leave no possibility 
of human freedom in religious activity. So sociologically dogmatic was 
its its tone that Berger was impelled to write A Rumour of Angels as a 
complementary volume to offset the possible 'counsel of despair for 
religion in the modern world' which the earlier book seemed to imply 
1. 
2. 
Berger, P.L. 1969:34. 
Cf. Mircea Eliade, 1979:91. 
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1 not actually to advocate. Far from being a mere recitation of 
caveats this later volume, subtitled 'modern society and the rediscovery 
of the supernatural', is a creative attempt at relating sociological 
and theologiCal enterprises. The major theme of Rumour of Angels is 
that of transcendence, a notion which may be singled out as one which 
most clearly identifies the inherent contradiction between the ideas 
of projection and revelation which themselves indicate a major 
methodological and ideological distinction between social scientific 
and theological disciplines. It might be said that Berger engages in a 
kind of natural theology originating in the notion of transcendence. 
He offers five arguments as suggestive of the actual existence of a 
transcendental realm beyond that of human life, but which originate 
in the every day life world. These arguments which are reminiscent of 
the classical arguments for the existence of God are, thus, clearly 
the product of the phenomenological method and also bring together 
several descriptions of human nature provided by the human sciences in 
recent decades. They are particularly apposite to the present discussion 
inasmuch as the first one is ~ a l l e d d the 'argument from ordering,.2 Both 
in this basic theme and in the very language he uses to describe the 
religious expositions of what he calls 'signals of transcendence' the 
paradigm of meaning can be seen to be of primary importance for Berger 
since these signals convey a message concerning the ordered nature of 
reality. The core of his argument can be stated by saying that 'in the 
observable human propensity to order r ~ a l i t y y there is an intrinsic 
impulse to give ~ o s m i c c scope to this order, an impulse which implies not 
only that human order in some way corresponds to an order that transcends 
1. Berger, P.L. 1971. 
2. Ibid, p. 72. 
it, but that this order is of such a character that man can trust 
himself and his destiny to it,.l 
Along with the argument from ordering are those from play, 
hope, damnation and humour which together provide the basis for an 
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inductive faith which fully appreciates the historical and sociological 
issues of relativity yet which seeks to do full justice to the human 
nature of man as it appears to the phenomenological analyst. Berger is 
t 
careful in his suggestions for theological study being well aware of 
the fundamental difference between sociological and theological frames 
of reference. While he asserts the importance of 'what appears as a 
human projection' in the former kind of study, as exemplified in 
The Social Reality of Religion , he wants theologians to recognise 
the fact that the same phenomena may also be identified 'as a reflection 
of divine realities. The logic of the first perspective does not preclude 
the possibility of the latter', and this explains the rationale behind his 
writing A Rumour of Angels, which is to encourage theologians to utilize 
the perspective of the sociology of knowledge within their theological 
exercises. This intention reasserts the importance of the projection model 
of analysis in religious studies but goes further in suggesting a relation 
between human projections and 'reality as such'. His suggestion is that 
'what is projected is itself a reflection, an imitation of ultimate 
reality. Religion, then, is not only (from the point of view of empirical 
reason) a projection of the human order, but ( from the view of what might 
2 be called inductive faith) the ultimately true vindication of human order'. 
, 
Such an assertion is not, of course, necessarily true and involves an 
1. Ibid, p.75. 
2. Idem. 
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a priori assumption about the nature of reality. This differs markedly 
from position of Schutz yet it offers a distinctive method of study and 
one which has already been taken up by John Bowker in his Wilde Lectures. 
What this suggestion does imply, however, is that the objective 
existence of certain phenomena be taken into account when discussing the 
process of projection. This itself involves a change in the way 
projection is understood and introduces another theoretical perspective 
t 
which, in its turn, leads to the establishment of a distinctive model 
which could be called the cybernetic or communication theory model. 
Reference to this model will be made throughout the following chapters 
before a final assessment is made of it in the concluding chapter. 
Mention of it here has been necessary in order to justify the more 
philosophical stance adopted in some of the cases studies later. The 
basic issue in this model is that there exist systems of various kinds 
which interact with each other, constraining each other and causing 
responses which might not otherwise have occurred. Human systems of 
religion are thus seen as resulting from an interrelation between 
man's endeavour to achieve meaning and those phenomena which demand 
explanation or which frustrate the processes of meaning construction. 
It is in this context that Bowker criticizes Berger's use of 
the notion of legitimation in his sociology of knowledge, for while 
the latter argues that the process of meaning construction involves 
a dialectical relation between individual and the world, he over-
stresses that part of the relation which he describes as man pourlng 
out meaning into the world, and underestimates the fact that external 
stimuli might actually be causing man to react in a particular kind 
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of way. Bowker's central point is that there are 'cues of meaning' 
provided for man by the world and which enable him to make sense of 
.t 1 1 • In many respects both hold very similar positions and differ 
more on where they place the emphasis than on matters of substance. 
This is clear from the key expressions they use to focus their 
arguments, for while Berger's signals of transcendence indicate the 
human source of meaning construction, Bowker's cues of meaning assert 
the importance of extra-human factors feeding intp the human processes 
of nanization. 
The theoretical questions involved in the interrelation of 
meaning systems will be discussed in detail only in the concluding 
chapter. First we must take up the more pragmatic aspects of man and 
society and their mutual relation with nature, inasmuch as such processes 
of interaction relate to religious phenomena. What has, so far, been 
established is the significance of the paradigm of meaning in its 
various forms as a potential unifying perspective in religious studies, 
following the fragmented state of the field after the demise of 
evolutionary theories in the human sciences. The relevance of the notion 
of meaning has also been seen by Robert Bellah and Zwi Werblowsky to 
mention only two scholars who might be said to represent the sociological 
and more explicitly history of religions traditons respectively.2 The 
objective of this thesis is to show how the paradigm of meaning can be 
applied to a wide variety of religious phenomena, and in particular to 
show how the sociology of knowledge can be utilized in discussing the 
central issues of evil and salvation by means of what might be called 
plausibility theory. 
1. 
2. 
Bowker, J. 
Bellah, R. N. 
1973:45. 
1970: 9. 
Werblowsky ,R. J. Z. 1976:108. 
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Chapter Two Plausibility TheorY and the Problem of Evil 
In the light of what has already been said about the 
phenomenology of the everyday life-world we can easily understand 
Berger and Luckmann's assertion that a 'plausibility structure is 
the social base for the particular suspension of doubt without which 
the de£inition of reality in question cannot be maintained in 
. , I 
conSClousness. Furthermore this quotation provides a useful 
I 
definition of plausibility theory inasmuch as it refers to three 
major phenomenological ideas which require further comment and which 
together imply a fourth notion, that of evil, which is taken as the 
central theme of this chapter. 
In the definition of plausibility the first significant point 
is raised by the phrase 'social base'. Its precise importance for the 
present argument lies in the fact that both cognitive and affective 
factors are fundamental constituents or aspects of social institutions 
whether economic, political, religious, or pertaining to kinship or 
even to leisure. Plausibility theory, when applied to religious 
phenomena, does not only concern itself with doctrinal schemes or 
philosophical systems of abstract forms, but also pays due regard to 
the emotional elements entering into religious conceptions and to the 
manner in which people hold to and maintain their beliefs. The fact 
that western scholarship tends to eliminate affective aspects of life 
in its use of the notion of reason is to be regretted, as Tillich and 
others have remarked. So the importance of affective aspects of social 
1. Berger, P.L. and Thomas Luckmann, 1967:175. 
bases will be presumed and incorporated into the following studies 
of religious groups. 
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The phrase 'suspension of doubt' indicates the second 
phenomenologically important notion, that of the natural epoche in 
which most men live most of the time. The entire process of 
socialization is conducive to this state: yet, as will be shown 
below, this condition is not beyond question for it involves a 
certain fragility which is also to be interpreted in terms of the 
notion of evil. The suspension of doubt is possible, however, because 
of the power exerted by processes of legitimation which, in terms of 
the third phrase, provide a 'definition of reality' for people. 
Despite the fact that within a social group people find it possible 
to suspend doubt in the light of given interpretations of reality there 
are moments when crises of the given plausibility take place. 
The precise way in which the relation between plausibility 
structures and processes which militate against them is discussed is 
instructi ve with respect to the status given by a writer to both 
phenomena. Berger tends to reify what he calls 'intrusions of the 
anomic phenomena of suffering, evil and above all of death' and the 
'forces of chaos' which 'threaten' humanly constructed worlds of 
meaning. 1 Perhaps such reification is inevitable when discussing a 
phenomenon which is so inextricably part of the human, and thereby 
personal, awareness of the world. In any case, Berger establishes 
'the problem of theodicy' as a central aspect of the maintenance of 
religious plausibility, being careful to say that his specific 
1. Berger, P. L. 1969:61. 
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meaning varies from that adopted and customary in theology. For him 
theodicy focuses upon the human task of legitimation rather than 
upon any questioning of the purpose of an almighty and beneficent 
deity in the light of evil occurrences. It sometimes appears that 
Berger espouses and voices a form of existentialism which sees the 
world as essentially fragile and tending more to dissolution than to 
a robust perpetuation. 'The worlds that man constructs are forever 
threatened by the forces of chaos, finally by t h ~ ~ inevitable fact 
1 
of death.' 
A much less personified conception of negative features in 
religious structures is offered by John Bowker in his Wilde Lectures. 
These argue in some depth a theory of religion which, while similar 
to Berger's t' is by no means identical. Religions are taken to be 
'route finding activities, as homeostatic and conservative life-ways, 
through which as a whole human lives are made significant, and in 
which the meaning of their lives and of the universe is able to be 
discerned.' 2 The similarity to Berger's position and the significance 
of Bowker's thesis for the present argument lies in the emphasis upon 
that 'meaning' and 'significance' which religions are said to confer. 
Yet Bowker's perspective is more powerful than Berger's because it is 
essentially more analytical and operates at a higher level of theoretical 
abstraction. While the importance of this will be taken up at the end 
of this study it must be mentioned here that Bowker is asserting that 
religions are one kind of communication system set amidst other systems. 
In other words he does not follow Berger in accentuating the autonomy of 
1. Ibid, p.87. 
2. Bowker, J. 1973:82. 
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human thought in processes of meaning construction. While man does 
impose significance upon external reality, as Berger powerfully 
argues in his notion of exteriorization, there are also sources 
external to man which influence his conceptions. Now Berger does 
admit the fact that external phenomena exert an influence on man and 
he handles the fact by means of the socialization processes of 
internalization ; but, and this is where the two scholars differ, the 
external influences were themselves creations of society. For Berger 
it is external social reality which exists in dialectical relation with 
succeeding generations; for Bowker there are important external 
influences which are not of social or human origin. One caveat might, 
perhaps, be introduced into this criticism of Berger inasmuch as 
society may itself be conceived of as a natural phenomenon as it was 
by the Durkheimian tradition in French sociology. Even allowing for 
this there remains a basic difference of approach, and in the following 
chapt,ers the outlook of Bowker is regarded as at least a possibility. 
One issue which is not directly stated in Bowker's quotation on 
religions as route finding activities but which is important for his 
argument as a whole, and which demonstrates the closeness of his thought 
to that of Berger, is the question of negative factors in experience. 
Berger's notion of theodicy is represented in Bowker through the notion 
of 'compound of limitation' and denotes those factors which hinder 
legitimation processes. The emphasis in Bowker is upon the positive 
aspect of meaning construction, on the fact that human society tends 
more in the direction of a firm cosmos than it does towards chaos. 
One reason for this lies in his belief that what he calls 'cues of 
meaning' are not all socially derived, as they are with Berger. Religions 
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are rather like evolutionary systems which have survived because they 
have discovered or developed patterns of behaviour which facilitate 
life which is, itself, associated with many problems and hazards. 
Religions are thus routes through the difficulties but they are 
supported in their work by factors emerging from the external world 
which is at the same time the very source of difficulty, or as Bowker 
expresses it, 'there are enough cues in the universe to support the 
plausibility of an eventual way through,.l The world is thus not as 
fragile and tenuous a structure as Berger makes it out to be. The 
problem which has been identified in this brief comment on two scholars 
will recur throughout the following chapters and will also be discussed 
in terms appropriate to academic traditions of others whose work has 
yet to be reviewed. For the moment this problem of evil needs to be 
further described in terms of the phenomenological concept-s already 
introduced and which relate to the basic model of meaning. 
The maintenance of a plausible world view may be seen to depend 
on two different kinds of mental perspectives. The first is that of the 
natural epoche which involves the suspension of doubt about the given 
lelJ,i timating structures provided by both society and universe, and here 
we may combine the position of Berger and Bowker and thereby include 
both realities. So much we have already considered and may now describe 
as a naive structure of consciousness which may be differentiated for the 
purpose of the present argument from the second perspective, that of a 
fully conscious and directed state of mind which is Ci',.!i1re of the particular 
problems posed by the world. The difference between these states is one 
1. Ibid, p. 78. 
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of explicitness and of the level of articulation of the perception of 
negativities found in particular groups. The significant phenomenolog-
ical point is that there emerge conditions in which the normal suspension 
of doubt becomes impossible. Those circumstances which lead to questions 
of theodicy are precisely those in which doubt c ~ l n o t t be suspended. We 
may then say that the problem of evil, phenomenologically speaking, is 
a question of identifying those areas or aspects of life which call 
the natural epoche itself into question. 
The following studies of particular religious movements will 
exemplify the kinds of factors which serve such negative functions, 
what is true for them all is that man operates rather differently 
under what might be called routine challenges to epoche on the one 
hand and under critical challenges on the other. The first kind is 
met with the naive, non-directed style of epoche, while the second 
involves a far more specific and explicit kind of legitimation. These 
differences are of degree rather than of kind so that the basic processes 
operating in the everyday life-world are also observable, albeit at a 
more intense level of operation, In periods of crisis. Berger argues 
in this kind of a way for a view of theodicy proper as but an 
.b 1 application of a general human attrl ute. 
So it is that meaning assertion as the characteristic activity 
of man is no neutral activity but takes place in a context of perceived 
implausibility. It is this perception of implausibility or of what 
might be called an inadequacy of meaning in the world that constitutes 
the starting point, logically at least, for the study of specific 
1. Berger, P.L. 1969:63. 
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religious movements. The advantage of adopting a paradigm of meanlng 
in respect of implausibility lies in the fact that if such a paradigm 
is set within the context of a communication-type theory, then the 
issue of whether the sense of evil precedes the salvation response or 
merely results from the message of salvation is made redundant. Such 
a cause and effect rationale is replaced by the notion of interrelated 
systems involving mutual changes and no immediate given priority either 
to the anomic or to the legitimation processes. Phenomenologically 
speaking this means that the notion of salvation, like that of evil, 1S 
grounded in human perception of the particular context of life in which 
a person finds himself. Both contexts and perceptions of life change 
and as they do so the relative significance and meaning of salvation 
and evil alter in relation the one to the other. If this is the case 
then it is possible to suggest a working definition of salvation which 
focuses more upon the mechanics of plausibility processes than upon 
any specific doctrinal schemes of belief in gods or the like. 
Salvation as Plausibility 
I have already argued elsewhere that it is desirable to adopt 
a working definition of salvation in religious studies which is not 
the direct product of anyone religious tradition, and that the 
sociology of knowledge is precisely the kind of theoretical source 
which can help rid overly theological descriptions of their religion-
specific significance. So, in the light of what has been said about 
plausibility theory a definition of salvation as a theoretical construct 
may be suggested as the basis for subsequent analyses of widely 
differing religious movements. The benefit to be gained from an 
43 
essentially non-theological definition of salvation lies not only 
in the fact that if the religious sense of one tradition Here adopted 
then the argument would tend towards a dogmatic perspective, but that 
if a fundamentally different notion is assumed at the outset then very 
many theological and religious phenomena may be illuminated by the 
critical view brought to bear upon them 'from the outside'. What this 
implies is that the dominant outlook of this study is more that of the 
historian and phenomenologist of religion than of the theologian as 
such. This point needs to be made clear if only to prevent a confusion 
of aims and to avoid misdirected criticism. W e r b l o w s k ~ ~ has argued 
.I 
the necessity of making clear whether a study of religious phenomena 
is carried out from the position of religious commitment or from 
that of academic detachment from a particular dogmatism. This study 
does not espouse a confessional basis which is why its central criteria 
have been drawn from the social sciences. l 
Accordingly we may say in general terms that salvation is a 
state of cognitive and affective well-being within the currently 
ava.ilable system of world interpretation'. More formally we might 
say that 'salvation is that state of sufficiency of plausibility 
existing for an individual or group, under given ideological and 
2 
social structural conditions, such that no alternative is sought'. 
One important implication of the phrase 'given .•. conditions' , as far 
as the whole argument of this study is concerned, is that it permits 
a religion to be understood as one system amongst other systems, in 
other words it admits the importance of arguments from general systems 
1. 
2. 
Werblowsky, R.J. Zwi. 1976 
Davies, D.J. 1978:91. Cf. P.L. Berger 1977:216. 
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theory which will be discussed at length later. What must also be 
emphasized is that such given conditions always involve the negative 
aspects of reality which, as has already been shown, are identified 
by Bowker as those compounds of limitation through which religions 
establish themselves as route finding activities. These compounds 
of limitation along with Berger's notion of anomic intrusions 
constitute a phenomenological category of structures of implausibility. 
This will serve to express in terms of a simple pAradigm of meaning 
the various ideas of evil held by scholars in different disciplines. 
This means that the term evil, like salvation, can be used in a way 
which s t r ~ s s e s s no specific theological meaning belonging to any 
particular religious tradition, but as a phenomenologically descriptive 
category indicating that which contradicts plausibility in any given 
context. While most perceptions of implausibility are related to and 
contained within major religious traditions, so that salvation systems 
might ~ e e said to contextualize evil, there will be occasions when the 
sense of implausibility leads to a fundamentally different kind of 
response and explanation. There are, then, periods in the history of 
religions when plausibility is no longer durable enough to withstand 
the forces of negative questions. Such 'questions' can be of a strictly 
philosophical or scientific kind, as was the case of Darwinian evolution 
in the nineteenth century or Durkheimian sociology in the twentieth, or 
they may result from life experiences and periods of social or 
autobiographical change as will be shown in the cases of Mormonism and 
Sikhism. It is precisely because religions are themselves systems of 
meaning construction set within ever changing social contexts that 
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religious doctrines and rites must be viewed not as static phenomena 
but as dynamic interpretations of and responses to the external 
environment. It is just such a perspective that a general systems theory 
approach can justify at the theoretical level. A fundamental 
presupposition of this view is that analyses of religious phenomena 
ought not to engage in simplistic reductionist arguments with a strict 
cause and effect mechanism seen as underlying religious 'responses to 
social pressures' and the like; but ought to be considered as creative 
systems in relation with, responding to, but also causing other systems 
to respond to it. Religious systems are thus taken to be self-regulating 
in respect of certain goals which vary from group to group, and as 
influencing other institutions in the society concerned. To be self-
regulating is not, however, to be autonomous inasmuch as once a 
general systems theory approach is adopted the only sensible way of 
talking about religions is that of one system amongst others. It 1S 
only because one system coexists with others that it may be said to 
possess any basis for its own continued existence. Sociological 
deprivation theories of religion, for example, tend to elevate one 
principle of explanation above any others, and the available data are 
then interpreted by means of that single perspective. Once a religious 
movement is subordinated to other social processes as far as explanation 
is concerned it becomes easy to overlook the influence of that movement 
on other institutions. As will be shown below,the methodological 
predilection of historians of religion to evaluate religious phenomena 
in terms appropriate to them can be seen to be in accord with the 
general systems theory approach, and also resembles the method adopted 
by phenomenologists which has already been discussed. 
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These general comments lead to the question of what factors 
do enter into the perception of evil and of salvation. Berger and 
Bowker provide a useful starting point in answering this question 
and serve to show how academic and philosophical presuppositions 
cannot be ignored when evaluating scholarly contributions to religious 
studies. Bowker, for example, in his desire to emphasize the external 
origin of cues of meaning fails to appreciate fully the fact that the 
need for meaning, which underlies the process in which man utilizes 
external cues in constructing meaning systems, lies in man and that it 
is the very mental process of man which results in plausible frameworks. 
Berger, by contrast, follows Durkheimian orthodoxy in understanding 
man's category construction and religious conceptualizations as 
originating in social experience. The most interesting theoretical 
difference between these two authors lies in their respective attitudes 
to the stability and instability of man's worlds of meaning.Bowker's 
p o s i t ~ o n n follows that of a general systems approach and presumes order 
rather than chaos, while Berger reflects more of an existentialist 
belief in the tenous nature of life and uses sociological arguments 
to show how chaos is avoided. It is hard to say to what extent Bowker's 
position may be influenced by belief in God, what is certain is that he 
wishes to include the reality of God as one system interacting with all 
others. It is, perhaps, instructive to see that Bowker stresses 
implausibility not in the structures of general life activities but 
specifically within religious boundaries by recognizing that 'crises 
of plausibility ... occur far more frequently ... within theistic 
traditions themselves than being imposed from outside,.l Here he is not 
1. Bowker, J. 1973:84. 
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being sufficiently analytical and instead of considering the wider 
contexts of social institutions he chooses to focus on the kind of 
intellectual questioning which, while it does arise in some movements, 
need not affect the majority of members. He 1S advancing the notion of 
plausibility-implausibility in terms of the Christian theological 
perspective of the relation between faith and doubt. That doubt is 
related to faith is true in many types of Protestant theology, especially 
those involving an existentialist perspective; but to extend the idea 
to make it of universal application is hazardous. 'This doubt about 
the plausibility of projected ways', which Bowker says, 'is possible 
at any time, even in so called ages of faith', is a different concept 
from the phenomenologically defined notion of evil used in this study.l 
In constructing a phenomenologically descriptive system of religions 
it would be true to say, with Bowker, that the kind of perceived 
implausibility found in a group will be directly related to the process 
a d o p t ~ d d to overcome it, but it would be untrue to say that evil itself,or 
the compounds of limitation themselves, are necessarily part of the 
transcending process. 
Christianity can provide an illustration of this contention 
inasmuch as the Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Science and Mormon 
movements do not admit the element of doubt to their notion of faith. 
Some qualification could, inevitably, be made of this assertion since 
certain groups of Mormon intellectuals, for example, are prepared to 
acknowledge the role of doubt and uncertainty in their attitude to 
certain "doctrines, but this type of questioning is seldom found among 
the mass membership. While this kind of intellectualism can be maintained 
1. Ibid, p.72. 
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among small groups who continue to act as ordinary believers it 
is far removed from the normative stance of the majority for whom 
doubt is antithetical to faith. The very fact of conversion in sect 
groups emphasizes the difference In that converts are those who have 
been in a state of confusion and doubt prior to their membership and 
who have now passed into a new life of certainty characterized by the 
sectarian affirmation which does not merely say 'I beleive', but 
'I know'. The universe of meaning which is constituted by sectarian 
institutions is one of complete and completed significance. It owes 
its very existence to the fact that available systems of world 
interpretation are found by some to be insufficient in terms of the 
explanation of life as well as motivation for living. So it lS that 
the notion of doubt as belonging to the structures of faith has 
tended to emerge in traditions which stress intellectualism and 
undervalue emotional factors, as in Anglicanism and some types of 
Reformed Protestantism. But this is certainly not a universal 
feature of religiosity and while the theoretical possibility of a 
co-existing faith and doubt structure must be entertained, the 
general location of doubt as a manifestation of implausibility ought 
to be in the world outside the religious plausibility system. In one 
sense there is but little point in making this criticism too strongly 
since the important factor is the recognition of negative features 
in religious concerns and this Bowker has done well. The real basis 
of the criticism lies in an attempt to reinforce the point that no one 
religious idea should be used as the basis for academic categories 
employed in religious s t u d i e s ~ ~ as has already been argued for the terms 
salvation and evil. 
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Having already commented on what both these terms can mean 
. 
In a phenomenological sense it will now be useful to introduce an 
hypothesis which will facilitate the following discussion of 
religious phenomena and which deals with the notion of the durability 
of plausibility. To do this we must refer to the work of Claude Levi-
Strauss in structuralist anthrOpology and to his suggestion that 
'in any society communication operates on three different levels: 
communication of women, of goods and services, and of messages,.l 
These different forms of communication are all of different orders 
of reality and may be said to vary in their level of symbolic expression. 
For example, in kinship, that which is exchanged and those performing it 
are the same for men exchange women but both are human beings. In the 
case of language, by contrast, the words used are of a high level of 
symbolic association bearing little resemblance at the material level 
to the things they represent. Moreover the actual time taken to 
perform a communication event varies from a rapid exchange in the case 
of words to the passing of entire generations in the case of kinship. 
If this notion of communication is used in conjunction with Berger 
and Luckmann's analysis of socialization, which stresses both the 
linguistic and non-verbal aspects of human life, then the suggestion 
may be made that what might be called the speed of communication and 
the durability of plausibility are inversely related so that the faster 
the communication event the less durable ' will be the plausibility 
conferred. The higher the speed the more abstract the message conveyed 
and the less likely it is that the message will result in bringing about 
an emotional response on the part of the receiver. This hypothesis has 
obvious significance for a paradigm of meaning concerned with religious 
1. Levi -Strauss ,:.. c. 1963:296. 
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phenomena; for it provides a broad theoretical perspective for 
describing ritual, symbolism and myth. To use the verb 'describe' 
in this context might be thought odd inasmuch as the application of 
this notion of durability suggests a measure of explanation as well 
as mere description. This is indeed so and the communication model 
underlying the notion of durability does possess explanatory power 
while also facilitating phenomenological description. 
One particularly important aspect of the idea of speed of 
communication lies in the fact that it may seem to emphasize the fact 
that the notion of meaning applies as much to the affective dimensions 
as to the cognitive processes of human life. This hypothesis can thus 
be expressed in terms which assert that the higher the speed of 
communication and the less emotional is the affective component then 
the more dependent upon 'reason' does the communication event become. 
More than this, it may be said that whenever the intellectual element 
comes 'to predominate to an inordinate extent then the plausibility 
conferring power of the communication is reduced. This is not to say 
that philosophical arguments are devoid of non-rational or emotional 
roots, for the motif of all metaphysics is an emotional motivation, but 
it does argue that the power of ideas is likely to be maintained only 
if there is a group or community committed to them. In the following 
chapters the plausibility model will be drawn upon to show how the 
phenomenon of evil and the ways of dealing with it have been conceived, 
while the notion of speed of communication and of the durability of 
plausibility will be shown to constitute one facet of the general 
. 1 paradigm of meanlng. 
1. Davies, D.J. 1978:97. 
The Perception of Evil 
In coming to emphasize the centrality of the perception of 
evil for religious studies one is identifying an area in which 
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theological, philosophical, and phenomenological interests converge. 
In one sense this fact illustrates what has already been argued with 
respect to the paradigm of meaning, for the very fact that negative 
features of existence are established as problems In these various 
disciplines attests to the power of the desire for meaning which is 
thwarted by these very phenomena. As already argued above, the mutual 
relation of meaning and non-meaning ought not to be ignored and, what 
lS more, both aspects require to be taken together as constituting 
the paradigm of meaning at the pragmatic level of religious phenomena. 
To argue either the priority of meaning over non-meaning as Berger 
does, or of negative factors of positive ones as I have done elsewhere 
. h··d d 1 lS somew at mlsgul e . Bowker adopts a more theoretically satisfying 
view in which negative factors - his compounds of limitation- coexist 
with and in relation to the positive aspect of religion as a route 
finding activity. It is precisely because of this close interaction that 
ideas of evil and of salvation change so specifically in terms of each 
other. Both Mormon and Sikh religions provide apt illustration of this 
fact as we show below. 
For the present a more abstract point must be made, namely, that 
differences in ideas of evil and salvation may often be seen to express 
the degree of externalization or internalization present in a group. Both 
the way of conceiving evil and the methods adopted for its resolution 
1. Ibid, p.92. 
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vary according to the degree of personification and abstraction engaged 
in with respect to negative features. It is not possible to construct 
any simple continuum with a clearly personified and externalized source 
of evil at one end and a highly subjective and internalized source at 
the other, and then to apply to apply it to eastern and western forms of 
religion. While this is the case it remains true that eastern forms of 
religiosity often do stress the subjective consciousness aspect while 
western forms of Christianity assert the external/ontological status of 
evil. But since there are so many qualifications which would have to 
be made of such generalizations they must be left simply at the level 
of helpful label- categorizing trends rather than rules. 
One western philosophical study which clearly demonstrated the 
complexity of these issues is provided by Paul Ricoeur whose philosophie 
de la v o l o n t ~ ~ shows how far the internalization of the notion of evil 
can be taken in a western work. His.·second volume of Finitude et 
C u l p a b i l i t ~ ~ entitled La Symbolique du mal is particularly useful ln 
the present context showing as it does the variety present in man's 
awareness of evil, as well as illustrating the contribution made by 
this existentialist philosopher who, as John Rogerson suggests, shows 
similarities with the phenomenologists. l 
Ricoeur argues that the three notions of defilement, of sin, and 
of guilt (souillure, peche, c u l p a b i l i t ~ ) , , have emerged, the one from 
the other, in a kind of historical development which demonstrates an 
increasing internalization of negative self-evaluation. The religious 
sense, which of all kinds of awareness is the one most particularly 
involved in this act of self-judgement, operates in many spheres of life 
1. Rogerson, J.W. 1974:128. 
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and especially in confession to bring man to an acknowledgement of 
his true plight: 'cet aveu est une parole qui l'homme prononce sur 
1 . A 1 til-meme'. As a later discussion of Aboriginal religion will show 
it is quite possible for a people to possess such a megative self-
evaluation without having to express it in terms of sin or of a status 
which presumes the existence of a god. Though Ricoeur's analysis _ 
naturally enough - reflects a particular western theological outlook 
which has its own limitations, yet the descriptioh of life which is 
provides there offers a scheme which can be matched in form if not in 
actual content by data from non-christian cultures. 2 The question 
of myth occupies much more of Ricoeur's argument than might be expected 
in the work of a philosopher for he sees myths as among the most 
1. Ricoeur, P. 1960, Vol. ii, p.ll. In his volume L'homme 
faillible Ricoeur expresses this enigma of existence by saying 
that in the world of myth man's world is represented to him as 
already fragmented, while man himself is often characterized as 
being in a state of internal division of the self. 'Ce 
caractere global - le concept de faillibilite - consiste dans 
une certaine non-coincidence de l'homme avec l u i - m ~ m e ' ' ,Vol.i,p.2l. 
It could well be added that what moves Ricoeur to take this view 
is his own sense of dividedness as simul iustus et peccator. 
However, the origin of Ricoeur's position is not what concerns 
us at the moment. 
2. Cf. Ibid, p.155. 'Plus fondamentalement encore le my the veut 
atteindre l'enigme de l'existence humaine a savoir la discordance 
entre la ~ a l i t e e fondamentale - etat d'innocence, statut de 
;' "'. .;' d' creature, etre essentlal - et la modallte actuelle e 1 homme, 
en tant que s o u i l l ~ , , pecheur, coupable'. 
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fundamental modes of expression capable of dealing with the enigmatic 
nature of human experience. J.W. Rogerson has aptly characterized myths 
as functioning as symbols in Ricoeur's work, in the sense that while 
they refer to certain ideas they cannot be fully interpreted in terms 
of those ideas in any purely intellectual way.l This point can be 
clarified by recalling Levi-Strauss's argument that myths can be 
translated without serious loss of meaning. 2 To use the words 
'interpret' and 'translate' indicates the centrality of myths in 
the question of meaning and also pinpoints the necessity of firmly 
establishing the status of myths as units of communication. Both 
Ricoeur and Levi-Strauss regard myths as conveying a kind of knowledge 
which cannot be gained in any other way: and the same could be 
said of E ~ i a d e e in the history of religions and of Stanner in anthropology. 
So while a myth may be translated into the language of another culture 
and stillelicit an appropriate response, it cannot be interpreted by 
non-mythical intellectual means and still function as myth. 
This brief comment on myth shows the significance of the 
paradigm of meaning for this area of religious studies. In discovering 
the meaning of myths as they are found among religious believers and 
where they function as legitimating phenomena, the scholar sees how 
'meaning' possesses more than a simple logical or reasonable significance. 
For Ricoeur as for Levi-Strauss that which is explained is nothing less 
than the human condition, with the former emphasizing the moral 
imperfection of man while the latter underlines the perceived dichotomy 
between nature and culture as man's basic concern. These emphases 
apart,both identify myth as THE area of communication in which man 
1. 
2. 
Rogerson, J.W. 
Levi-Strauss, c. 
1974:135. 
1963:206 ff. 
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attempts to solve the most basic problems of his perceived reality. 
What is more the resolution of these difficulties need not, and usually 
does not, take the form of any fully rational explanation of things. 
A rather similar point is made by the historian J.B. Russell in his 
analysis of 'the perception of evil', where his major concern is with 
the idea of 'understanding' the work of the devil. Russell 1S less 
bothered by the idea of evil in itself than by the experience of evil 
encountered by human beings. The notion of understanding evil thus 
relates to the way in which evil experiences are 'assimilated and 
integrated' into a person's life such that he knows how to cope with 
. 
the problem, rather than to any fully logical mode of explaining the 
nature and source of the problem. Russell's study is an instructive 
contribution to the descriptive phenomenology of evil because it 
stresses the personal focus of the phenomenon evil is 'sensed as 
hurt deliberately inflicted, it is perceived as personified and is 
1 
never abstract'. What is more, and here his argument supports the 
burden of this study, 'the perception of a flawed world is as 
widespread as any that can be ascribed to mankind' .2 
To talk about how evil is coped with is to become involved in 
the question of the appropriateness of forms of understanding to specific 
types of problem, a question that has received much attention 1n the 
longstanding anthropological debate over primitive mentality. From the 
nineteenth century issue of whether a pre-logical mentality existed 
in primitive tribes which differed significantly from the logical 
inclination of Victorian intellectuals to the twentieth century interest 
in rationality anthropological opinions have varied greatly as I have 
3 
shown elsewhere. One question which may be usefully extricated from 
1. 
2. 
~ ~
Russell, J.B. 
Ibid, p. 21. 
Devies, D.J. 
1977:11. 
1975. 
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this rather intractible debate is whether the central emphasis ought 
to be placed less upon the notion of kinds of mentality than on styles 
of thought, frames of mind, or in more phenomenological terms upon 
tensions of consciousness: those mental sets that are adopted for and 
are appropriate to specific kinds of task. If we do this it becomes 
easier to talk of the fact that, for example, primitive peoples are 
as markedly pragmatic in certain aspects of their life as some western 
urban folk are devotionally mystical. Mythopreic' thought can then be 
viewed as a universal mode of mental operation in the same way as is 
pragmatic thought, or any other outlook which is determined by the object 
of perception and the goal of discourse. The oft repeated problem of 
the primitive mentality debate lay in the fact that religious endeavours 
of tribal peoples were compared with the scientific activities of 
western men. Once a correction is made for this inappropriate comparison 
many of the apparent difficulties are removed. 
Other problems of a more profound nature still remain but are 
beyond the scope of this present study. Not least among these are the 
psychological issues associated with mental processes. For example ,while 
it may be possible to agree with Levi-Strauss that 'the same logical 
processes operate in myth as in science', one ought not not to presume 
1 
that logical processes and tensions of consciousness can be equated. 
Modern studies of meditation alone would provide sufficient evidence to 
suggest that different mental activities are associated with different 
. 2 
modes of neural activity and result in altered states of conSClousness. 
This is not to say that if myth is a sui generis category then it will 
1. Levi-Strauss, C. 1963:230 
2. Benson, H. 1977. 
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always generate a particular experience in the hearers, but since 
that is at least a possibility it suggests the necessity of exploring 
the function of this poenomenon which may be peculiar to itself. 
Levi-Strauss affords a suggestive insight into the nature of myth in 
asserting that 'the intellectual impulse' which produces myth may well 
be exhausted before any true logical resolution of perceived 
t d · t·· . d I con ra lC lon lS attalne. In terms of plausibility theory this could 
be expressed as the participant achieving a level of sufficient 
plausibility apart from exhaustive logical explanation. This level of 
meaning would result as much from affective ritual involvement 
incorporating the myth as from deliberative reasoning. So the rationale 
of the mythic solution may well take one form for the practitioner who 
might even regard the myth as being historically true and affording a 
concrete explanation of things, and another for the analyst who has 
to locate the function of myth alongside its apparent content. It is 
precisely in acknowledgement of the complexity of religious phenomena 
which contribute to a sense of meaning for men that the phenomenology 
and history of religions have been acutely aware of the hazards of 
reductionism in explanation, and it is for this reason that emphasis 
has been placed upon the possibility that myth is a category irreducible 
to another. A similar argument will be advanced later for aspects of 
ritual which contribute to religious meaning for the practitioner. 
In logical if not in chronological terms, then, the mastery of 
evil begins with a categorizing of it within each religious tradition. 
Its paradoxical presence is then approached by means of ritual acts and 
mythical expressions in an attempt to remove or to attenuate it. As far 
1. Levi-Strauss, c. 1963:229. 
58 
as most religions are concerned at the level of popular devotion 
and spirituality philosophical problems of evil are subordinated 
to the task of coping with the very experiences which give rise 
to abstract theorizing over their origin. In practical terms 
this means that perception and categorization of evil are processes 
which are closely associated with those of salvation which counter 
the perceived power of evil. This obvious point has been made by 
. 
many scholars, not least by Sigmund Freud who identified the 
'threefold task' of the gods as exorcizing the terrors of nature, 
reconciling men to the cruelty of fate especially in the form of death, 
and of compensating them for the sufferings and privations imposed by 
. . 1. . 1 Cl Vl lzatlon. 
The wide variety of ways in which religions identify evil 
and set about its resolution makes a theoretical perspective such 
as that of plausibility theory all the more necessary as a means 
. 
of establishing phenomenological order. The definition of salvation 
given above along with the discussion of evil as a flaw in plausibility 
structures will be seen to be advantageous in analysing specific cases 
of African tribal, Mormon, and Sikh religions. To this task we now 
turn before going on to consider further developments in the general 
paradigm of meaning, especially the notion of identity as an aspect 
of meaning. 
1. Freud, S. 1973:14. 
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Chapter Three Evil and Witchcraft 
Reference has already been made in the first chapter to the theoretical 
significance of E.E. Evans-Pritchard's anthropological work as marking and 
effecting a change from functionalism to what might be called a weak form 
of structuralism. This is not the strong form of L ~ v i - S t r a u s s ' s s work, 
which itself marks the foremost French contribution to a paradigm of meaning 
. in the study of man. Though it presupposes a theory of mind and mental 
operations it is more pragmatic in seeking so to analyse social phenomena 
as to allow their inner structure to be fully manifest to the anthropologist. 
'The anthropologist seeks to do more than understand the thought and values 
of a primitive people and translate them into his own culture. He seeks 
also to discover the structural order of the society, the patterns which, 
once established, enable him to see it as a whole, as a set of interrelated 
abstractions,.l In his most influential early work on witchcraft among 
the Azande of the southern Sudan Evans-Pritchard demonstrated how this 
structural order could be identified and communicated to a reader unfamiliar 
with the native context. The wide significance and influence exerted by 
this study can be assessed from the fact that the 1968 meeting of the 
Association of Social Anthropologists was devoted to the theme of witchcraft 
and the ensuing volume dedicated to Evans-Pritchard. In the Editorial of 
that volume Mary Douglas emphasizes the importance of Evans-Pritchard's 
work, commenting significantly that Witchcraft and Oracles among the Azande 
was in effect, a study in the sociology of knowledge. , Because 
anthropologists had tended to read it as some kind of functionalist analysis 
Mary Douglas felt it necessary to 'establish that the study of A ~ a n d e e
1. Evans-Pritchard, E.D. 1962:22. 
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witchcraft was indeed offered as a contribution to the sociology of 
. ,1 perceptlon . Similarly in The Nuer and Nuer Religion his concern 
with issues of social values, experience and mind is obvious and ln 
this his intellectual affinity to Durkheim is marked as he seeks the 
abstract system of thought underlying native culture. Yet he does 
not present any abstract set of models expressing the rationale of 
indigenous thought: 'interpretations are contained in the facts 
themselves, for I have described the facts in such a way that the 
interpretations emerge as part of the description,:2 The 'purposive 
description' presented by Evans-Pritchard is, perhaps, one of the 
most sophisticated social scientific examples of the paradigm of 
meaning to be found in ethnographic literature, for in his description 
of Zande life Evans-Pritchard sets forth the 'how', or the indigenous 
rationale, of life-phenomena but he does so in a way which itself 
presupposes, at an academic level, that the culture as a whole possesses 
a meaning which can be understood by his readers who do not begin with 
. •. 3 Zande presupposltlons. 
So it is that Evans-Pritchard discusses the subject of witchcraft 
as one aspect of the problem of explanation as such, asking why any 
metaphysical system should be accepted. In an interesting way his 
basic question is the opposite form of Berger's interest in the nature 
of social reality: the latter views problematic areas of life as the 
major tensions on plausibility systems while Evans-Pritchard is more 
occupied with the constraints supporting belief in a system of explanation. 
Mary Douglas identifies three elements of the Azande study as having been 
significant for later work and which demonstrate the significance of 
1. 
2. 
Douglas, M. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
3. Ibid, p.4. 
1970:xiv. 
1937:5. 
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witchcraft as a plausibility maintaining process. In terms of this 
thesis these elements also demonstrate the way evil, defined as 
implausibility, can be viewed and dealt with apart from reference to 
transcendent sources of evil. In the first place witchcraft accusations 
'allowed grudges to be brought out into the open and ... provided a 
f 1 f t · . . f ,1 ormu a or ac lon ln mlS ortune . Secondly such accusations were 
clearly associated with areas of life and persons involved in conflict 
and rivalries, while, thirdly, the witch beliefs were directly related 
to the moral code inasmuch as witches were characterized as possessing 
anti-social features of behaviour as of physical appearance. While 
this kind of analysis is open to criticism focusing on functionalism 
of too static a kind it nevertheless shows how witchcraft operates as 
a kind of homeostatic device for social friction. In addition it 
provides an explanatory framework for evil experienced in social 
2 intercourse 'based on the idea of a communication system'. Even when 
other anthropologists such as Marwick, Middleton and Turner developed 
witchcraft studies in directions other than a functionalist-like way 
they, nevertheless, utilized Evans-Pritchard's insight that witchcraft 
was, primarily, 'essentially a means of clarifying and affirming social 
f . .. ,2 de lnltlons . Whether witchcraft processes led to the maintenance of 
social relations or their disruption they served the purpose of fostering 
a system of plausibility. 
As far as the Azande study is concerned witchcraft demonstrates 
clearly that plausibility is a notion relating to both intellectual and 
emotional factors,' and Evans-Pritchard goes to pains to show that the 
emotional and experiential dimension may even predominate inasmuch as 
1. 
2. 
Douglas, M. 
Douglas, M. 
1970:xvii. 
Idem, p.xxv. 
witchcraft is a method of actually coping with a problem in terms of 
action rather than one of elaborate intellectualizing upon a problem. 
'In truth Azande experience feelings about witchcraft rather than 
ideas, for their intellectual concepts of it are weak and they know 
better what to do when attacked by it than how to explain it. Their 
response is action and not analysis. The Zande actualizes these 
beliefs rather than intellectualizes them, their tenets are expressed 
in socially controlled behaviour rather than in doctrines,.l The 
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fact that the Azande do not possess an entirely coherent and systematic 
logic of witchcraft, that they not merely have an uncompleted system in 
western terms of system or rationality, but know and feel it to be 
'peculiar' and one they do not 'profess to understand entirely', in no 
sense appears to reduce the plausibility conferred by the beliefs. 2 
For the rites performed by the Azande appear to them to achieve the 
desired end, whatever is wrong is righted; and since the very 
implausibility exists at the level of experience it is at that same 
level where the resolution occurs. 
The Azande case makes clearly the point that not only will 
postulated solutions vary according to the nature of evil in particular 
groups, but that pragmatic causes are assignificant as intellectual 
ones in some instances. Evans-Pritchard is remarkably clear on the 
way in which Azande attain satisfactory levels of meaning in life, 
telling of how, in his own participant observation, he adopted their 
mode of coping with problems and recisions making. In attempting to 
'think black', or as he corrects himself, to 'feel black', he found it 
an effort to check his 'lapse into unreason' when using magic oracles 
1. 
2. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
Ibid, p.99. 
1937:82-3. 
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in daily life. Yet he urges acceptance of the fact that Azande methods 
possessed an intellectual consistency when viewed in context, and when 
it is appreciated that their coherency is to be evaluated as a product 
of particular cultural contexts. The beliefs in witchcraft, oracles 
and magic relate to one another as 'loose associations of notions' which 
operate 'in bits, not as a whole', with the'plasticity of beliefs' 
resulting from or being the function of situations and not 'indivisible 
'd . 1 1 eatlonal structures'. It is likely to be true that this kind of 
! 
situation obtains for practical religion in all societies even though 
formal theologies advanced by religious specialists tend to ignore the 
fact. As a type case the Azande material would suggest that the notion 
of sufficiency of plausibility might well be applied to ritual as to more 
theoretical means of dealing with life's misfortunes in situations where 
there are no fully systematized and comprehensive schemes of knowledge. 
Witchcraft and oracles are, then, institutions which, according 
to the basic argument of this thesis, pertain to salvation, inasmuch as 
they serve to interpret phenomena of evil to the Azande and go on to 
help validate the nature of reality by means of ritual processes which 
serve to overcome the perceived implausibility of the Zande world. 
What is more, these institutions are in no direct sense associated with 
• . 2 the Zande concept of God, which itself is no single and unlform notlon. 
Witchcraft is a physical characteristic of certain persons and is inherited 
by unilineal descent, the substance causing it can even be located within 
the dead body of a witch at an autopsy.3 This witchcraft or mangu causes 
illness and disease of all kinds with only two exceptions which beset 
infants and which are usually fatal. These infant diseases are vaguely 
1. Ibid, p.540. 
2. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
1962:162 ff. 
1937:22. 
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thought to be permitted by the supreme being but do not result from 
witchcraft. As Evans-Pritchard suggests these babies are scarcely 
social beings and so are hardly susceptible to witchcraft when it is 
interpreted anthropologically as the result of social friction arising 
between established social persons; further than this, as far as the 
Azande are concerned the child has only recently arrived and his soul 
may well soon return whence it has come. For adult persons a different 
rationale is employed which ascribes all misfortune to witchcraft, and 
while it possesses a supernatural mode of operation its source is not 
the supreme being but in man himself. This is a significant point for 
the present study for it indicates that even when a phenomenon is not 
attributed to a diety there may still be a folk explanation which a 
western observer might regard as supernatural, the fact that mangu is 
of human origin yet operates supernaturally shows that much care must 
be taken in applying t h e g e n ~ a l i z e d d ideas of plausibility to concrete 
cases. 
At the folk level of a paradigm of meaning the Azande might be 
said to engage in the maintenance of a pragmatic plausibility, one 
which seeks to rectify life's misfortunes in a practical way as the 
case of death will demonstrate. All Zande deaths must be avenged by 
kinsmen for all death is believed to be the outcome of witchcraft. 
The way in which vengeance is enacted does not, however, cause further 
social strife but leads to a sense of satisfaction on the part of the 
bereaved kinsmen. This is so even though the apparent logic of 
vengeance ritual, which involves the death of the offending witch and 
the questioning of oracles to see whether any recently dead person was 
t5 
that witch, leads to yet another round of magic on the part of the 
newly deceased's kinsmen. A death brings to an end the questioning 
of the first group and satisfies them, for at the pragmatic level the 
issue of death and of man's response to it has met with action deemed 
appropriate and justifying. Evans-Pritchard emphasizes the intellectual 
consistency of Azande at the pragmatic level of thought as well as 
stressing their lack of co-ordination and systematic logicality in 
magic as a whole. 
The case of the Azande affords an interesting example of western 
academic approaches to the question of thought inasmuch as studies of 
their religion have produced integrated systems where none, as far as 
Evans-Pritchard's extensive ethnography is concerned, seems to exist in 
the minds of the people. References to prayers used by Zande to Mbori 
or the supreme being have been organized into theological systems by 
western commentators whereas 'in real life they are never so presented 
but are dissociated phrases evoked in situations of grief, anxiety and 
fear' • In such contexts they possess an 'emotional rather than 
. . f. , 1 conceptual slgnl lcance . Indeed Evans-Pritchard in criticizing over-
schematizations in interpretations of Zande thought expresses the opinion 
that the 'Azande do not have any clear doctrinal opinions, for they 
actualize their beliefs, expressing them in rite and prayer rather than 
2 intellectualizing them in dogma and myth'. The important feature lies 
. . . ,3 in the 'logico-emotional dependencies between rellglous categorles . 
The form of this dependency is what constitutes the system of plausibility 
and the relative balance of logical and emotional factors the sufficiency 
of plausibility for Azande. 
1. 
2. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
3. Ibid, p.197. 
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lack of it, is complemented by the great attention paid to social 
relations and the factors underlying them. Plausibility is generated 
against the social background rather than against a cosmic or even 
divine-satanic scenario. 
By contrast with the Azande the Nuer, another Sudanese tribal 
people, direct their thinking about evil by means of the idea of spirit 
or kwoth. Spirit, unlike mangu, does not originate in man but belongs 
to another order of reality, and it is with respecu to that other order 
that Nuer direct their religious activity. This particular emphasis 
permits mention of a theoretically important idea which Evans-Pritchard 
raises in the concluding section of his Nuer Religion, and which bears 
directly on this thesis. In reflecting on the lack of theoretical 
development in the study of primitive and, one might add, advanced 
religion he suggests that what is necessary is a comparative study of 
what he calls primitive philosophies, of the weltanschauungen which 
include elements which might not normally be regarded as religious. 
As a basis for such comparison he proposed that the 'dominant motif' 
of each culture be identified; but since there are so many potential 
motifs Evans-Pritchard went on to make the significant suggestion that 
'the test of what is the dominant motif is usually, perhaps always, to 
identify that to which a people attribute dangers and sickness and other 
. . . h' 1 misfortunes and what steps they take to avold or ellmlnate t em . 
While this criterion might be thought a particularly appropriate choice 
of topic for Evans-Pritchard to make given the predilections of Azande 
and Nuer thought, it may well have an application of much broader scope 
as Evans-Pritchard hoped and as this thesis hopes to establish for groups 
1. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1956:315. 
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outside the African culture area. 
One area of weakness in religious studies requires some comment 
in the light of this expressed hope, especially as it is one which 
Evans-Pritchard himself saw clearly. It lS the way in which primitive 
religions tend to be treated as different in kind from the so called 
world religions. In criticising the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century intellectualist, emotionalist and projectionist scholars of 
religion Evans-Pritchard expresses regret that they: did not pay attention 
to contemporary forms of the world religions. Had they investigated the 
actual functioning of these religions rather than studying only the texts, 
creeds and formal systems then their relation to primitive religions 
would have been more obviously apparent and s i m i l a r ~ ~ and the primitive 
religions would not have been treated 'as something so unlike the 
religions of civilization that they appeared to require a special kind 
of interpretation and a special vocabulary,.l The evolutionary 
presupposition which directed much of this divorce between kinds of 
religion has already been considered, and it remains to say that in 
subsequent discussions no essential difference is postulated in the 
practical expression of religions. The paradigm of meaning implies 
that religions are engaged in the basic task of plausibility generation 
in the context of perceived evil and that this process can be identified 
despite culturally different expressions of evil and salvation. To 
reinforce this perspective a rather hard test case will be considered 
from the field of African ethnography, one which might almost serve to 
disprove the plausibility generalization. 
1. Evans-Pritchard, .E. Ibid, p.314. 
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The Mbuti pygmies of the Ituri Forest in the Congo do not 
possess any witchcraft beliefs or techniques, neither do they entertain 
any cosmological explanation for misfortune and evil.l This unusual 
combination contradicts S.F. Nadel's compensatory theory of witchcraft 
which argues that witchcraft will be employed as an explanation of evil 
if there is no cosmological or 'scientific' account of it readily 
available. Mary Douglas's comment on the Mbuti ethnography, that 
'people can do without explanations of misfortune. They can live 
in tolerance and amity and without metaphysical curiosity', is quite 
critical for the paradigm of meaning offered in this thesis in terms 
of plausibility theory. Yet this is the very exception which proves 
the rule; for Douglas goes on to say that the apparent precondition 
for this state of affairs is that the Mbuti 'should be free to move 
away from each other whenever strains appear. The price of such a 
benign cosmology is a low level of organization,.2 
In different terms the Mbuti could be described as exhibiting 
a developed form of pragmatic plausibility which shows the necessity 
of making explicit reference to affective factors entering into the 
construction of a world of satisfactory meaning. This pragmatism 
operates as much at the level of supernatural beliefs as at that of 
social organization, for as C.M. Turnbull had adequately demonstrated 
in his extensive ethnography of the pygmies they have no elaborate 
conception of any world of gods, and even regard abstractions about a 
future life as without adequate foundation in human experience. Some 
of the systematized accounts of Mbuti theology which have been constructed 
Turnbull regards as more the result of western desires 'to present a 
1. 
2. 
Turnbull, C.M. 
Douglas, M. 
1965. 
1970:xxxiii. 
picture of a system applicable to all Mbuti' than as an accurate 
assessment of the actual state of affairs. l In his criticism of 
Father Schebasta's over systematizations Turnbull resembles Evans-
Pritchard's regrets with respect to similar exercises performed on 
the Nuer and Azande. The Mbuti supernatural pragmatism, if it might 
be so called, is manifested in the fact that the forest itself, which 
is an immediate phenomenon, rather than some abstraction of it, lies 
at the centre of all their thought and action. Just as the Azande 
enact their attitude to misfortune through the rituals of witchcraft 
and oracles so the Mbuti act out their attitude to life and reality 
in their forest nomadism. Some comment on the perception of evil is 
required for the Mbuti since their case appears to be so exceptional. 
Perhaps Turnbull's study of the Mbuti provides one of the best 
examples of a functionalist approach to witchcraft for it not only 
demonstrates how the pygmies who normally live in the forest itself 
have no ,witchcraft ritual, as already mentioned but goes on to show 
that the tribal villagers, with whom the Mbuti engage in economic 
~ ~
exchange, do practise both witchcraft and sorcery, which serve to 
dispel the social frictions and conflicts engendered by village life. 
Witchcraft here is 'a concept employed usefully to bring to light 
hidden sources of dispute and to publically shame troublemakers,.2 
In the social life of the village, as symbolized and expressed in 
witchcraft, the Mbuti encounter that which is 'totally outside their 
forest-world experience, conscious malevolence'. 2 This is not to 
life of pygmy hordes . always calm and illustrative of say that the 1S 
that lack of noise which they regard as the best way to live In , and 
1. Ibid, p.245. 
2. Turnbull, C.M. Ibid, p.59. 
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without disturbing, the great forest itself. Friction does take 
place but the social response to it lies in the intentional division 
of the group with the offending parties withdrawing to different parts 
of the forest. This response to what must be regarded as a perception 
of evil as social conflict is an example of the Mbuti pragmatic outlook, 
and is possible because, as Mary Douglas rightly says, they possess a 
low level of social organization. This response is not open to the 
villagers ln the same way, for they live under the restraints of having 
to build houses in jungle clearings which cannot be abandoned just because 
trouble arises among neighbours. 
The normal absence of crisis among the Mbuti results from their 
expertise as forest livers in an environment which is essentially 
benevolent, and which makes the basic nature of life appear to be good. 
T h e ~ k n o w w how to cope with practically all problems they encounter, and 
illness in particular is something they know how to treat though the 
basic healthiness of their environment makes this less of a problem 
than it might be. Turnbull goes so far as to say that there is not a 
'solitary instance to show the belief in a malevolent power against which 
protection must be sought': there is, rather, an intimacy of relationship 
between the individual Mbuti and the forest which is his father and mother, 
the source of his life and all his good. The one obvious exception is, 
inevitably, death itself. Yet unlike the Azande and the jungle villagers 
the Mbuti do not regard death as caused by the evil intention of one of 
their number. Witchcraft accusations never follow death, it being 
accepted as p e r f e c ~ l y y natural and in accord with the processes which are 
forever at work in the forest. There is, nonetheless, the feeling that 
death is 'the one really imperfect thing in life', and death rites 
as with those of mourning, serve to restore the normality of life as 
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. kl . 1 qU1C Y as poss1ble. The Mbuti would thus appear to present a case 
in which evil as such, or where perceived implausibility, is not a 
significant concern as far as the entire scheme of life is concerned. 
What they do present, however, is the desire to maintain that level 
of plausibility which forest life makes possible and which is 
interestingly expressed in the ideas of sound and noise. 
Noise, especially loud noise, 1S said to be disturbing to the 
forest as such. This is as true of natural noises as of noises made 
by quarrels, and as far as the Mbuti are concerned one might just as 
easily express the notion of social friction as social noise as in any 
other way. It 1S better, they say, to disperse than to have such noise 
ln the forest. Quiet, by contrast, is good and pleasing to the forest, 
its social expression through sound is in song. Song is, in terms of 
their conceptual classification, a form of quiet inasmuch as both quiet 
and song are 'cool' phenomena whereas noise is 'hot'. As might then 
be expected song rituals occupy a central place in rites of crisis such 
as death, and serve to attract the attention of the forest itself to 
their needs which helps restore the coolness of good order which itself 
is a feature of normal times. From this it can be seen that Mary 
Douglas's assertion that people can do without explanations of misfortune 
is both accurate and misleading; accurate inasmuch as the Mbuti do not 
have elaborate accounts of why disruptions occur, but misleading since 
they do possess ideas of what to do when quarrels occur. It is this 
action framework which characterizes both Mbuti and Azande religiosity, 
1. Ibid, p.147. 
and it might be supposed that similar religious responses obtain much 
more widely. One way of understanding folk religion in any context 
is to regard those abstract theorizings which have been the focus of 
study for scholars of the world religions as less important than 
usually they are assumed to be, and to consider in more depth the 
pragmatic responses taken to various life circumstances. The great 
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divide between primitive religions and the 'village' manifestation of 
the world religions would then assume radically different proportions. 
A postscript to this notion of pragmatic plausibility may be 
provided by drawing from another study of Turnbull, one which offers 
another rather paradoxical test of the paradigm of meaning. In fact 
no greater contrast with the Mbuti could be found than that provided 
by the Ik tribe of Uganda which, because of particularly bad climatic 
conditions, was forced into surviving against the pressures of 
overwhelming hunger. l This later study of Turnbull, which 1S as much 
an a u t o ~ i o g r a p h i c a l l essay on the nature of man as it is an ethnography, 
illustrates the growing irrelevance of religious belief and ritual 
practice under conditions of social disintegration resulting from an 
increasing individualism itself made necessary to obtain food for 
personal survival. Even witchcraft accusations which might have been 
expected to increase in number as social conflicts multiplied came to 
be used more as a form of abuse than as a social corrective. This 
would appear to reinforce the essentially Durkheimian view of religion 
as a social phenomenon concerned both with corporate morality and the 
classification of the world. No morality remained among the Ik, and 
social classifications as expressed in religious forms had virtually 
1. Turnbull, C.M. 1973. 
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been abandoned. It appeared to Turnbull that they had come 'to a 
recognition of what they accept as man's basic selfishness, of his 
natural determination to survive as an individual before all else,.l 
Not only was there no attempt to improve conditions by ritual means, 
for actual physical conditions were acknowledged as having passed all 
bounds of reversal, but the basic categories of good and evil were 
themselves made redundant. In this world of social fragmentation 
all values were reduced to insignificance beside that of possessing 
food for oneself. 
This example demonstrates the necessity of appropriate constraints 
in any society conceived as a communication system and in which processes 
of plausibility generation may operate effectively. The extreme 
environmental conditions made social existence a practical impossibility 
and what is witnessed is human life apart from its normative social 
context. Precisely because of this the social nature of plausibility 
theory is underlined and the general paradigm of meaning established as 
a normal human endeavour. 
Evil and Sin 
With the exception of the Ik ethnography, anthropological and 
phenomenological studies of religion have functioning social groups 
as the object of their analysis, and in them can be discerned systems 
of religious communication involving ideas of evil and methods for its 
resolution. Because this thesis urges that the idea of evil be 
interpreted non-theologically and in terms of plausibility theory some 
further thought must be given to what is implied in this use of terms. 
Some distinction must be drawn between the term evil when used in the 
1. Ibid, p.182. 
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sociological sense of implausibility, and sin when employed theologically 
to refer to a transgressed divine imperative. The necessity of such a 
distinction, one which will facilitate analysis of 'negative' religious 
phenomena, becomes quite apparent in the light of an important 
anthropological contribution to this whole area namely Christoph von 
" Furer-Haimendorf's Henry Myers Lecture delivered at the British Academy 
and entitled 'The Sense of Sin in Cross-Cultural Perspective'. His 
conclusion that 'the concept of sin and with it the sense of sin cannot 
be common to all branches of humanity' would appear to undermine a 
central theme of this thesis, namely that the perception of evil is the 
primary process in religions. l After a clarification of terminology 
this will be seen not to be the case. 
Once the suggested distinction is drawn between evil and Sln it 
" is possible to agree with Furer-Haimendorf that 'many societies lack a 
developed sense of sin and the belief in supernatural sanctions for 
transgressions of the moral code', and to agree with his further 
assertion to which he wishes to give a near universal status, that men 
have had to acknowledge that they have to 'struggle in a world beset 
. d· f . ,2 by eVll an lmper ectlon . This point he elaborates even more In 
saying 'that the feeling that man was born for a fate better than his 
present condition is found among popUlations of all economic levels f • 
Evil as perceived implausibility in the nature of things is the 
category which could be used to interpret this universal sense of 
,.., 
L 
imperfection, while sin would be a category relating to particular 
theological interpretations of imperfections including moral transgressions. 
While this is a far from perfect distinction inasmuch as different 
" 1. Furer-Haimendorf, C. von. 1974. 
2. Ibid, p.555. 
t h e o ~ i e s s require more particular distinctions to be drawn between 
kinds of 'sin', it does allow an initial phenomenological description 
to be made which is itself not grounded in any theological definition. 
" A positive contribution made by Furer-Haimendorf lies in the 
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final assessment that there is no universal correlation existing between 
types of social structure and the kind of sin identified by a society; 
there is no direct or indirect association between social and economic 
levels of development and the form of sin experienGed. If the 
distinction between evil and sin is adopted after the plausibility model 
it would be easier to make this point and to say that while sin is not a 
universal feature of human experience evil is, everywhere, a part of 
man's self-evaluation. Even such a simple redefinition would make one 
" of Furer-Haimendorf's concluding generalizations more intelligible in 
the light of his own preceding argument. 'Like other religious beliefs', 
he suggests, 'the sense of sin is a phenomenon sui generis which 
intertwines with social and economic phenomena but has an existence of 
1 its own not determined by conditions in secular spheres'. This must 
be interpreted as saying that it is the sense of evil as perceived 
implausibility which is the sui generis element rather than the phenomenon 
of sin as transgressed imperatives which he has already shown to be absent 
from certain cultures including the Chenchus of the Deccan. 
" What is particularly significant in Furer-Haimendorf's position 
is the ascription of a sui generis status to the sense of sin. While 
this presumably refers to a phenomenon which is not reducible to other 
aspects of social structure he seems to offer the idea as a way of 
describing that which is widely present and yet is not determined by 
1. Idem. 
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particular features of a social structure. Indeed, he makes it quite 
clear that anthropologists as anthropologists can make no philosophical 
or religious assertions about the ultimate nature of reality, and he 
cites Evans-Pritchard's closing and provocative words in Nuer Religion 
a5 'at this point the theologian takes over from the anthropologist,.l 
" While Furer-Haimendorf's argument remains ultimately undefined its 
intention is perfectly clear and is that of asserting the universality 
f th 'f t f h . f . ,2 o e ac 0 uman lmper ectlon . His desire is not to explain 
'the ultimate roots of evil and sin' but merely to describe, in a manner 
which might even be called phenomenological, how various cultures 
identify the negative features of their existence. 3 His disinterest ln 
engaging ln any philosophical debate on the nature of this evil is 
characteristic of the pragmatic character of British anthropology, yet 
the very fact that he wants to establish a sui generls status for the 
negative phenomenon which 'has an existence of its own not determined by 
conditions in secular spheres', shows the impropriety of termination the 
discussion at the level of description. This thesis seeks to show that 
this kind of anthropological analysis is not the final one as far as 
religious studies are concerned. 
tt 
One reason why Furer-Haimendorf does not argue for a universal 
notion of sin, in his sense of the word, is because some tribes lack 
appropriate words to describe it. To what degree latent Christian ideas 
. 
have influenced his search for words corresponding to those expresslng 
guilt and penitence it is hard to say. Once, however, any directly 
Christian model is eschewed, as in the perspective of plausibility theory, 
it is much easier to see how the perception of negative features is 
1. 
2. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
F D ~ e r - H a i m e n d o r f , , C. von. 
3. Idem. 
1956:322. 
Ibid, p.556. 
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categorized in world cultures. This would establish the awareness 
of a lack of perfection as the basis for the sui generis category of 
evil, which might or might not involve a notion of human imperfection 
in any -one social group. In the case of the Mbuti there would be no 
such indigenous notion of human evil while in most religions of the 
great traditions there would be such a factor. Some attention must 
be given to the way in which particular religious traditions develop 
their idea of implausibility if only to show that to talk of a sui 
generis category is impossible without relating it to concrete instances 
which both help identify the nature of the general category and assert 
the distinctive difference of various cultural expression. 
W.J. Boyd has carried out a useful study in this area showing 
how man's experience of evil is expressed in mythical form. Mqking 
considerable use of Rudolph Otto's categories of the holy he begins 
from an existentialist standpoint to show how Buddhist and Christian 
frameworks have developed ideas of evil explaining human experience. 
Christianity is evaluated as maximizing the externality of evil and 
the horrendum aspect of it, while minimizing its fascinans element. 
Buddhism, by contrast emphasizes this element of fascination which he 
links with the notion of bondage to samsara, or the repetitive existence 
of the unenlightened being. The points of greatest similarity are 
those which manifest a numinal quality attributed to symbolizations 
of evil, Satan in the case of Christianity and Mara in that of Buddhism. 
Precisely what is meant by numinal quality is hard to say. Boyd 
describes it as 'an overplus of meaning eluding conceptual analysis', 
and seems to be expressing the idea of the power and compulsion 
~ x p e r i e n c e d d in and through the symbols of evil as most dramatically 
portrayed in the phenomenon of possession by Mara or Satan. l What 
constitutes this power as evil is its disruptive aspect, the way it 
opposes what Christians and Buddhists regard as the truest expression 
of the ultimate. This positive goal or pattern of ideas Boyd 
identifies as the holy and true and while their specific meanings 
are determined by the respective traditions he, nevertheless, regards 
them as correlates within these traditions. 
Analysing Boyd's usage, evil might be said to be a term which 
identifies the disruption between good and evil, a kind of statement 
asserting that the holy and true is not easily attained. It does not 
provide any comment on the specific content of categories of evil. 
In this approach follows Ricoeur's analysis of evil as a shattering 
of man's grasp upon the sacred. As far as the present argument is 
concerned Boyd does not commence his description of evil at a sufficiently 
early period in the process of religious perception; for it is not 
necessarily true that 'the meaning of evil is derived from the meaning 
2 of the sacred'. While it is impossible to arrive at any knowledge of 
whether mankind identified evil before identifying good, it is at least 
feasible to discuss the interrelation between notions of good and evil 
ln anyone religious tradition conceived as communication system. In 
so doing no priority is given either to the notion of good or evil, both 
being regarded as necessary for the very rationale of that religious 
system of salvation to make any sense. 
One of the most significant and influential studies to have 
addressed itself to these central categories of good and evil ln an 
1. 
2. 
Boyd, W.J. 
Boyd, W.J. 
1975:150. 
Ibid, p.165. 
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essentially non-theological way was William Robertson Smith's 
Religion of the Semites. In the fourth of these Burnett Lectures Smith 
began his theoretical analysis of religion in earnest by identifying the 
central categories without which he felt a study of religion to be 
impossible. The most important of these he calls 'the distinction 
between what is holy and what is common,.l But Smith - and here his 
caution is at a premium and rather unlike the attitude of many other 
nineteenth century intellectualists - adds that the precise meaning of 
the terms holy and common is not easy to establish since it varies from 
religion to religion and also within any religion over the course of time. 
Here Smith seeks to identify a general feature in religious 
phenomena which can be established in any particular case and yet which 
need not be of any particular kind. He is postulating the existence of 
religious structures rather than of any particular content. He exemplifies 
the principle by asserting that while holiness implies an ethical factor it 
did not do so in' early Semitic religion. The notion of holiness he likens 
to electricity and to electrical discharges which might be associated with 
specific places or persons. A fundamental aspect of the category holy lay 
in the fact of relationship, indeed holiness is the most general notion 
that governs the relationship between the gods or the divine and human 
. 2 belngs. 
Inasmuch as holiness has to do with this interaction there may be 
said to exist rules governing it. These 'rules of holiness' Smith 
identifies with schemes of taboo, with those 'rules of conduct for the 
, 'hd.' ,3 regulation of man s contact Wlt eltles. Not only does he conceive 
of a positive taboo associated with divinities, but he emphasizes the 
1. Smith, W. Robertson. 1894:140. 
2. Ibid, p.142. 
~ . . Ibid,p.I52. 
lmportance of negative taboos relating to man's encounter with evil 
spirits and powers, and these taboos he identifies with rules of 
80 
uncleanness. In practical terms there is a problem in Smith's scheme 
since the notions of holiness and uncleanness can function in a very 
similar way in some societies, for what the rules associated with them 
are essentially concerned with is man's contact with or access to , , 
sources of power and influence. 
Smith did not appear to recognise the difficulties introduced by 
his categories of holy and common; for while arguing the case for the 
difference between positive and negative taboos he makes the point both 
that 'in most savage societies no sharp line seems to be drawn between 
the two kinds of taboo', and that 'in the Levitical legislation the law 
of clean and unclean may be brought within the sphere of divine 
ordinance on the view that uncleanness is hateful to God,.l 
If it be asked what level or kind of analysis Smith is here 
engaged" in, the response would have to acknowledge a certain confusion 
in his entire scheme. While he is doubtless more concerned with man 
as a social being than as an individual consciousness he finds difficulty 
in handling a discussion on the social nature of man. The result of 
this lack of conceptual apparatus was the temptation to make unfounded 
statements about primitive man. For twentieth century social scientists 
these are a priori and not a posteriori statements. Again, his perspective 
is decidedly evolutionary, not in the concrete sense of Frazer, for example, 
who postulated distinct phases through which human society had passed, but 
in a more general sense of periods and trends through which various ideas 
had been developed. This e m e r g e n c ~ ~ of religious conceptions was not in 
1. Ibid, p.153. 
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Smith's thinking necessarily a positive and beneficial process. One 
of the best examples to the contrary is furnished by his belief that 
ancient religion was in some way more pure because less tainted and 
influenced by the idea of property in relation to sacrifice and the 
gods. Here, perhaps, lurks Smith's inherent protestant evaluation of 
religion in the sense that he disliked the idea of 3 powerful priesthood 
whose status was derived from sacrificial ritual. 
While Smith is unconcerned about the individual level of 
religiosity he, nevertheless, presupposes states of religious awareness 
in the early and later phases of religion. There is a certain 
methodological confusion in this too for Smith is never able to formulate 
clearly the nature of the relation between the individual and the group. 
His constant concern with processes of human thought resembles the general 
nineteenth century anthropological involvement in the issue of primitive 
mentality which was not settled satisfactorily. It is for this reason 
that some of the crucial sections in the Religion of the Semites are 
notoriously difficult to interpret, as, for example, in this representative 
quotation from the ninth lecture dealing with sacrifice. 'In the 
beginnings of human thought, the natural and the supernatural, the material 
and the spiritual were confounded, and this confusion gave rise to the old 
notion of holiness, which turned on the idea that supernatural influences 
. . f . f . t· 1 th· ,1 emanated, llke an ln ectlon, rom certaln rna erla lngs. A major 
problem in such sections lies in deciding whether Smith wanted to refer 
to states of mind or to modes of thought, to kinds of feeling states or 
to systemsof logic. It may be closer to his intention to say that both 
were included so that the mode of experiencing and the understanding of 
1. Ibid, p.395. 
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what had been experienced combined in the lives of early man. What 
is clear is that Smith had sl'mply not d' 1scovered an adequate methodology 
and theoretical perspective which could have made his work more subtle 
and penetrating. 
/ 
Emile Durkheim, whose work was fundamentally influenced by Smith, 
was able to achieve greater clarity and precision over the basic 
classification of humanly perceived reality through his sociological 
method, though as far as religious studies in the broadest sense is 
concerned and apart from sociology in the stricter sense, this was at 
the expense of a complete sociological r e d u c t i o n i s ~ . . To make religion 
a mere epiphenomenon of social interaction, albeit a radically important 
creation of society, would not have satisfied Smith who forcefully 
argued for an adequate treatment of the supernatural element in 
Christianity, and who maintained a practical attitude of piety, which 
witnesses to this dimension, until his death. l But this is of 
secondary importance here, for what is true both of Smith and Durkheim 
is that the idea of a basic dichotomy, Smith's holy and common, expresses 
both a perception of phenomena and a means of classifying them. It 
relates both to the description and identification of experience, and 
more especially to experience gained within social contexts rather than 
in isolation. It was precisely this relational perspective which 
Durkheim developed in his study of The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
'f 2 L1 e. There he showed that the source of religiosity lay not in sacred 
places but in the community itself, not in any awesome power of a sanctuary 
but in the dynamic of society which itself generated religious power 
experienced by the participants as something completely different from 
1. 
2. 
Black, J.S. and G.W. Chrystal. 
, 
Durkheim, E. 1912. 
1912 a. p.109; 1912 b. p.572. 
their mundane existence, indeed for Durkheim this was 'the real 
characteristic of social facts, their transcendence over individual 
minds,.l 
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It is quite clear that Durkheim followed Smith in assuming the 
fundamental significance of a dichotomy in the classification of 
reality, but Durkheim is much firmer in his grasp of the way in which 
these categories originate in social life. For him all categories of 
thought are generated from social experience and iB his opening chapter 
on 'religious sociology and the theory of knowledge' he provides a 
classical expression of a sociological theory of knowledge. Behind all 
categories of mind lies the primacy of the dichotomy between the sacred 
and the profane, terms developed from Smith's holy and common, and which 
are so profoundly different that in the whole history of human thought 
there exists no other example of two categories of things so radically 
2 
opposed to one another'. In accounting for the basis of this difference 
Durkehim grounds it in the nature of social reality as opposed to 
individual reality, of social goals and private goals. Accordingly 
magic is classified as profane inasmuch as it works antisocial ends as 
it achieves some seifish benefit for an individual. In this Durkheim 
may be seen to clarify one point of confusion in Robertson Smith, namely, 
that positive and negative taboos are of an essentially different kind. 
Without any explicit reference to Smith, Durkheim makes the point that 
even the traditional opposition of good and evil is nothing beside the 
sacred and profane dichotomy, thereby implying that positive and negative 
taboos ought not to be classified as members of the same class. Durkheim's 
obvious and explicit respect for Smith's work is less likely to be the 
1. Ibid, p.23l. 
2. Ibid, p.38. 
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reason for his not arguing directly against his scheme, than the fact 
that Durkehim continues the argument of The Elementary Forms with very 
few direct references to or confrontations with other scholars. 
Since Durkehim regarded his study of religion as one which laid 
bare the essential features of religion, and since he saw the sacred 
and profane as the most fundamental features it might seem surprising 
that he did not go on to discuss, or at least refer to, the idea of 
salvation. For the sake of the theoretical development of religious 
studies it is worth commenting upon this omission because it has 
influenced, albeit after the fashion of an argument from silence, the 
way scholars have related primitive and advanced religions. Durkheim 
appears not to have conreived of Aboriginal religion as even possibly 
containing elements of the idea of salvation, and the sacred-profane 
dichotomy which might have served as a basis for discussing the 
phenomenon of evil and the human response to it, is restricted for use 
In analysing the social nature of religiosity. Hhether his avoidance 
of the idea of salvation results from his sociological rather than 
theological intention, or from the evolutionist assumption that to 
discuss the notion with respect to so primitive a level of society was 
a fruitless task since it was only in later phases of development that 
such phenomena emerged, it is impossible to say with certainty. It 
would, nevertheless be true to say that the explanatory framework adopted 
always determines not only how description and analysis proceeds, but also 
what is perceived as an appropriate object of study, and not least is this 
true for the idea of salvation. On the whole it would seem that Durkheim 
" falls into the position held by Furer-Haimendorf who regarded saviour and 
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salvation motifs as the products of relatively advanced social systems, 
advanced in terms of economic and cultural technology. This kind of 
perspective is markedly different from Evans-Pritchard's studies of 
equally undeveloped societies for he admits the possibility and 
importance of another dimension to the life of, for example, the Nuer, 
one which could not be completely explained in terms of any single social 
scientific theory. This emphasis upon the individual's perception of 
his relationship to a divinity, noted but not analysed by Evans-Pritchard, 
marks a significant difference in the way he sees the individual relating 
to society compared with Durkheim's rather more abstract considerations, 
this difference is to be understood, in part, in the light of the fact 
that Durkheim never did study a group in the field. 
In terms of the plausibility model of salvation it is possible to 
interpret Durkheim's study of religion as one which is very much concerned 
with the reality of salvation even though Durkheim did not see the issue in 
this way at all. Given the sound rejection of the ethnographic accuracy 
of The Elementary Forms by modern anthropology, the main reason for 
focusing on it now is to show how theoretical perspective can alter the 
entire significance of the religious phenomena studied. l If, then, the 
category of the sacred originates in the intensity of social experience, 
salvation can be identified as the state of maximum social involvement 
experienced by each participant member of a society. It is, as Durkheim 
says, the state of transcendence resulting from ritual activity in which 
the power of society is encountered but only as perceived in the totems 
and other sacra. 2 Again in terms of plausibility theory, the profane 
would represent states of disintegration when the unifying forces of 
1. 
2. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 
/ 
Durkheim, E. 
1965:53ff. 
Ibid, p.2l5. 
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social relationships are no longer present or effective, a condition 
which indicates Durkheim's evaluation of man whose religiosity is not 
only a function of his sociality but is actually identified with it. 
Durkheim describes man as Homo duplex with the two components of 
individuality and sociability producing the whole. Yet as far as he 
is concerned man is only fully himself when caught up in the central 
totemic rites which serve to reinforce the individual in his social 
role, once separated from community interaction the sole person declines 
from a full measure of humanity. The real significance of what Durkheim 
is here suggesting can be appreciated only when it is realised that he 
does make a full equivalence between god and society. Total dependence 
on god, or god as that which is ultimately significant, is what Durkheim 
sees society to be in relation to its individual members, so that to be 
in a state of salvation is to be a fully participant member of society, 
for outside affective society there is no salvation. 
To think of religious ritual only in terms of psychological 
excitement would, however, be incorrect, an error of understanding which 
can be rectified by a consideration of Durkheim's analysis of knowledge, 
and the fundamental premise that true knowledge is to be equated with 
impersonal reason which itself is a product of historical and collective 
processes. Durkheim forces the point that all personal and subjective 
elements must be 'rooted out' of collective representations 'if we are 
1 
to approach reality more closely'. The means by which the personal 
factor is eliminated is that of corporate agreement, a form of social 
whl·ch establishes basic ideas while ignoring idiosyncratic consensus 
elements of thought. Durkheim's reification of the notion 'society' 
" 
1. Durkheim, E. Cf. 1976:13 :ff. 
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underlies this kind of argument and enables him to believe that what 1S 
produced by social action is different from that resulting from 
individual cogitation. For Durkheim, then, reason itself is a social 
phenomenon, a social product divested of both personal and collective 
emotionalism while religious phenomena retain as a basic attribute high 
levels of affectivity. Religious 'knowledge' and rational knowledge 
can be seen to occupy different positions in Durkheim's thought such that 
the categories of thought are, themselves, ever present with individuals 
whereas religious knowledge or awareness cannot be maintained except on 
the basis of repeated reinforcement. This means that any notion of 
salvation as far as Durkheim is concerned would, necessarily, have to 
involve affective factors as well as a reasonable, that is, a non-
emotionally based explanation of what takes place in the ritual process. 
Interestingly this emphasis on mind and affectivity though rather 
" different, is the thrust of another nineteenth century scholar, Max Muller, 
whose Hibbert Lectures of 1878 are a model of clear thinking in the history 
" of religions. Mention of Muller serves not only to acknowledge one who 
has been called 'the father of comparative religion', but also to make the 
more substantial point that the later nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century scholars were much given to issues of mind, perception 
f h · 1 and the true nature 0 t lngs. " In Muller's case, as in that of Durkheim, 
there is no interest in the question of salvation or evil in any analytical 
sense. M ~ l l e r r is fundamentally as evolutionist preoccupied with the 
problem of how notions of supernatural entities developed from the growth 
of language. It is, however, to be regretted that he is usually only 
remembered for his infamous 'disease of language' theory of the origin of 
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divinity which results from the ascription and subsequent reification 
of personal names and attributes to natural phenomena. 
In the first of his lectures a section is devoted to the question 
of 'religion as a sUbjective faculty for the apprehension of the infinite'. 
He takes up a definition of religion presented in 1873 in a lecture to 
the Royal Institution. The substance of this definition involves the 
notion of a mental faculty: 'religion is a mental faculty or disposition 
which, independent of, nay, in spite of sense and neason, enables man to 
apprehend the Infinite under different names and under varying disguises,.l 
" By contrast with Durkheim's social emphasis Muller's argument clearly 
demonstrates the philosophical and individualistic concern of the 
" intellectualist anthropologists, philosophers and theologians of Muller's 
period. Yet the dichotomy of emphasis between Durkheim's social processes 
" and Muller's individual dimension should not be allowed to obscure their 
mutual interest in mind and the structure and origin of religious 
" consciousness. Muller makes perfectly clear with respect to his 
definition of religion, and to potential criticism of it, that he does not 
intend saying that the term 'faculty' involves the notion of 'a substantial 
something', for there is 'but one self and one consciousness' with no 
•. ,2. 
'separate consciousness for rellglon . What differentiates religious 
awareness from any other kind of mental state is the object of consciousness, 
so the notion of faculty designates a mode of action in relation to an 
object of general consciousness and for religion this is the most general 
of all categories, the idea of totality, of all that transcends sense and 
reason. 
" 1. Muller, M. 1898:22. 
2. Ibid, p.21. 
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While it would be possible and interesting to show the intellectual 
affinity between this view, which focuses upon the relation between 
consciousness and the object of consciousness, and that of William James 
in psychology along with subsequent phenomenologists and their notion of 
intentionality, it is much more appropriate as far as the present argument 
" is concerned to indicate the way in which Muller is attempting to handle 
questions of meaning through the study of the notion of totality. When 
he says that 'the history of religion is a history of all human effort to 
render the Infinite less and less indefinite' he was engaging in the 
highest level of generalization of a specifically philosophical kind, and 
in that was but little concerned with practical aspects of religion which 
might, at the more affective dimension, work towards the elimination of 
indefinite factors, yet he thereby demonstrated, albeit indirectly and 
by implication, that religious studies could not ignore the fact that men 
perceived the world as other than they desired it to be. l Later 
" unpopularity of Muller's theory of language and mythology, along with the 
evolutionistic dimension of his speculative thought, has obscured the 
" basic similarity of intention between Muller and the much more recent 
work on the paradigm of meaning in religion, especially, perhaps, that 
of Hans Mol. 
Meaning and Identity 
Mol's recent study, Identity and the Sacred, is particularly 
far as the paradigm of meaning is concerned because it important as 
advances the status of affective phenomena within the entire positively 
. . t' 2 process of meanlng construe lone In short this change can be typified 
terms use, from meanlng to identity, where the very notion in the very 
1. Ibid, p.36. 
2. Mol, H. 1976. Cf. 1978. 
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of identity presupposes an emotional dimension to the human sense of 
significance. Mol describes this work as a sketch for a general social 
scientific theory of religion, 'yet one which seeks to avoid the general 
sociological tendency to relativise the phenomena under consideration by 
absolutizing the theory adopted,.l The desire to avoid reductionist 
forms of explanation has a dual basis, for Mol is both convinced that 
vital religiosity is more important a human phenomenon than is theorizing 
from an absolute position, and that to do so 1S to fall foul of a central 
tenet of his own theory. For, as far as he is concerned, absolutized 
theories, or explanations which claim ultimate validity, are potential 
religious phenomena themselves. 
Mol regards all men, including members of primitive society, as 
engaged in a 'search for identity', which as part of man's nature as an 
evolving species implies a contrasting and paradoxical tension through 
the process of change in which he is involved either as a recipient or 
.. 2 1nst1gator. There exists in man a dialectic between 'adaptation and 
identity, between differentiation and integration', a dialectic which 
may be evaluated not only in terms of social values and expectations as 
1n Durkehim, but also psychologically at the level of the individual. 
It is precisely this concern with the individual which leads Mol to 
emphasize emotional aspects of life associated with the construction of 
a personal identity, and therein a sense of meaning. He categorizes 
what might be called this affective dimension of plausibility subsisting 
in the phenomenon of personal identity as the element of 'commitment', or 
the 'emotional attachment to a specific focus of identity' which serves 
the religious individual as the 'pivot of articulation between the 
1. Ibid, p.x. 
2. Ibid, p.2. 
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transcendent and the mundane,.l It 1S precisely the overemphasis on 
rationality in scientific method and much philosophy which has lead to 
the inability of science 'to anchor meaning emotionally,.2 
Mol follows Talcott Parsons' idea that it is commitment 
demonstrated in action which makes a religion out of a mere philosophy, 
but commitment of that kind presupposes the worthwhileness of the endeavour 
and assumes that a creed or set of values is worthy of implementation on 
the part of the religious person. This leads theiargument to Mol's central 
thesis that an idea system which provides a definition and explanation of a 
person's life will tend to be sacralized, and that such sacralized 
ideologies constitute a religion. In other words and by the way of 
definition he" says that sacralization is a 'process by means of which 
on the level of symbol systems certain patterns acquire ... (a) taken for 
granted, stable, eternal quality,.3 So it is that the sacralization 
process possesses the function of 'objectification', the 'tendency to sum 
up the variegated elements of mundane existence in a trancendental point 
of reference', while also engendering a commitment to the focus of identity 
4 located in the objectified structures. 
Much of this language and material follows the general outline of 
plausibility theory and Mol acknowledges his debt to Berger through whom 
most of Mol's phenomenological material, deriving ultimately from Alfred 
Schutz, has been mediated. Mol's emphasis upon the integrity of the 
personality in the process of emergent identity leads him to consider the 
significance of general affective dimensions and to place less emphasis 
upon language than does Berger for example, this is a useful corrective 
to Berger's phenomenological sociology. One reason why Mol's discussion 
1. Ibid, p.ll. 
2. Ibid, p.126. 
Ibid, p.ll. 
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of pe I . t' . 1 1 . . rsona 1 y 1S part1cu ar y slgn1ficant for this thesis emerges from 
his belief that there are processes operating against the integrity and 
identity of the personality of the individual and also of groups. These 
negative factors are located in, or arise from, both the human being as 
an individual and the social processes of evolution. The inevitable 
changes influencing man as he faces new environments, both natural and 
social, present a perpetual challenge to whatever state of equilibrium 
obtains, this 'inexorable tendency towards change and differentiation' 
is, for Mol, to be seen as inevitable because of the very fact of human 
b · . h 1 e1ng 1n t e world .. This rather philosophical expression is only a 
gloss on the basic reality of man as a biological and social creature 
set within an ever changing and dynamic environment, as part of this 
environment may also be added the changing understanding of philosophical 
and theological kinds which call the intellectual status quo into question. 
This is a somewhat better explanation of the immediacy of 'alienation and 
disorder' than that offered by John Bowker and his notion of religions as 
route finding activities set amidst compounds of limitation. At least 
it provides a more adequate theoretical context for discussing the 
. f 2 phenomenon of negat1ve eatures. In another respect the evolutionary 
context even aids Bowker's form of argument, for it is primarily concerned 
with processes of interaction between entities in the present and which 
may be seen as working towards a homeostatic equilibrium of a dynamic kind. 
That is to say that Mol's use of evolution is less that speculative 
developmental ism which has already been criticized in the nineteenth century 
scholars than another way of expressing what has already been applauded in 
the communication theory approach of general systems theory. While Mol 
1. Ibid, p.262. 
2. Ibid, p.265. 
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does not emphasize the negative aspects of the interaction between man 
and environment, indeed he stresses that his concern lies on the side 
of the positive sacralizing processes, their significance remains quite 
considerable inasmuch as man is seen to be engaged in ascribing 
differential values to the world in which he is set. 
For Mol religion is a term which defines an ideology as ultimate, 
an idology which itself necessarily defines man's status and condition 
to him including an evaluation of negative features. Moreover 'religion 
sacralizes any identity', it 'defines man and his place in the universe', 
functions which are of a positive nature and which symbolize man's 
'proclivity for order' . Here meaning and order can be seen to be more 
objective and impersonal notions while identity serves a more sUbjective 
and personal end. Hence sacralization of identity presupposes the 
affective element in any paradigm of meaning, it is a quality perceived 
in a proposition about the nature of things. l " To relate Mol to Muller 
one might say the former is not content merely to show how man comes to 
understand the Infinite, but how he comes to relate himself, in action, 
to it. Religious beliefs are placed beyond doubt, as far as practical 
action on the basis of them is concerned, when they are sacralized, their 
self-evident and compelling nature determines how men relate to them. 
Here Mol's notion of validation closely resembles Berger's use of 
legitimation processes. Mol is not so acutely aware of the problem of 
evil as was Berger who emphasized factors which challenged legitimizing 
processes, and also Bowker in his argument that religious systems are 
those explanatory modes which are expressly directed towards particularly 
intransigent problems of meaning experienced by man. Mol's particular 
1. Ibid, pp.63, 70. 
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contribution, despite his underemphasis on negative factors, lies in 
identifying the quality of the sacred as inhering in statements of 
identity and of definitions of ultimate reality. Unlike Durkheim Mol 
did not see that ultimate religious reality, as far as a social scientific 
perspective is concerned, necessarily involves the profane along with the 
sacred, the only reason for labouring this point is that Mol's own 
explanation of objectification processes is hindered by the perpetual 
accentuation placed upon the sacred. His reference to the notion of 
maya demonstrates the disadvantage under which he has placed himself. 
Arguing that objectification 'is the tendency to sum up the variegated 
elements of mundane existence in a transcendental frame of reference 
where they can appear in a more orderly, consistent and more timeless 
way', Mol offers several examples of notions which he orders in a ranked 
manner on what might be described as a basis of the distance of the 
phenomenon from the mundane world. Thus mana is categorized as a 
'supernatural power concretized in persons and things', and appears 
bnly one step removed from the mundane' and hardly distinguishes between 
the transcendent and the immanent. Maya, by contrast, is further removed 
constituting the 'utmost universalization of mythic being ... unified into 
a single interpretative system,.l In order to make these assertions which, 
if true would exemplify and substantiate his argument, Mol finds it necessary 
to engage in some reinterpretation, firstly by taking recourse to the 
'original' meaning of maya as supernatural power rather than to its more 
usual sense of cosmic illusion, and secondly by identifying maya with the 
Brahman-atman doctrine which he says represents the notion of cosmic 
identity. In this double elimination of the notion of maya in its sense 
1. Ibid, p.206. 
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which might easily be interpreted in terms of plausibility and negativity 
Mol says that the 'profane is relativized', a relativization which has 
'a balancing effect on the mundane,.l The consequence of this exercise 
is that Hinduism comes to be evaluated as possessing 'a weak potential 
for active motivation; and as encouraging an 'essentially negative 
world-view', though exactly why tbis should be Mol does not say. 
Similarly in examples from Judaism, Islam and Christianity finds himself 
having to provide explanations in order to avoid categorizing sacred 
entities along with profane ones. If once it is admitted that both 
sacred and profane entities can be sacralized then this problem is 
removed. To say that the profane can be sacralized is to employ Mol's 
terms and means that men act towards the profane ina particular way, it 
is not to equate the sacred and the profane in terms of their content. 
Despite these criticisms Mol's study stands as a clear example of 
how the paradigm of meaning can be seen to underlie modern religious 
studies, most particularly it shows how high level generalizations about 
the nature of thought and interpretative categories can be related to the 
actual commitment of ordinary religious practitioners. It is just this 
kind of perspective which will be adopted in looking at particular cases 
of sectarian religion and Indian religion in following chapters. Before 
that, however, attention must be turned to another aspect of the paradigm 
of meaning which can best be described as hermeneutics. 
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Chapter Four Anthropological Hermeneutics 
The central concern of this chapter is that of reductionism 
as a characteristic feature of social scientific explanations of 
religion. More than many others religious phenomena are subject 
to a great variety of interpretations at a number of levels of 
analysis. Both scholars from many disciplines and religious men 
themselves seek to identify the essential reality of religion,and 
this has led to competing and alternative forms of explanation. 
In this chapter we explore some of the central problems associated 
with explanations that presuppose such an essential element in 
religion, and suggest that some forms of argument which assert that 
• 
man is Homo religiosus are as open to the charge of reductionism as 
those that would explain religious behaviour in terms of society or 
psychology. Because this study is not an exercise in systematic 
theology no attempt is made to contribute any confessional views 
on the nature of religion. The contention is rather that the 
critical evaluation of methods used in religious studies to 
evaluate the nature of man's religiosity is a necessary preliminary 
act to such an endeavour. 
In the earlier discussion of the sacred-profane dichotomy it 
was argued that all theorizing operates upon certain fundamental 
principles which soon become established and difficult to abandon 
even though further evidence becomes difficult to manipulate by the 
old means. The issue which this now raises is whether the data 
themselves should be allowed to influence the manner of their own 
interpretation. 
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What then does this issue mean for anthropological hermeneutics 
It obviously does not mean that the observer, whether anthropologist 
or theologian, must come to accept the religious claims made by the 
movement he studies; neither, however, does it demand that he seek 
to disprove whatever claims to truth are made. While most sociologists 
and anthropologists would not explicitly engage in any such a 
destructive task - indeed they often assert that truth claims have 
nothing to do with them as analysts - it remains true that the form 
of their interpretation often presupposes the error of religious 
assertions, by demonstrating that the significant facts of a religion 
are to be discovered through the way it reflects the social structure 
or the like. Having said this it is only proper to add that some 
historians of r e l i g i ~ n n presuppose the ultimate veracity of 
religion as the basis for their studies, this is dangerous when 
they ignore their own 'religious reductionism' while deploring 
the,sociological reductionism of others. If we now turn to the 
paradigm of meaning it may be possible to demonstrate a certain 
similarity of approach between anthropologists and historians of 
religion while also placing the issue of reductionism in a 
broader perspective. 
Wilhelm Dupre in his study of ethnophilosophy argued in 
much the same vein as Hans Mol, viewing religion as a unitary 
phenomenon grounded in man's universal solidarity in the search 
for meaning. Religion becomes an 'intensive quality of the process 
of symbolization in general' and as such may be regarded as a 
symbol of symbolization, thereby representing 'the culmination of 
life in general' in which meaning may be _said to be concretized. l 
1. Dupre, Wilhelm. 1975:139;131;138. 
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This line of thought resembles much of what has already been 
said about the paradigm of meaning and it lead Dupre to the 
obvious point that the study of religion must 'evolve out of 
an analysis of culture and man' , by means of what he designates 
as an 'unconditioned functionalism,.l More perceptively it 
helped him to realize that indigenous terminology should be retained 
as a reminder to the scholar of his 'hermeneutic situation'. He 
fully acknowledges the fact of cultural diversity, as the retention 
of native terms ~ h o w s , , but he also believes in a fundamental human 
2 
unity manifested in the 'quest for meaning'. It is as a result 
~ ~
of this paradox of human unity and diversity that Dupre's passing 
comments on hermeneutics lie in need of further elaboration. 
A primary question concerns the very word 'meaning'. This 
metaproblem -the meaning of meaning- assumes anything but a trite 
significance once it is realized that some cultures hold different 
notions of what ideas and values are worthy of social recognition 
and validation. How then can the term be so used as to make it 
viable in cross-cultural contexts? We shall return to the issue 
of the status of the word 'meaning' in the concluding chapter, 
but for the present the s i ~ p l e s t t answer results from distinguishing 
between the form and content of the notion of meaning. By form is 
intended the presupposition that men and cultures seek an ordered 
and intelligible world, while content refers to the specific cultural 
set of values in the light of which order is persued. To distinguish 
between form and content is thus to raise again the issue of 
1. Ibid, p.120. 
2. Ibid, p.119. 
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external and internal observers' models, and to admit that the 
meaning of a culture established by the anthropologist may differ 
from the indigenous form of understanding. When such a difference 
occurs it will, usually, be because the observer is engaging in 
some higher level - and probably reductionist- mode of interpretation. 
So the question of meaning is rather like the definition of religion, 
inasmuch as any term which is used cross culturally must possess both 
general and specific attributes. 
At the most pragmatic level it might be argued that the form 
of the notion of meaning derives from man's biological and social 
relations through which he orders his environment for the purpose 
of survival. Its particular features will vary from the kind of 
content furnished by the forest life of the Mbuti to the urban 
complexity of many western Sikhs and Mormons. All are set upon 
survival even though the precise mechanics of that motivation vary 
to a marked extent. It is in this connection that accurate 
descriptions of social and religious phenomena become invaluable 
inasmuch as they do not prejudge the content of indigenous value 
and meaning systems, and seek only to permit whatever native 
structures of significance there are to manifest themselves. This 
shows the need for the phenomenological act of epoche in the task 
of description, as well as for as full a description as possible, 
since it may only be at a late stage of observation that otherwise 
insignificant factors assume a major place in the broad system 
of meaning. 
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If the first stage of study consists in this kind of 
phenomenological description the second is even more difficult 
to discuss and to name, for while the term 'analysis' suggests 
itself it rather begs the question of criteria, while 'understanding' 
in the sense of verstehen appears at first to be too vague. What 
/ Dupre seems to suggest as desirable is an analysis which is grounded 
in the facts themselves, an understanding emerging from the indigenous 
phenomena. He presumes that the observer will p4rceive a kind of 
intellectual gestalt amidst the diverse material that will enable 
him to identify several key ideas which can then be utilized in 
interpreting less obvious data. 
, 
Dupre introduced the notion of 'constitutive analysis' to 
embrace this kind of study, it is an 'analysis of the particulars 
that receives its logic from the whole which bears them in their 
particularity'. 1 In actual fact he is advancing no further forward 
methodologically than the point reached by Evans-Pritchard and discussed 
above, except, perhaps, that Evans-Pritchard engaged in the task rather 
than explore the nature of identifying-and categorizing what he was 
doing. It is probably significant that the one reference to him in 
Dupre's work is to an attempt at integrating meaning and ritual. This 
suggests a rather partial reading of Evans-Pritchard which can, in 
fact, be seen as a practical example of both descriptive phenomenology 
and constitutive analysis without claiming to be either .. In both 
the Nuer and Zande studies he uses the data themselves to provide the 
framework for analysing the indigenous rationale of thought. 
1. Ibid, p.119. 
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This lack of appreciation by Dupre of Evans-Pritchard's 
work may be excused since it is only recently that anthropologists 
themselves have given it theoretical reappraisal. It does not, 
however, lessen the importance of the point he is eager to make, 
and which Evans-Pritchard made implicitly, namely that any religious 
phenomenon set within a cultural context must be interpreted in 
the light of that culture. The system of logic, or pattern of 
thought, relative to a culture must be d i s c o v e ~ d d and described 
whether or not it bears a resemblance to any other system of thought. 
This is a major methodological safeguard against postulating a 
primitive or any other kind of mentality to social groups. 
It also safeguards against another methodological fallacy which 
might be described as the Platonic fallacy of approximation, or in 
other words the ascribing to mankind essential features or attributes 
on the basis of observing different levels of manifestation of a 
phenomenon such as religiosity in a number of different cultures. 
Observations based on a limited, restricted or selected group 
of cases could easily present a wrongly balanced evaluation of the 
nature of man in terms of anyone aspect of his constitution be it 
religious, economic, psychological, or biological. 
Homo religiosus 
In the context of this chapter it is particularly informative 
to observe that the very title Homo religiosus was first suggested as 
a substitute for Homo sapiens in an argument centred on the problem 
of interpretation. R.R. Marett, who coined this phrase in his 1932-3 
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Gifford Lectures, was well aware of the critical nature of cultural 
diversity as far as its analysis and interpretation were concerned, 
and he identified the choice between using european words to describe 
the thoughts of the uncivilized which might be misunderstood, or those 
of the natives which might not be understood at all, as the 'dilemma 
1 
of anthropology'. Marett believed in the unity of man as far as his 
essential constitunon and mental faculties were concerned, preferring 
the 'old fashioned assumption of the absolute homogeneity of the 
human mind' to the position he saw represented in Levy-Bruhl which 
regarded man as possessing 'as many distinct mentalities as there 
are distinct social types,.2 His criticism of Levy-Bruhl and of the 
Annee Sociologique -which he otherwise tended to favour- resembles 
the methodological criticism raised later in this study with respect 
to Rodney Needham's work on mentality, inasmuch as Marett reasoned 
that 'if the mentalities of different men at different levels of 
culture are in all respects as incommunicable as their passing dreams 
then Social Anthropology would be utterly inconceivable,.3 
For Marett anthropology was an eminently conceivable discipline 
as long as its subject matter was clearly identified and given an 
intelligible status. It was in attempting to denote the nature of the 
study that he disagreed with the Durkheimian emphasis upon rather 
reified notions such as 'sentiment' , for Marett saw that reification 
which viewed the products of psychological states as 'things' in 
themselves as part of a process which reduced the significance of the 
individual as such in the entire system of explanation. It was for this 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Marett, R.R. 
Marett, R.R. 
Ibid, p.175. 
1933:3. 
1929:174. 
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reason that Marett advocated a social psychological approach, one 
which accommodated the individual to the group and vice versa. As 
far as the historical development of anthropological theory is concerned, 
and in terms of the study of religion the implications of this are 
significant, Marett's paper of 1908 entitled 'A Sociological View 
of Comparative Religion' is important because in it he avers that 
British anthropologists would 'one and all, if challenged, declare 
(their) method to be, broadly speaking, psycho16gical,.1 
Marett's concern was with the problem of reductionism and it 
was this which led him to criticise both what he called individual 
psychology with its general philosophical emphasis upon the discrete 
existence of the single self, and the 'social morphology' of the 
L'Annee Sociologique tradition which he saw as reducing the status of 
the individual by subsuming it into that of the social body. There is 
a kind of pragmatic focus upon the individual in Marett's work which 
is more reminiscent of the stance of phenomenologists and historians 
of religion than of most subsequent anthropologists who tended more 
in the direction of the social nature of human life. It would certainly 
be true to say that apart from occasional contributions of recent 
British anthropologists such as loan Lewis the continuing tradition 
in Britain has not regarded psychological considerations with favour. 2 
It will be necessary to return to this issue of psychology later since 
the very model of meaning can hardly be discussed apart from it. For the 
present it suffices to say that Marett not only presumed that men were 
universally similar in thought processes, but regarded religious factors 
as basic to the constitution of human life itself. 3 Religion is what 
enables man to face the unknown and to deal with it optimistically, 
1. Ibid, p.124. 
2. Lewis, I.M. 1971 , 1977. 
3. Marett, R."'l\, Anthropology , undated. 
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especially in periods of crisis. So, asserting the pragmatic quality 
of primitive thought and action, and being fully aware that primitive 
and advanced men are similar in many mental characteristics, Marett 
identified the religious factor as a certain attitude to the world 
which he characterized as being associated with the sacred. Crises 
and other events may elicit from man a feeling of awe and a sense 
that he is involved in a realm quite different from that of the 
workaday world. It is precisely this 'supernormal' dimension and 
the attitude of sacredness which attaches to it which constitutes 
Homo religiosus for Marett. 
In his paper on 'The Conception of Mana' he takes up this 
problem of definition of religion and the sacred by suggesting an 
alternative minimal definition of religion to that offered by Tylor, 
it involved a necessary complementarity of the notions mana and tabu. 
Marett shows himself clearly aware of the delicate decision to adopt 
alien terms in the field of what he calls comparative religion, but 
feels that the variety of phenomena which can be embraced by the two 
terms is sufficiently wide as to benefit from the description. Mana 
designates the 'positive aspect of the supernatural, or sacred' ,and 
describes those events or experiences which 'differ perceptibly from 
the order of ordinary happenings' ; tabu, by contrast, serves to 
1 identify the negative aspects of such experience. Marett then goes 
on to distinguish between the essential nature of these experiences 
and the diverse ways in which they are expressed accross cultures. 
In certain respects this anthropological stance resembles the 
outlook of Mircea Eliade in the history of religions, particularly in 
1. Idem. 
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the way the sacred as a category. is- thought to be prime as far as 
the ultimate quality of human perception is concerned. It would 
also, be possible to compare and contrast Marett's general 
categories of mana and tabu with Rudolph Otto's conception of 
the holy as embracing attracting and repelling elements. Again, the 
similarity between these ideas and those of Robertson Smith on holy 
and common factors on the one hand, and of Durkhiem on sacred and 
profane entities on the other, is quite striking and raises again 
the question of how data are related to the categories constructed to 
handle them. The obvious fact that Marett was familiar both with the 
work of Robertson Smith and Durkheim is less valuable than the suggestion 
that in order to accommodate his argument to the data as he found them 
it was necessary to adopt a twofold classification. 
If Dupre's notion of constitutive analysis be recalled here 
it could be suggested that the information gathered in religious 
studies has influenced or directed the way in which categories have 
been constructed to cope with it. If this is so then the fundamental 
dichotomy represented by the various opposed terms of sacred-profane etc. , 
might be said to c o r r e s ~ J n d d to the actual world of religious perception. 
Were that the case then what might be called the family resemblance 
between these descriptive categories would represent scholarly attempts 
to render intelligible a diverse mass of material which, despite its 
volume and extent, appears to disclose a certain polarity of basic 
phenomena. To ~ a y y this is to move into more philosophical areas which 
will be explored more fully in the final chapter. To raise the lssue in 
the present context of hermeneutics is quite proper, however, since 
these brief comments on Marett show that, contrary to many recent 
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anthropological expectations, it is not improper to ask questions 
about the basic nature of man and his relation to his complete 
environment which might include a supernatural dimension. 
In terms of the paradigm of meaning there is, however, an 
even more pressing question raised by what we have identified as 
categories bearing a family resemblance grounded in the positive 
and negative polarity. Both at the level of folk religiosity and at 
the more abstract level of scholarly analysis there seems to be a 
consensus as to the twofold nature of human experience. This duality 
of perception both of plausible and implausible features of life and 
of the inner duality of religious phenomena reinforces the point 
made earlier that both scholarly and non-reflective considerations 
of the human condition aggree on the general mode of meaning 
construction even though the manner of expression varies. The fact 
of this polarity also reinforces 'the argument that identification of 
the,sources of implausibility constitutes, in terms of structure at 
least, the basic element in the process of salvation. To say that 
there is a group of categories relating specifically to good and 
evil is to say that the process of meaning construction shows a 
certain unity in the field of religion. When such categories are 
also constructed in differing disciplines they may be said to mark 
the trend of the paradigm of meaning as a unifying approach to the 
study of religion. 
Perhaps the best known anthropological contribution which 
could be drawn upon to reinforce the argument on meaning is that 
of Claude Levi-Strauss and his structural analysis of myth. Although 
r-
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it is not intended to embark on any significanct discussion of the 
Levi-Straussian corpus it is necessary to make several observations 
which are apposite to the idea of categories embracing fundamental 
polarities of existence, and to the pervasiveness of the notion of 
plausibility. 
Firstly it should be observed that Levi-Strauss is concerned 
to show that all men, irrespective of their so called level of 
cultural development, exhibit the same kind of mental alacrity and 
facility in ordering the world in which they find themselves, and in 
the face of the paradoxes of experience they encounter. l This implies 
that all men are engaged in the search for meaning and that it is not 
significantly different in form even when cultural content varies 
quite considerably. Emerging from this indirectly is the question 
of how the mythologist differs from the myth teller. Indeed it became 
fashionable in reviews and critiques of Levi-Strauss to suggest, for 
example, that 'in the final analysis, the intellectually reflective 
and scientifically deliberate study of the infrastructure and hidden 
unconscious reality of myth "is itself a kind of myth" '. 2 But to make 
such comments is not even to score a cheap point: it is, rather, to 
,. 
ignore the fact that both man and anthropologist are human. While Levi-
Strauss is not concerned to argue any explicit phenomenology of the 
status and function of the anthropologist he is aware that the basic 
human processes are at work in him as his autobiographical volume 
Tristes Tropiques 
3 
amply indicates. So L ~ v i - S t r a u s s ' s s work could 
1. English usage tends to make man the actor rather than the one 
acted upon. Godfrey Lienhardt' s notion of:"passiones is relevant 
to a more phenomenologically neutral way of discussion perception. 
Lienhardt, Godfrey. 1961:151. 
2. Scholte, Bob. 1970: 148. 
3. L ~ V i - S t r a ~ , , Claude. 1968. 
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itself be advanced as an example of the way in which the paradigm 
of meaning operates both in the producer and analyst of culture, 
albeit at varying levels of insight into the very'motives for 
and processes of meaning construction. 
The second major issue raised by Levi-Strauss's approach 
is that of the nature of the perceived polarities he believes to 
be present in many different kinds of culture. It is well known that 
Levi-Strauss presupposes that 'mythical thought always progresses from 
the awareness of oppositions towards their resolution' , by means of 
sets of binary oppositions which serve as mediating notions between 
the initial distinctions. l These primary oppositions are not 
necessarily those of good and evil in any simple moral sense, they 
relate rather to the essential ontological awareness of man that he 
is a creature of nature whilst also being a person of culture. To 
what extent this distinction could be related to the Durkheimian 
opposition of sacred and profane, or to the other categories we 
have considered, it is difficult to say. What is certain is that 
Levi-Strauss finds that he cannot engage in his anthropological 
analyses apart from this conceptual distinction underlying man's 
self awareness. Here then is shown the power of the evidence itself 
in compelling the anthropologist to pay due regard to the internal 
observer's model provided by indigenous informants. This he has done 
1n his classic study of Totemism where he emphasizes the point made 
by E.B. Tylor that 'it is necessary to consider the tendency of 
mankind to classify out the universe' 2 The fact remains that 
1. 
2. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude. 
1963:224. 
1962:13-
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Levi-Strauss pays the closest attention to the ways in which 
tribal peoples work out their ideas on the realities they experience 
in life by means of mythological study. The category opposition of 
nature and culture usually embraces the more obvious distinctions 
between death and life, earth and heaven, and the like. 
The final idea in Levi-Strauss which bears directly upon the 
present argument concerns the personal level at which meaning is 
to be sought and which includes an affective dimension. Levi-Strauss 
is quite explicit in identifying anthropology as a 'semiological 
science' 1 which takes 'as a guiding principle that of 'meaning' , 
He is not only saying that both myths and symbols operate at 
cognitive as well as affective levels as far as the native is concerned, 
though the fact that he has been criticized for overstressing the 
unconscious mind demonstrates that he has a real interest in both 
dimensions of being. Rather he is suggesting that the anthropologist 
himself must not ignore the existential dimension of those he studies 
or, indeed, of his own life. So it is that he associates anthropology 
more with 'humanistic studies' than with the social sciences of 
economics and demography which, he thinks, resemble the natural the 
natural sciences. 2 This same emphasis can be further exemplified in 
the work of a lesser known anthropologist, W.E.H. Stanner, whose 
contribution to the study of religion possesses a direct significance 
for the question of anthropological hermeneutics and reductionism. 
1. Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1963:364. 
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Reductionism and Elementary Forms 
The problem of reductionism 1S central to any consideration 
of how analysis and interpretation should proceed, and it is also 
directly related to how the anthropologist views himself. A total 
reductionism is only possible when the observer and the observed are 
thought of as belonging to essentially different orders of reality. 
The style of functionalist anthropology which treats of social 
institutions as entities independent of the observer is perfectly 
proper, but some phenomena tend to implicate the observer from the 
outset. The moment the observer is himself seen as part of the same 
field as his subjects, or is under the influence of similar restraints, 
then it becomes impossible for any complete reductionism to take place. 
Although anthropologists of religion have been well aware of 
the problem of ethnocentricity for many years, and while historians 
and phenomenologists have acknowledged the necessity of understanding 
alien religiousnotions in terms appropriate to them, the power 
of systematizing western intellectual traditions has, nevertheless, 
tended to impress itself upon analyses of other cultures.Stanner 
is particularly aware of this because his own field of interest,that 
of Aboriginal religion, has attracted varying degrees of culture-
boundinterpretation for over a century. Durkheim's classic work on 
the nature of primitive religion is an obvious case of a study which 
influenced later traditions in this area, and simply because it 1S so 
well known may serve as a constant comparison of the difference in 
intention between that author's theoretical stance and that of Stanner. 
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While in no sense following either an implicit or explicit 
phenomenological approach Stanner sets out 'to try as far as 
possible to let Murinbata religion exhibit itself,.l He interprets 
his data in terms of its own inner logic, in terms of the messages 
conveyed through myths and rituals, foras he says, 'if the main 
functions of myth are not cognitive I wonder if we can understand 
2 
them at all'. This is not to say that mythic functions are only 
cognitive, he argues against this position, bot that they are at 
least intelligible to other men b e y o n d ~ t h e e group in which the myths 
are found. 
Stanner reversed Durkheim's theoretical approach by avoiding 
making religious facts of primary concern and social ones of 
d .. f· 3 secon ary Slgnl lcance. In other words he did not engage in an 
a priori reductionism, with religious phenomena being interpreted 
in terms of social s t r u c t u r ~ s s and processes. This was the case because 
he came to the conviction during his fieldwork that the Aboriginal 
religion could not be understood unless it was first assumed that it 
possessed particular and distinctive features which might be said 
to impress themselves upon the researcher. Stanner describes the 
groups studied as possessing 'overwhelming convictions about 
ultimate values', so much so that Aboriginal man might be called 
H • 4 omo convlctus. If it be said that Durkheim evaluated Aboriginal 
religion in terms of emotional release, then Stanner might be regarded 
as shifting the emphasis more to the philosophical dimension. While it 
1. Stanner, W.E.H. 1959:107. 
2. Ibid, p.50. 
3. Ib id , p. 28. 
4. Ibid, p.27. 
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is true to say that Durkheim did deal with the question of the 
problem of knowledge and the construction of logical categories 
in association with social organization and structure, it is 
equally true to say that he remained largely unaware of the 
meaning of the religion to its Aboriginal practitioners, and it 
was this which Stanner set at the forefront of his concern. This 
meaning is the meaning which exists for the practitioners and not 
primarily for the analyst, it represents the inner logic of the 
religion. 
Stanner is implicitly disagreeing with any procedure which 
allows privileged access for the anthropologist to the real meaning 
of a phenomenon whilst the participant members of a group only 
possess some other level of meaning of lesser significance. His study 
of Murinbatasociety is instructive both for the ethnographic data and 
for the way he shows how academic analysis entertains certain 
presuppositions with respect to religious ideas and their configurations. 
For the purposes of this chapter it will be convenient to focus on 
one of the many rituals discussed by Stanner, that which concerns 
initiation from boyhood into manhood and is called the punj ritual. 
Througpthis rite of passage the young males are brought into direct 
contact with the basic symbols of Murinbata society, and it is precisely 
the question of how the individual comes to understand himself and 
his society through these rites which Stanner takes up with some ardour. 
His intention is to emphasize the profound significance of initiation 
rites in this tribe as far as the psychological and intellectual 
dimension of the youths' lives is concerned. By contrast with most 
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Aboriginal studies, as he readily admits, he is concerned with 
'metaphysical problems' because he sees the data as themselves 
expressing concern over metaphysical themes. By the term meta-
physical he denotes an awareness of non-empirical realities which 
is related to man's life-pattern in the midst of the empirical 
world, and which help man in making sense of that world. 
This all-embracing reality might be described as possessing 
two aspects, one which could be denoted as the dimensional and the 
other as the qualitative components of life. The dimension of reality 
is the notion of time, which for the Murinbata does not possess a 
linear significance as it does in the Judeao-Christian tradition or 
even the more cyclical meaning form of the broad Hindu-Buddhist 
context. Rather it is to be evaluated in terms of the second aspect 
just referred to, and which is best described as a quality perceived 
in the present, a quality which results from a direct participation 
in the life of the group. This is not as abstract a comment as might 
first appear since every culture defines its present in terms of 
something, the western world in the twentieth century is heir to 
the nineteenth century emphasis on history and therefore defines the 
present in terms of an historical past and in the hope of an 
'historic future'. What Stanner suggests is a different mode of 
evaluation in which the present is best understood as a quality of 
life rather than as a moment in the passage of time. The Murinbata 
myths, for example, refer to no g o l d ~ n n age, and there is no notion of 
perfection as such either in 'nostalgia for a past or yearning after 
. ,1 
a perfected futurlty • 
1. Ibid, pp.45,58. 
That to which the myths do refer is to be 
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found in the present and is expressed by ritual: -it lS the 
awareness of the meaning of man's self-reflective life set 
amidst the reality of social-life. So it is that the physical 
hole or hollow in which a central part of the punj ritual 
takes place is referred to both as a nest and as a wallow, that is, 
as a place of comfort and refuge expressed in the imagery of a nest, 
and as the site of discomfort and pain expressed as a wallow. The 
sacred space of the punj rite thus 'denotes what seem like positive 
and negative statements of the same truth about life', for standing 
at the centre of society this focal point of ritual announces the 
1 dual truth of reality - Tefuge and rottenness'. Stanner refers to 
this paradoxical message of the rite as the 'covenant of duality' 
into which the emerging generation is initiated through symbols of 
life and of suffering. 2 In this process each initiate is 'taken out 
of his empirical and-social self as though to meet something of his 
essential self', while the connection which is established between 
this essential self and the equally essential nature of the life 
he has to lead in society and the natural world is portrayed as one 
which is inherently i m p l a u s i b l e ~ ~ Concrete existence is shown to be 
mixed and the initiate is brought to a position from which he may 
obtain an . f· h .. ,3 'intuition of an lntegral moral law In uman assoclatlon . 
The reality which exists beyond any individual and yet in which all 
participate is one of 'perennial good-with-suffering, of order-with-
4 tragedy'. It is prec isely because of the mixed and uncertain nature 
of the world that the young men are taught through the rites to depend 
on the positive features despite the reality of their negative pairs. 
1. Ibid, p.44. 
2. Ibid, p.56. 
3. Ibid, p.44. 
1 
4. Ibid, p.10. 
115 
It might be argued that through the'punj ritual certain 
'elementary forms' are manifested and experienced in the sense 
that the initiates are confronted with events which demonstrate 
the nature of reality as understood by the Murinbata. These are 
internal observers' models and not those of the anthropologist, 
yet they furnish the very evidence that underlies his analysis of 
what is happening in and through the ritual. The significant 
point of Stanner's argument is that he is attempting to extend or 
develop the level of philosophical awareness of the anthropologist 
himself, in the hope that certain of the indigenous elementary forms 
will be viewed as essential categories which cannot be fully under-
stood by means of being changed into another kind of expression 
through some reductionist explanation. What this means, in part at 
least, is that the scope of anthropology is broadened to embrace 
those philosophical issues which have normally been beyond what 
has been regarded as the proper concerns of the disipline. Such 
a philosophical anthropology is inevitable once a discussion of 
meaning is proposed - even though it might be regarded by some 
as too speculative and too far removed from the more pragmatic 
debates about social structures. As far as most British studies 
of anthropology are concerned it would probably be true to say that 
they have, as it were, been satisfied with a middle range of 
ideological argument. Since it will be necessary to refer to this 
point later it suffices to say that any anthropology whic is to 
contribute to a broader study of religion through dialogue with 
the history and phenomenology of religion will, inevitably, have 
to comment on the nature of man in terms other than those of 
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social determinism. This is what Stanner attempts to do in suggesting 
that in myths man finds a way of expressing a set of meanings which 
cannot be directly interpreted in terms of any other system of 
explanation. The full meaning of myth cannot, therefore, be explained 
by means of propositional statements, by iconographic or other means. 
If this is true it means that the kind of final analysis sought by 
scholars is likely to elude their grasp, at least in terms of the 
existential significance of myths to those using them. It also 
means that myths ~ u s t t be accorded a certain autonomy as discrete 
categories of religious phenomena, and to admit this is to comply 
to a great extent with the goals and intentions of historians and 
phenomenologists of religion in viewing religious phenomena as 
independent variables and not as sociologically or psychologically 
dependent variables. 
As far as hermeneutics in the anthropology of religion is then 
concerned it would be necessary to consider not only the culturally 
different values of social groups but also that ultimate point of 
significance which the anthropologist can only identify as being 
present for a people, without claiming to grasp from the inside. 
ThEis, inevitably, a hazardous area of debate inasmuch as the question 
of knowledge is seen as involving the factor of commitment. To 
understand the structural relation of ideas within a culture is the 
ordinary task of field anthropologists, and the analysis which 
relates that structure to other aspects of the social world 1S what 
is usually presented as a study of a culture. The fact that these 
patterns of meaning also carry with them the weight of personal 
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commitment involves what might be called a personal equation 
which the anthropologist, by the very fact that he is an observer -
albeit a participant observer- cannot make. Of the many implications 
which follow from this one of the most important is that a reconsider-
ation of the question of primitive mentality and myth should take 
place. This is so because the question of the logic of mythical 
structure cannot be divorced from that of the degree and manner 
of commitment which exists between individuals and their social 
mythologies. In other words, it may be less of a question of kind 
of thought involved than of the nature of commitment to the beliefs 
and values enshrined in the myth, or in the power the myth brings 
to bear on people who are themselves adherents to the truth it 
expresses. When that truth diverges from the normative perspective 
of the analyst it is quite possible that he will regard the whole 
mythic context as absurd, archaic or perhaps even prelogical. 
One of Stanner's most important suggestions is that the 
system of Murinbata symbols communicates messages concerning the 
nature of personal reality to each individual in a way which 
cannot be e x p ~ a i n e d d in terms of strict logic. The very fact that no 
independent stance could be adopted to describe analytically what 
the symbols did is indicative of what they actually do for the 
committed individuals concerned. Once a paradigm of meaning is 
adopted by the student of religion it becomes possible to refer 
to the fact that such personal meanings are communicated, and even 
to detail aspects of their content, while still admitting that the 
level of individual significance must elude full observation. It was 
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just this kind of anthropological awareness which Evans-Pritchard 
expressed in the last chapter of Nuer Religion , in referring to 
the 'intuitive apprehension' of the phenomenon of Spirit by 
individual . ~ N u e r r , and in the assertion that 'Nuer religion is 
1 
ultimately an interior state'. To say this is not to deny the 
power of anthropological explanation with respect to the ritual 
data drawn from the field of social life, but it is to say that 
anthropological hermeneutics can, justifiably, be related to the 
mode of d i s c o u r ~ e e employed by historians and phenomenologists in 
discussing myth and ritual. In the final analysis, as Eliade says, 
'reductionism ... is irrelevant as a hermeneutical tool,.2 The 
positive acceptance of the paradigm of meaning by these disciplines 
also involves a further fact, that the emotional dimension of belief 
is fundamentally important and that it is part of the personal 
equation mentioned above. The necessary consequence of such a 
factor is precisely that a degree of irreducible personal 
significance be identified as part of religious processes. If 
both myth and some rituals also serve the function of correlating 
diverse aspects of life in the process of meaning construction then 
it will be true to say that such phenomena which serve unifying 
purposes can hardly be analysed critically in terms of anyone 
aspect of reality without suffering loss of their central nature. 
Stanner does so regard symbols, for example, as uniting 'several 
distinct structures of existence, including the cosmological, 
social and ecological' aspects of life. 3 What can be said in 
1. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1956:321-2. 
2. Eliade, M. 1973:xvii. 
3. Stanner, W.E.H. 1959:167. 
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analysing religious phenomena is that they facilitate meaning, but 
this generalization cannot be completely explained at all levels as 
far as the individual is concerned. It is the form of meaning which 
can be guaranteed rather than any specific content. So the punj 
ritual may be described as a rite which maximizes plausibility 
in the context of hostile features present in both natural and 
social environments, while the precise manner in which this meaning 
is appropriated by individuals must be said to be beyond academic 
access. 
To support the idea that religious phenomena such as symbols 
and myths may not be completely transparent to critical analysis is 
not, necessarily, to agree with historians of religion who assert 
the complete distinctiveness and sui generis character of, for 
example, the idea of the holy in Rudolph Otto's work, the sacred 
in Eliade, or that of prayer for Heiler. l While such scholars find 
it easy to chide the reductionist tendencies shown by some sociologists 
of religion they fail to appreciate that a similar kind of tendency 
can be discerned in their own work. Indeed in those cases where 
scholars assert the importance of a specific religious category it 
would not be improper to speak of religious reductionism. Once any 
such a phenomenon is established as an independent variable it 
becomes incumbent upon the analyst to take care in devising schemes 
of causation. 
The particular strength of, for example, Durkheim's theory 
of religion lay in the complete reductionism which he openly 
1. Eliade, Mir1ea. 
Otto, Rudolph. 
1957. 
1924. 
Heiler, Friederich. 1932. 
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espoused in the belief that his sociological u n d e r s t ~ l d i n g g of 
the nature of man was actually correct, and was the inevitable 
perspective for anyone hoping to gain insight into the real 
nature of the human condition. The fact that Durkheim also 
believed that social phenomena could be treated as discrete 
entities facilitated his work whereas, for example, Dupre 
asserts quite categorically that an 'objective description 
of religious phenomena is a factual impossibility,.l The 
nature of this impossibility is derived from a form of 
existential awareness of the hazards involved in attempting 
to discuss the inner meaning of ideas for another person. 
The difference in emphasis between these two authors can 
usefully be drawn from their respective definitions of 
religion. Whereas Durkheim's definition is eminently 
sociological and focuses upon the more institutional aspects of life 
involving systems of ideas so that; 
'A religion is a unified system of beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden - beliefs 
and practices which unite into one single moral 
community called a Church, all those who adhere 
to them " 
Dupre's perspective shows a clear understanding of the context in 
which the scholar is himself set, and manifests an existential 
. 2 dimension quite alien to Durkhelm. 
1. 
2. 
Religion is 'an achievement through which man 
becomes capable of bearing the burden of 
existence. Birth and death, suffering and joy, 
Dupre, Wilhelm. 
./ 
Durkheim, E. 
1975:2. 
1976: 47. 
failure and success, threat and trust, all 
these instances of human life are mediated 
with one another in the ultimate symbols of 
myth, cult and life itself. Religion in this 
sense renders meaning to man under the 
conditions of the life community. It enables 
him to accept the necessities of life as a 
human being. Religion is to be understood 
as the symbolic structure in which the 
humaneness of man receives lasting expression. 
As. such it shares in the truth of man as a 
human being'. 1 
121 
There is no difficulty in showing how D u p ~ ' s s outlook manifests 
the general notion of meaning, what needs simple outlining is the 
fact of the personal philosophical dimension of his argument. The 
question is not just that of social systems of an integrated kind 
which confer meaning upon man - a view which could be read into 
Durkheim's perspective - it is, rather, one which presupposes 
that the issue of meaning has a direct personal significance. 
The existential dimension of Dupre's thought is also clear in 
a statement which shows how his concerns approximate to those 
in this study with respect to the idea of evil: he says that 
'in addition to (the) experience of evil as the negation of 
meaning in the objectivity of consciousness, there is also 
its affirmation in the SUbjectivity of conscience,.2 This 
definition of religion could easily be applied to Stanner's 
view of Murinbata religion. What it means for hermeneutics, 
however, is that care also needs to be taken lest an overly 
philosophical bias leads to what might be called an 
existentialist reductionism. 
1. 
,. 
Dupre, W. 1975:334. 
2. Idem. 
From what has been said about this variety of possible 
reductionisms it will be obvious that the very idea of 
'elementary forms' is far from being a simple one. The nature 
of elementary forms, or those essential features which may be 
said to be ; the fundamental units of religion, will change 
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from system to system of explanation depending upon the dominant 
theory adopted in them. It cannot be presupposed from some 
a r c h e m ~ i c c point that any particular religion will demonstrate a 
specific feature of belief or practice. Once it is accepted 
that cultures may themselves possess interpretations of reality 
which differ the one from the other, and once it be admitted 
that the autonomy of a culture is a proper notion to entertain 
in religious studies, then the question of interpreting the 
sense of any religion in terms of the cultural perspective 
of the analyst becomes quite critical. This is especially true 
with respect to the question of understanding and commitment. 
The act of making available to members of one culture data 
pertaining to another, particularly on religious matters, is 
an act of translation which emphasizes the conceptual and verbal 
dimensions of religiosity. It is, ipso facto, impossible to 
communicate the sense of native commitment to value systems 
apart from the experience of actual commitment. This fact is 
an implicit assumption of anthropological work but needs to be 
made explicit in inter-disciplinary religious studies inasmuch 
as the study of religions in the west has often proceeded along 
the lines of historical and textual analysis. The reason why 
the hermeneutical problem has tended to be implicit in anthropology 
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lies, perhaps, in the experience of fieldwork and in the 
intuitive, non-verbal, sediments of knowledge accumulated by 
the scholar during his personal contacts with people. When 
one anthropologist reads an ethnographic study of another he 
reads it in the light of this experiential dimension and, almost 
unconsciously, makes the necessary provision of the affective 
dimension to complement the social-structural account presented 
in the study itself. l 
In one sense it was just this process of understanding thdr 
allowed anthropologists to be content with the kind of 
explanations which were provided by their ethnologies. It is when 
anthropological studies become the basis of discussions engaged 
in by historians or phenomenologists of religion that a more 
explicit account of method is required, and this is the reason 
for having devoted so much of this chapter to the issue 
of anthropological hermeneutics. 
Having alluded to religious reductionism as well as to 
existential reductionism and the more often cited sociological 
variety, it remains to say that the accusation of engaging in 
reductionist explanation can become a tedious and ill-advised 
repetition, since any kind of explanation can be subjected to 
its pejorative tones. The problem of an inter-disciplinary 
approach to the study of religions is one of accommodating 
different traditions of interpretation to each other, and this 
involves bringing scholars to see their own conventions as 
1.The importance of fieldwork as a means of affective change in 
the anthropologist should not be overlooked in this context. 
Cf. Levi-Strauss, Claude. 1968:346 ff. And Sol Tax, 1964:248 ff. 
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potential stumbling blocks to others. One function of the paradigm 
of meaning is to permit each tradition to contribute its theoretical 
perspective upon one or another level of meaning present in a 
social group. It may well be that the level and kind of analysis 
that satisfies anthropologists will not appeal to historians of 
religion, while theologians set within a confessional framework 
will probably require yet further levels of explanation. While 
the notion of paradigm of meaning is advocated" here as a basic 
outlook which seems to be emerging in many disciplines, it it is 
not suggested that each approach should be turned into an 
attenuated version of itself with the intention of resembling 
others. The paradigm is presented to 'show that the notion of 
meaning admits of many variations while also arguing the 
fundamental theme of plausibility and implausibility as the 
polar oppositions by means of which the problem of evil and 
salvation can be fruitfully dealt with in a theoretical manner. 
Chapter Five Hermeneutics in the History and Phenomenology 
of Religion. 
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If indigenous groups studied by fieldwork techniques of 
participant observation characterize the anthropological perspective, 
and if that kind of critical discipline can permit the data to 
influence the final analysis, then the history of religions which 
studies the great religions of the world, largely in their classical 
and systematic expressions, and through philological and historical 
means, ought to have less difficulty in so doing. 
The main question raised in this chapter concerns those 
presuppositional restraints found in the history and phenomenology 
of religions which both facilitate and hinder the approach to 
religious phenomena adopted by social scientific disciplines being 
accepted by historians and phenomenologists. In particular we 
shall consider how applicable the general paradigm of meaning is 
to the work of selected historians and pheneomenologists. 
No extensive attempt is made to differentiate between the 
history and phenomenology of religions inasmuch as those who 
emphasize either the historical critical method or the identification 
of the essential features of phenomena often utilize aspects of the 
other view when occasion demands it. ( In general terms in might be 
said that the history of religions is to phenomenology what 
nineteenth century anthropology with its emphasis on stages of 
development is to twentieth century anthropology and its concern 
with the relations which may be seen to exist between phenomena). 
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Because of the difficulty attendant upon generalizing 
over academic disciplines covering a wide area we shall consider 
the approaches of several specific historians and phenomenologists 
of religion to see how they develop their methodology, especially 
in terms of the question of evil and salvation, and in the light 
of what has already been said about the general paradigm of meaning. 
This is all the more necessary because of the avowed anthropological 
commitment of the history of religions despite which significant 
differences have remained between the respective traditions. The 
declaration signed by Mircea Eliade, J.M. Kitagawa and others in 
1958 to the effect that history of religions 'is an anthropological 
discipline studying the religious phenomenon as a creation, feature 
and aspect of human culture' is, itself, indicative of the 
awareness of differences between the respective traditions. 1 
Hultkrantz commented on this declaration that despite the fact that 
'no definite barrier' existed between anthropology and the history 
of religions there still remained 'an important difference of 
orientation,.2 As has already been mentioned this difference 
originated largely, though by no means exclusively, in the change 
of attitude to evolutionary perspectives over the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Personal ideological commitments on the part 
of individual scholars h a ~ ~ also been influential in maintaining 
a different p e r ~ p e c t i v e e as the case of Eliade will amply demonstrate. 
Mircea Eliade was born in Bucharest':in 1907 and having studied 
ln India with Dasgupta returned to the west working in England, France 
1. 
2. 
Schimmel, A.M. 
Hul tkranz, Ake. 
1960:236. 
1970: 338. 
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and America. Through this international contact, and as a result 
of his prolific publications in both academic and popular areas 
Eliade came to exert a wide influence as an authority - if not 
the authority - in the history of religions. We are not here 
concerned with any real evaluation of Eliade's corpus and the 
biographical points mentioned serve only to emphasize his pervasive 
influence in religious studies. But it is important to consider 
Eliade's central notion of the sacred because it is a constant 
theme of his work and because it has influenced others to a marked 
extent. 
Eliade sees the purpose of his writings as that of influencing 
western man's fundamental outlook and attitude to the world. History 
of religions aids man's understanding of his true nature and is no 
mere neutral discussion of natural phenomena. It cannot be a 
'detached' discipline in any sense of the word because its very 
existence effects a change in personal attitude. So radical may 
this change be in the scholar that Eliade has described the history 
. . ,. d. . . ,1 
of rellglons as a savlng lsclpllne. It is a 'total hermeneutics' 
applied to 'every kind of encounter of man with the sacred from 
2 prehistory to today' . This particular quotation pinpoints Eliade's 
central notion of and overriding concern with the sacred as that 
phenomenon with which man is inextricably associated. This approach 
can well be described as relational inasmuch as it is neither the 
object in itself nor the essential nature of the subject which alone 
determines the character of a religious phenomenon, that is the 
.. . 3 
result of how they are related in the entlre Ilfe experlence. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Eliade, M. 
Eliade, M. 
Bettis, J.D. 
1978:296. 
1965:5. 
1969:199. 
Eliade is not concerned with discussing this process in any 
strictly philosophical sense and makes no serious use of 
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phenomenological notions such as that of intentionality. Yet 
in practical terms he is much taken up with this area of 
p e r c e p t i o n ~ ~ for through the very study of the history of religions 
a growth in personal understanding is said to take place. Indeed, 
'the degree to which you understand is the degree to which you change' 
for each individual is modified through his increased understanding, 
what is more this is 'the equivalent of a step forward in the process 
f If ·b :, 1 o se II eratlon • As far as Eliade is concerned western man 
lies very much in need of such a transformation because the Judaeo-
Christian tradition led to the denial of the sacred quality of 
earthly phenomena. In saying this he is largely in agreement with 
the argument of Max Weber on the progressive demystification of the 
world consequent upon an increase in rational procedures fostered 
by puritan forms of t h e o l o g y ~ ~ and also with Harvey Cox's more 
radical argument that the origin of secularization is in the 
old testament view of God. 2 
So accordinging to Eliade the history of religions possesses 
'an awakening effect' enabling man to perceive an aspect of reality 
which has largely been lost to him. 3 It awakens the sense of the 
sacred which western life has done so much to attenuate, and which 
for Eliade constitutes the prime nature of religious man, and 
therefore of essential humanity. This notion of the sacred resembles 
1. Eliade, M. 1978:296. 
2. Cox, H. 1968. 
Weber, M. 1976. 
3. Eliade, M. 1978:233. 
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Rudolph Otto's concept of the sensus numinis and, in fact, Eliade 
makes many references to The Idea of the Holy, though he criticizes 
Otto's lack of methodological rigour and especially his avoidance 
of the question of myth and mythopoeic modes of thought. This is 
important for Eliade because he believes the sacred to be 'an 
element of the structure of consciousness and not a moment in the 
history of consciousness', in other words, man's essential nature 
possesses the faculty of perceiving a discrete category of 
phenomena different from those resulting from everyday encounters 
in the world. l The dichotomy inherent in this view of sacred and 
profane lies at the centre of his understanding of human nature and 
is directly related to a cognate notion, that of hierophany. A 
hierophany is any phenomenon by means of which the sacred is manifest, 
the history of religions is itself 'constituted by a number of 
important hierophanies from the most elementary manifestation of the 
sacred in a rock or tree to the supreme hierophany, the incarnation 
of God in Jesus Christ,.2 From these brief references it can be seen 
that the notion of the sacred possesses the two dimensions referred 
to when we commented upon the relational nature of Eliade's work. 
The first is a function of the phenomenon experienced while the 
second pertains to the act of experiencing itself, so both the 
subject perceiving and the object disclosing constitute the realm 
of the sacred. It is important to appreciate this complementary 
constitution of the sacred if Eliade's discussion of modern western 
man is to be understood, for despite the fact that sacredness is 
viewed as so significant a component of human life he asserts that 
1. 
2. 
Eliade, M. 
Eliade, M. 
1979:xiii. 
1968:124. 
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european man has virtually lost his sense of the sacred. The 
pragmatic world of empirical causalities has robbed man of this 
dimension so that he lives in the absence of the sacred, in a 
state of what might be called profanity. Herein lies the 
justification of history of religions for it provides such people 
with ethnographic and historical materials which serve as the 
requisite hierophanic focus which itself may trigger off the 
sacred response in man. 
It might be argued that Eliade has so over-valued the 
notion of the sacred that he defines human nature in terms contrary 
to much of the evidence suggestive of man's basic secularity, or 
that he is not prepared to conceive of the possibility of a change 
in human consciousness in the course of history such that the 
sacred component is removed. However, the intention of the present 
discussion was merely to show how Eliade uses the notion of the 
sacred and also how he understands the function of the history of 
religions as an academic and human discipline. One illuminating 
point emerging from all this is his lack of reference to Durkheim's 
use of the categories sacred and profane. He virtually ignores 
Durkheim's usage despite the fact that it was the French sociologist 
who popularized the idea. Eliade is, of course, perfectly familiar 
with Durkheim's work in the Annee sociologique as with Les Formes 
elementaires , but it seems that Durkheim's completely reductionist 
position made him disagreeable to Eliade. Indeed it would seem to 
be this distaste which led Eliade to make the rather academically 
eccentric assertion that Les Formes elementaires 'does not 
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properly speaking represent a contribution to the sociology of 
1 .. ,1 re 19lon . While the strictly anthropological criticisms of 
that work are well known and quite devastating as far as the 
erroneous arguments on totemism and clan structure are concerned, 
yet even the most scathing critics have praised its general 
insights and contribution to sociological thought. But Eliade 
decries Durkheim's .. endeavours for the very reason that he 
praises those of Otto , for the former discourages commitment to 
the sacred by explaining its origin in the social interaction of 
ritual, whereas the latter locates it in the divine. In fact such 
a simplistic evaluation hardly does justice to Durkheim for whom the 
idea of God is no less significant in practical terms because it is 
viewed as a social product than if it was.actually derived from a 
self-existent being: but that kind of feat of intellectualizing does 
not appeal to Eliade. It might have been more to Eliade's credit if 
he had been prepared to consider Durkheim's totemic ritual as 
hierophanic material, but his dedication to establishing the history 
of religions as a means of religious awakening hardly permitted the 
use of reductionist sociology which that exercise would have entailed. 
What would have accorded more with his particular desires would have 
been a closer study of Robertson Smith's original use of the notions 
sacred and common, for he, at least, entertained no reductionist 
notions in his Religion of the Semites , the book on which Durkheim's 
study of religion was based. In fact Robertson Smith is mentioned 
very briefly and only in passing, for Eliade's final judgement is 
1. Eliade, M. 1969:15. 
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that this kind of sociological hypothesis, such as was also 
espoused by R.R.Marett, Andrew Lang, J.F. MacLennan and 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, has had no 'lasting influence on historico-
1 · . d·' 1 re 19lOUS stu les . 
The framework within which Eliade thus works emphasizes 
the central opposition between the sacred and the profane which 
must itself be seen as a way of conceptualizing the state of 
human life. Because the sacred and profane - whether in the forms 
of space and time it does not matter - correspond to the 'two 
modes of being in the world' it is difficult to discuss the 
notion of salvation in Eliade's work despite the fact that it might 
be said to be the central concern of all his work. Primarily 
salvation would seem to refer to the quality of life which he 
identifies as the sacred and which admits of many dimensions. For 
the primitive this involves the belief that the cosmos was made by 
the gods and is still a place of transcendent significance and power 
which man experiences through his own initiatory rituals and the 
more regular cultic activity of his society. The modern, urban 
Christian, by contrast, has lost the sense of cosmic dimensions and 
for his salvation depends upon a more private and personal 
2 
relationship with God. Throughout Eliade's work the problem of 
meaning appears in the form of a problem of being. This is why his 
notion of salvation is hard to define with any precision, for being 
admits of many degrees and levels of attainment. Eliade thus arrives 
at a position not dissimilar from that of the paradigm of meaning 
1. Eliade, M. 1957:231. 
2. Ibid, p. 179. 
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once it is appreciated that for him the notion of meaning is 
allied with that of transcendent significance. It is the level 
of awareness of the sacred which constitutes the full category 
of meaning for him, and this involves the experiential dimension 
to a large extent. 
Eliade's methodology follows that history of religions 
perspective which concentrates more upon the 'essence' of 
religion than upon its historical context. This distinction is 
one which Eliade himself makes and it is critical for hermeneutics 
in the history of religions. He sees historians of religions as 
being divided 'between two divergent but complementary orientations' -
those who focus upon the typical 'structures of religious phenomena 
seek to understand the essence of religion' while those who prefer 
to analyse the 'historical context' desire to 'discover and 
communicate its history'. 1 Occasionally, however, he uses the 
n o ~ i o n n of essence in a confusing way as in the rhetorical question; 
'does the fact that we cannot grasp the essence of religion also 
mean that we cannot grasp the essence of religious phenomena ?,.2 
Here the distinction between the two types of essence is similar 
to that which in terms of anthropological analysis could be expressed 
as the difference between the origin and contemporary structure of 
a phenomenon. While it may be quite impossible to discover the origin 
of religious consciousness it is possible ( and Eliade's work shows 
this) to ascertain the way religious phenomena function in religious 
groups. This functioning can be studied not only in contemporary 
1. Ibid, p.232. 
2. Eliade, M. 1964:168. 
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contexts but also in religions of the past, for there is a 
theoretical distinction to be drawn between historical conjecture 
of the evolutionary style of nineteenth century anthropology and 
the approach of the history of religions which traces the development 
of religious doctrines, practices or, for example, iconography. 
Criticism of Eliade will always be influenced by the fear that in 
such historical analysis, as in any discussion of contemporary 
phenomena, his preoccupation with the notion of the sacred will 
lead to an undue bias over the importance of commitment on the 
part of the historian of religion. 
This desire to establish the history of religions as 
something more than a neutral academic discipline is also shared 
by Wilfred Cantwell Smith whose influence in the field, while not 
so widespread as that of Eliade, has been quite prominent. For Smith 
the history of religions should not only study the religious life of 
mankind but should also contribute to the religious and moral life 
of man, for 'every time a person anywhere makes a religious 
decision, at stake is the final destiny and meaning of the human race. 
If we do not see this and cannot make our public see it, then what-
. . f .. ,1 
ever else we may be, we are not hlstorlans 0 rellgon . To think 
ln these terms, let alone to express them in such strong language, is 
to make perfectly clear the approach adopted to religious phenomena. 
The goal of the discipline as he sees it is twofold: to turn our 
nascent world society into a world community, and to help individuals 
find meaning in their lives. These goals, which exemplify his sense 
of commitment to the task of the discipline, are reflected in a 
1. Smith, W.Cantwell. 1968. Cited in E.J.Sharpe, 1975:284. 
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major contribution Smith makes to the history of religions through 
his suggestion that the very word 'religion' be eliminated from 
general usage and be replaced by the notions of 'cumulative 
tradition' and ffaith,.l 
Smith resembles Eliade in seeking to avoid any type of 
reductionist explanation of religious phenomena and it is this 
motive which led him to examine the change in meaning of the 
word 'religion' through history and to show that it is a most 
inappropriate description of what actually counts as significant in 
the religious lives of men. The word has tended to be used of the 
actual doctrinal system of religious traditions rather than of the 
personal life of faith in individual cases. For this reason it is 
wiser to separate these two aspects of religiosity, with the tradition 
as an historical development with sets of teachings, rites and forms 
on the one hand, and the personal life of faith at which the religious 
tradition becomes meaningful for the individual on the other. It is 
also at this level that it is possible to talk of truth, he says, 
inasmuch as religious systems ought not to be discussed as abstract 
sets of propositions whose validity requires verification by 
philosophical analysis. Religious beliefs thus become true in 
individual lives in concrete life contexts. While this argument does 
not impress some philosophers of religion such as John Hick - who 
wishes to emphasize the question raised by contradictory truth 
assertions in religions - Smith feels that it does more justice to 
the complex realities of religious phenomena at the level of daily life. 
1. Smith, W. Cantwell. 1963:17. 
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Smith presumes some idea of meaningfulness for the religious 
believer without attempting to discuss it in any detail. What is clear 
is that he regards the formal system of doctrines in each religion 
as becoming significant for the historian of religion only after it 
has become vitally related to the actual life of individuals. 
Meaningfulness therefore has something to do with the intuitive 
apprehension and application of traditional teachings to personal 
and contemporary events, while salvation is the state in which these 
traditional formulae of spirituality are actualized. Smith thus 
outlines an argument which he believes can embrace any religion. The 
precise content of the traditional formulation of doctrines is not 
important, and their comparison ought not to be regarded as the 
central concern of the history of religions. What is more significant 
is the way in which traditional forms are related to present 
realization; it is precisely because religious studies have 'analysed 
the externals but missed the core of the matter' that a redefinition 
of method is required. l 
To complete this comment on historians of religion who see 
their task as one of discussing religion as an essential part of 
life it will be useful to refer to Joachim Wach who viewed 
religionswissenschaft as a discipline opposing secular tendencies 
in the modern world, and which could serve to reinvigorate personal 
religious values. The following quotation demonstrates how different 
the approach of the historian of religion is from that of the social 
anthropologist. 
1. Ibid, p.7. 
'To view the multiplicity of religious life and 
expression, to discover similarities and 
relationships need not as some fear have a 
sobering and paralysing effect on one's own 
religiosity. On the contrary it could become 
a support and aid in the battle against the 
godless and estranged powers, it ought to lead 
to the examination and preservation of one's 
own religious faith'. 1 
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Religious phenomena should thus, argues Wach, be interpreted in 
terms of their own logic and rationale, and in saying this he is 
completely in accord with Smith's view that methodology must be 
appropriate to the object of study.2 Reductionisms of sociological 
or psychological kinds are inadmissible as is historicism. When 
studied in terms of specifically religious schemes the subject 
matter of the history of religions will broaden and deepen the 
sensus numinis rather than detract from it. 
To admit that the subject matter of a study be allowed to 
dictate the terms of analysis is to introduce a potential hazard 
into methodology; but as long as it is possible to state clearly 
which elements and ideas are so accepted as guidelines it remains 
a possible way of proceeding. The great difficulty, however, lies 
in this very point concerning specificity of indigenous categories, 
a point which becomes clearer when Oxtoby's criticism is recalled 
to the effect that the phenomenology of religion has tended to 
'endorse religion in general as compared with secularity'. 3 In one 
sense the historian or phenomenologist is doing nothing different 
1. Wach, J. 1968:128. 
2. Smith, W.Cantwell. Ibid, p.6. 
3. Oxtoby, W.G. 1973:32. 
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from the anthropologist of Stanner's persuasion who seeks the 
essential and intrinsic pattern of ideas present in an indigenous 
culture. The difference lies in the fact that the western historian 
of religion already possesses his own native concept of religion as 
a general category and it is this which can, so easily, be brought 
to bear upon and to endorse religion in general. Yet Oxtoby's 
criticism would not hold for all scholars as the case of J.M. 
Kitagawa exemplifies. His brief for the history of religions 
focuses upon the dimension of religious experience and its 
diverse manifestations in history studied in a historical critical 
w a ~ ~ as opposed to a 'theological history of religions' which 
ak .. ab 1··· 1 m es presupposltl0ns out re 1910Slty. Kitagawa acknowledges 
the great difficulty of studying religions while seeking to avoid 
the influence of one's own tradition and suggests that one way of 
coping with the problem methodologically is to maintain an explicit 
tension between one's own religious background -along with its own 
theological evaluation of other religions- and the more neutral 
academic study of religion as such. Here Kitagawa can be seen to 
resemble Eliade, Smith and Wach since their statements about the 
commitment aspect of the discipline could also be said to apply 
specifically to the ultimate and final level of analysis. In the 
initial stages of work they, too, desire the neutral observation 
and documentation of religious phenomena, with formal religious 
apologetics coming in at a later stage of the argument. It is just 
this later stage which is absent from anthropological analysis and 
marks the real difference of approach and intention. 
1. Kitagawa, J.M. 1959:28. 
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It would be incorrect to infer from these comments on the 
apologetic aspect of the history of religions that it constituted 
the unifying factor in the discipline, though that would be an 
attractive proposition. We have already shown that for Eliade the 
history of religions was a 'total hermeneutics' of man's encounter 
with the sacred, but he went further than this to say that historians 
of religion did not, as a matter of fact, construct any unified 
perspective on this basis. On the contrary he sees the history of 
the discipline as a growth in a defeatist attitude emerging 
'precisely in an epoch in which knowledge concerning man increased 
considerably' through contributions from psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology, and at a time when knowledge of the eastern world 
was developing rapidly. The decline of the evolutionary paradigm 
contributed significantly to this change as we have already argued, 
so while Eliade might well regard the change as 'tragic' it was 
neither 'paradoxical' nor unintelligible, at least in retrospect. l 
The non-paradoxical nature of the change lies in the fact that as 
a greater wealth of material emerged so the growing and differentiating 
disciplines developed increasingly distinctive methods of dealing with 
it. When Eliade argued that the history of religions ought not to 
conform to models drawn from natural sciences, or in other words 
ought not to follow anyone of these newer approaches, he not only 
articulated the problem but also demonstrated the problem of the 
complexity of understanding In religious studies. In part it is 
this recognition of complexity which has made any kind of reductionism 
abhorrent to historians of religion. But there is also a personal 
1. Eliade, M. 1965:5. 
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factor involved in this complexity and concerns the tension between 
intuitive understanding and critical understanding. The former is 
the result of the private history of a man and embraces his cultural 
background, a factor of obvious importance to Eliade's own self-
understanding involving a deep lying eastern european folk religiosity 
expressed in his autobiography, wHle the latter represents the academic 
tradition to which he is heir and which occasions the central problem 
of deciding upon presuppositions for stUdy. For Eliade there is a 
further difficulty involved in this tension not only because it is 
hard to identitY his specific intellectual perspectives but because 
he finds the broad liberal humanist outlook unacceptable. This has 
meant that his own work has tended away from abstract neutrality in 
historical study to a position which is rather distinctive1y·. his 
own. That form of the history of religions which endorses religion 
in general is one which Eliade has done much to foster and develop, 
but because of its somewhat idiosyncratic perspective it was 
inevitable that he should find himself at variance with just those 
other academic disciplines whose views he could not completely accept. 
This assertion is not quite as tautologous as might first appear 
for Eliade does talk in terms of wishing that a more unified study 
of religion will come about while apparently failing to see that 
it is precisely because these methods were unacceptable to him 
that he set about constructing his own position. 
It is impossible to resolve this difficulty as long as some 
scholars feel the need to assert the significance of personal 
religious factors in the actual study of religion. Before looking 
at this problem in the case of Gerardus van der Leeuw as an 
established phenomenologist of religion, it will be instructive to 
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see how a similar problem has been acknowledged in anthropology. 
By introducing this comment here rather than in the former chapter 
it will become even clearer that the entire breadth of disciplines 
dealing with religious phenomena is beset with similar difficulties. 
One of the best known anthropological comments on this problem 
is that of Evans-Pritchard in the conclusion of his survey criticism 
on theories of primitive religion where he asks what kind of 
understanding has been gained from the classical theories of religion 
which is of any use in helping to explain the nature of personal 
religious experience. He is clear in asserting that as far as a 
discussion of religion in the social life of a group is concerned it 
makes no difference whether the anthropologist is a believer or not, 
but that once he wishes to go beyond this level of analysis then 
personal religious preferences do become significant. Evans-Pritchard's 
quotation from Wilhelm Schmidt to the effect that 'if religion is 
essentially of the inner life, it follows that it can be truly 
grasped only from within' is an expression of his own view of the 
significance of religiosity for the interior life of individuals. 
A similar point is made in the closing paragraphs of his Nuer Religion 
where the essentially personal aspect of religious experience is 
emphasized. l But these tantalizing comments are nowhere explored 
and developed: they merely stand as a testimony by a great 
anthropologist to the fact that even thorGugh analyses of social 
structures do not exhaust the complete meaning of religion. 
1. Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1965:121. 
A more extended discussion of the personal values of 
anthropologists is found in Raymond Firth's essays on religion 
1 
and anthropology. His position differs from that of Evans-
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Pritchard inasmuch as he is not a religious believer himself but 
is much concerned with the issue of motivation in religious analyses. 
He gives as an example the case of witchcraft which anthropologists 
normally interpret in terms of social tensions, and says that if they 
actually believed in the existence of malevolent power distinct from 
the influence of man on man then the interpretation would have to be 
radically different. The question is one of the status of the final 
referent. Firth is particularly useful an example to discuss ln 
this context of hermeneutics Slnce he devotes some time to the 
question of meaning, and regards the issue of orders of meaning as 
central to the quest of religious studies. In asserting that 
'religion is man's ultimate answer to the problem of meaning' Firth 
~ ~
shows how much he is taken up with the notion of social realities 
as conferring a sense of order upon individual lives. 2 Unlike many 
British anthropologists Firth wants to analyse the relationship 
between the level of meaning which operates for and within the 
individual on the one hand , and that which functions at the level 
of society at large on the other. While it is not possible to 
develop Firth's argument here it is necessary to say that his 
concern with the personal level of meaning is directly related 
to sociological lssues through the influence the individual can 
exert within religious movements. While he offers no particular 
scheme for interpreting systems of meaning construction he makes it 
1. Firth, R. 1964. 
2. Ibid, p.232. 
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quite clear that such systems are as much emotional as intellectual 
. 1 
In nature. In terms of a general paradigm of meaning no more 
appropriate anthropological an author could be sought than Firth 
even though the problems he raised are far from being solved, they 
serve, rather, to indicate the rather similar group of 
hermeneutical difficulties also shared by the history and 
phenomenology of religions. 
It is to the more specifically phenomenological issues 
that we must now turn in concluding this chapter, and in particular 
to the influential study of Gerardus van der Leeuw entitled 
Religion in Essence and Manifestation and first published in 
1933 as Phanomenologie Der Religion. Van der Leeuw's contribution 
to the phenomenology of religion is both a classic example of how 
descriptive phenomenology with its schemes of classification can be 
applied to religious entities, and also of the problem of 
presuppositions. This latter issue becomes even more problematical 
in the phenomenology of religion than in the history of religion, 
since the phenomenologist reckons to maintain himself in a state 
of suspension of doubt over the nature of the reality and validity 
of phenomena under consideration in the hope that the essential nature 
of these objects, rites or beliefs will become apparent through the 
act of description. Van der Leeuw asserts at the outset that 
'no imperiously dominating theory' lay behind his study, yet in the 
hundredth chapter - the section dealing with 'the religion of love' 
which is his typological description and categorization of Christianity-
he says that both that chapter and all that have gone before it had 
1. Ibid, p.234. 
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been written from the Christian viewpoint. 1 How it is that he can 
achieve the 'attitude of complete intellectual suspense' whilst 
also including his personal religious standpoint it is difficult 
to see. It originates in his conception of the phenomenology of 
religion as a total activity, and presumes that personal bias will 
be incorporated into the endeavour. Van der Leeuw hoped that by 
making public the fact of these private dispositions they could 
be included in the final evaluation. 
The basis of van der Leeuw's objection to the notion of 
the supposed neutrality of scholarly study lies in the fact of 
man's historical facticity. It is impossible, he argues, not to be 
ideologically inclined in some direction or other, and to attempt 
an unprejUdiced stance is only to adopt some 'interpretation of 
religion borrowed from some liberal western european Christianity, 
the deism of the Enlightenment or the so called monism of the 
natural sciences', but without acknowledging the fact. 2 So he too 
follows Eliade and Wach in advocating a committed perspective of 
a personal kind as a basis for religious studies. At least he lS 
explicit about it and, as far as most of Religion in Essence and 
Manifestation is concerned, this emphasis does not seem to be of 
very great importance to the interpretation offered. It is only 
when the more descriptive categories have been established that he 
progresses to an abstract consideration of the idea of salvation 
and imposes his Christian belief. Christianity is taken to be 
'the central form of historical religion', and the gospel as 
3 
'the fulfilment of religion in general'. The theoretical tension 
1. Leeuw, G. van der. 1938:10. 
2. Ibid, p.644. 
3. Ibid, p.646. 
between religious commitment and the epoche of phenomenology 
which is present here has beEn noted by E.J. Sharpe who 
observes that for van del' Leeuw 'phenomenological scholarship 
was not to be sharply differentiated from metaphysics or from 
1 
theology'. This unresolved tension is almost a distinctive 
feature of the work of the religiously committed involved in 
religious studies, and the factors influencing van del' Leeuw 
can be discerned in many studies of religion. The particular 
significance of this for the present argument lies in the 
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specific content he gives to the notion of meaning - one which 1S 
religiously informed. The power of the paradigm of meaning is 
that it can help avoid the doctrinal ethos or ideOlogical set of 
one tradition affecting the way others are studied. It is possible 
to be committed to the idea that all religious systems are essentially 
concerned with the process of meaning construction without having 
any fixed idea as to the precise content of a particular c a s e ~ ~ in 
other words one can have a formal notion of meaning without any 
material concept of it. It is when an author allows his own 
particular material notion of meaning to direct his study of 
other groups that difficulties are likely to arise. It is, for 
example, the Christian theological predisposition to positive 
resolutions of life problems which has led van del' Leeuw and others 
into an over-evaluation of the positive and creative aspects of 
religious phenomena. 2 This contrasts with the more essentially 
phenomenological outlook of Stanner which unashamedly documents 
the opposing realities in the life-world of the Murinbata. 
1. 
2. 
Sharpe, E.J. 1975: 234. 
Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, 1930:7 ff. 'In considering 
religion, we should not be obsessed by the idea of its 
necessary goodness. This is dangerous delusion'. 
_ JL ...... 
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Van der Leeuw's study of salvation exemplifies some of 
these points but also contributes to the paradigm of meaning 
because of its distinctive use of the notion of power. He begins 
with the theoretically important point that equivalent terms are not 
always easy to find in the comparative study of religious concepts. 
Even when translating between German, French, and English there are 
problems with the idea of salvation. The German heil , for example, 
which can be rendered as salvation also means deliverance, while its 
derivatives, heiland or saviour, heilig or holy, heiligtum or 
sanctuary, and heilsgeschichte or salvation history, all serve to 
broaden the notion and thereby prevent it from being restricted to 
what he regards as the 'accepted but definitely limited English 
. . f' , 1 slgnl lcance . Van der Leeuw thinks that such a breadth is useful 
inasmuch as he does not wish to restrict the notion of salvation 
to explicitly Christian doctrinal terms. This admirable intention 
is put relatively short lived, however, because he proceeds to a 
definition of salvation in terms of power, and of an awareness of 
a positive force in the self or in the external world - a force 
possessing a positive moral aspect, for 'salvation is ... power 
experienced as Good,.2 He then describes the emergence of this power 
and its identification with phenomena like water, certain animals, 
and the season of spring prior to its portrayal in savioutfigures. 
The theme of evil and demons is developed to account for the 
fact that power may also be experienced as 'terrifying, devastating 
and incalculable'. 3 Similarly the notion of the incomprehensibility 
of perceived evil is emphasized to demonstrate that affective 
1. Leeuw, G. van der. 1938:101. 
2. Ibid, p. 102. 
3. Ibid, p. 134. 
dimensions of religious traditions cannot be ignored ln 
theoretical works. 
'Beliefs in demons does not mean that chance 
rules the Universe, but rather that I have 
experienced the horror of some power which 
concerns itself neither with my reason nor 
my morals -<,it is not fear of any concrete 
terribleness, but vague terror of the 
gruesome 
projects 
demons. ' 
and the incomprehensible, which 
itself objectively in belief in 
1 
In this scheme evil is the emotional response to 
14 '7 
intellectual uncertainty, it is not simply ignorance but the 
context of unknowing which results in the potency of the 
negative sense of power. In terms of plausibility theory the 
notion of power can be said to include both the cognitive and 
affective dimensions with the latter serving as the context 
for the former. What is quite clear is that in van der Leeuw' s 
scheme the notions of meaning and power are closely aligned, so 
that his basic assumption about religiosity is that 'man does not 
simply accept the life that is given to him' but 'in life he 
2 
seeks power'. Power has to do with understanding the nature of 
reality in order to have it firmly under control for 'Homo 
religiosus betakes himself to the road to omnipotence, to 
complete understanding, to ultimate meaning. He would fain 
comprehend life in order to dominate it'. Power is not simply the 
desire for status and prestige - in the sense in which E.R. Leach 
postulated that 'a conscious or unconscious wish to gain power is 
1. Idem. 
2 . Ibid, p. 679. 
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a very general motive in human affairs' , where power means the 
seeking of recognition 'of access to office as social persons, 
the gaining of esteem' - but is the general category of man's 
response to a Id h o h hall h O ° ° 1 I ° wor w 1C c enges 1S own super1or1ty. t 1S 
in the process of attaining to full power and mastery that man 
experiences salvation even though during his actual life-time 
he does not achieve that full sense of power which he so much 
seeks. Van der Leeuw uses the notion of ahnung to describe 
this firm sense of conviction of the nature of things which still 
2 lacks the full grasp of them. Man is thus engaged in a process 
of becoming, of endeavouring to possess a full sense of meaning 
but without actually attaining to it. So it is that the religious 
life is not essentially different from the rest of cultural life 
which is also a pattern of constructed meanings and power, yet it 
is the natural conclusion of other aspects of cultural life. 'The 
religious significance of things ... is that on which no wider nor 
deeper meaning whatever can follow', says van der Leeuw, an assertion 
which resembles the position adopted later by Hans Mol and which 
will be considered in due course. The distinctive feature of van 
der Leeuw's argument lies in his view that man comes ultimately 
'to stand at the very frontier and perceives the ultimate 
superiority he will never attain', which as far as meaning 1S 
concerned implies that 'the last word is never spoken' and that 
full power is never achieved. 3 But it is just at this point when 
van der Leeuw has brought man to the limit of his self-perceived 
1. Leach, E. R. 1954:10. 
2. Leeuw, G. van der. 1938:665. 
3 . I bid, P . 6 80 . 
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boundary of power and meaning that he talks about salvation. 
Salvation is that desired, though unattained, state which directs 
human endeavour and which exerts a present influence upon those 
who are seeking it. The religious quest is thus set within the 
context of the unknown goal so that in Rudolph Otto's terms it 
might be said that the 'wholly other' is the determining feature 
of the searching spirit of man. It is as the ultimate is then 
being sought that the 'numinous' is experienced. There is yet 
another aspect of the context of salvation which merits attention, 
for it shows the similarity between van der Leeuw's thought and 
that of John Bowker whilst also exemplifying one of the central 
concerns of this study, namely the problem of evil in religious 
studies. 
There is, says van der Leeuw, a fundamental limitation or 
restriction experienced by man as he persues his path to power. 
It comes when man experiences the boundary separating him from 
full awareness and from the sense of possessing the entire meaning 
of his life and destiny. This knowledge of limitation involves a 
'devaluation of all that has preceded it', and an experience of 
'the malicious inadequacy of all that happens and the irrationality 
at the basis of life itself,.l The precise meaning of limitation 
in van der Leeuw is not, however, the same as Bowker's notion of 
compounds of limitation. For Bowker such limitations are the very 
facts of life which religion serves to overcome while for van der 
Leeuw they are intrinsic to religious processes as such. For example, 
1. Ibid, p.681. 
150 
the idea of the demonic which is but one manifestation of the 
'inadequate' in religion has been conceptually related to, and 
has come to be contained within the very concept of divinity. 
, In the very concept of God the demonic continues to proclaim 
its presence, whether as absolute incalculability (predestination) 
1 
or as inestimable mercy.' But such assertions are to be understood 
more as van der Leeuw's passing comments than as central concepts. 
In context they occupy a relatively insignificant place and they 
have been mentioned here only because of the theoretical importance 
placed upon negative features in the present study. What is evident 
from these comments on van der Leeuw's work is that his notions of 
power and limitation permit an easy application of the paradigm of 
meaning to his entire scheme, this demonstrates how hermeneutical 
exercises in the phenomenology of religion are not very far removed 
from those in both the history and anthropology of religions. 
This does not mean that a general paradigm of meaning can 
now be safely accepted in religious studies, or that an unquestionable 
uniformity has emerged amongst scholars. A consideration of the 
important study by the anthropologist Rodney Needham of the notion 
of belief will make this problem clear. This particular study, 
Belief, Language, and Experience, has been chosen as the focus of 
criticism for the concluding of this chapter not only because it 
offers a contradiction of the paradigm of meaning but because it 
raises the most fundamental questions concerning religious phenomena 
which bear direct relevance to the theorists already discussed. 2 
1. Ibid, p.140. 
2. Needham, Rodney. 1972. 
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The criticism directed against the lack of philosophical 
sophistication in anthropological studies in chapter four would 
be completely inappropriate as far as Needham's study is concerned. 
As a work it is both profoundly anthropological -inasmuch as it 
treats of those categories which pertain to religious institutions-
and at the same time profoundly philosophical in the Wittgensteinian 
tradition of linguistic analysis. The fact that Needham devotes the 
opening paragraphs to an explanation of the inter-disciplinary 
nature of his discussion, saying that he wanted to 'attract the 
attention of theologians, linguists and psychologists' as well 
as anthropologists and philosophers, shows the breadth of intention 
and intimates the possible scope of its influence. l Despite the fact 
that but little response has, as yet, been forthcoming from these 
quarters, Needham's analysis of the relationship between statements 
expressing belief in religious entities and inner feeling-states 
which might be thought to correspond to them stands as an unavoidable 
demonstration of the crucial issues which must be encountered by those 
interested in theoretical problems of religious study, and most 
especially in hermeneutical tasks. 
In sympathy with the general approach outlined earlier for 
the paradigm of meaning Needham explains the desire of the 
anthropologist as philosopher 'to discern a constant order in the 
world, and ... to make an orderly determination of the true nature 
of man,.2 This hope has not, however, come to fruition; for 'from 
the confident and universal programme of Comte' to his own 
1. Ibid, p.xiv. 
2. Ibid, p.243. 
152 
tentative and particular study there has been nothing but 
'a series of setbacks and disillusionments' which has removed 
any 'ground of absolute knowledge,.l His own contribution has 
a sense of finality about it, at least methodologically, inasmuch 
as the finding of order depends upon language, and his study has 
demonstrated only the 'phantasmagoric variegation of the collective 
forms of significance, in grammar and classificatory concepts' which 
reflects the essential relativity that marks all ideas about the 
meaning and determination of human experience' 2 This leads Needham 
to an increased scepticism and to a sense that no ultimate 
knowledge of the meaning of human life can be attained. It is no 
longer a question of the necessity for deeper or more extensive 
research, for the very idea that success is possible must itself 
be abandoned. He repeats this idea several times because he sees 
the essential problem as lying in language itself, a problem which 
is reflected in other areas of human thought. For the fact that 
there are words which clearly do signify certain things conduces to 
the conclusion - and Needham thinks it a false conclusion - that 
meaning is possible in any area given a suitable precision in the 
use of words. His study is an attempt to 'determine (man's) 
relationship to reality' and his conclusion is that language, far from 
3 helping to clarifY this problem, only further obscures it. He 
argues that language, by its very nature, cannot be relied upon to 
furnish accurate descriptions of the human condition; but since 
language is the only possible medium of analysis it follows that 
there can be no final and true word spoken on the nature of human life. 
No 'order of orders' is possible with the result that 'only shifting 
1. Idem. 3. Ibid, p.236. 
2. Ibid p.244. 
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relativities remain,.l This assertion is, inevitably, unpalatable 
to scholars who depend upon words, but it also lays bare the 
implications of the paradigm of meaning. In other words the 
general human desire for meaning can be seen as consonant with -
if not actually the result of- the general attribute and function 
of language as implying that a full meaning can be found for any 
phenomenon. And Needham reckons to have shown that this is not 
the case. This obviously merits further attention. 
Needham's actual emphasis upon the notion of belief followed 
less from any desire to study religion than from the wish to show 
that notions of a psychological type could not be given any full 
and specific verbal expression. In providing a thorough comparative 
study of this one term he thinks that a sound case has been made 
for the unreliability of psychological category terms in actual 
philosophical arguments. Needham appreciates that this finding is 
unsettling to intellectual pursuits which depend upon the reliability 
of verbal constructs. He resorts to a figurative passage replete 
with topographical metaphors to convey the sense of 'conceptual 
instability and the loss of location' which follows the necessary 
acknowledgement of 'the precariousness of our delineations of the 
d .. ,2 human con ltlon . 
It is particularly instructive to note this use of the word 
'precariousness' inasmuch as it is also emphasized in Berger's work. 
The exaltation of the phenomenon of language in both cases is 
largely to blame for their negative evaluation of the human condition. 
1. Ibid, p.243. 
2. Ibid, p.235,236. 
154 
This is an important point for the extreme emphasis on language 
. 
1S a methodological stance to be borne in mind when evaluating 
Needham and Bowker's hermeneutical perspectives. What is clear 
is that they favour the cognitive and logical dimension of 
life, omitting the affective realm to a large extent. One 
illuminating consequence of this, in the light of the position 
which many historians and phenomenologists of religion adopt, is 
a clear glimpse of the way sociologically inclined thinkers differ 
from those emphasizing the transcendental aspects of human life. 
Rudolph Otto, for example, is supremely confident that attributes 
of God can be grasped by the intellect •.. analysed by thought (and) 
admit of definition', in similar vein he is sure that .' mere feeling' 
apart from precise verbal expression is useless in religion. l The 
fact that Otto proceeds to an analysis of personal and affective 
dimensions does not detract from his commitment to the importance 
of .clear definitions. In fact the ensuing descriptions of the 
sensus numinis witness to his sense of security in employing 
language to render profound experiences intelligible to all. 
It is precisely this sense of security which merits comment 
for it depends less upon any theory of language which Otto possessed 
than upon his own general religious certainty of the ultimate 
existence of the realities with which he is concerned. In this sense 
Joachim Wach is just in evaluating Otto as one whose implicit 
religious convictions are not 'matched by an articulate statement 
of the methodological aspect' of his analysis of religious 
2 phenomena. Needham, by contrast, is all too clear as to his 
1. 
2. 
Otto, Rudolph. 
Wach, Joachim. 
1924: l. 
In J.M. Kitagawa, 1968:71. 
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methodology and pushes its consequences into those very areas 
where they are sensed as unwelcome. This reasserts the point that 
theoreticians are not exempt from the inclinations of their fellow 
men in the desire for security and certainty in the world. Mary 
Douglas has aptly observed that the notion of relativity is the 
'philosopher's bogy' which seems 'to sum up all the threats to 
. . ., 1 f 
our cognltlve securlty. To ollow a strictly sociological 
understanding such as that of Durkheim necessarily involves 
abandoning any 'comfort of stable anchorage for his cognitive 
efforts' ,Needham demonstrably achieves this and thereby proves 
~ h e e consistency of his hermeneutics and shows that once the subject 
of study is the nature of human life and religiosity then the 
personal perspective of the scholar cannot be ignored, whether it be 
that of transcendentalism or relativism. 2 
One further consequence of Needham's argument which relates 
to our present consideration of reductionism concerns how private 
states are to be related to public expressions of religiosity. 
Towards the close of his book Needham uses Alastair MacIntyre's 
notion of 'opacity' in describing the individual personality. 
It is inevitable that religious studies face the issue of how 
the individual relates to the group even though from the work of 
Robertson Smith in the nineteenth century through the growing 
sociological approach of Durkheim to the modern studies of Bryan 
Wilson the individual has received scant attention. 3 Just as the 
power of the sociological tradition tended to reify the notion of 
1. Douglas, Mary. 1975:xvii. 
2. Idem. 
3. Needham, Rodney. 1972:245. 
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society with a corresponding reduction of concern with private 
persons, so the history of religions tradition, from Max Huller 
to Eliade, has tended to reify a broad category of the sacred 
dimension whi ch also offered no real analysis of the role of 
religiosity in the personal life. This comment might seem to 
contradict the actual evidence of , for example, Rudolph Otto, 
but the point is that the individual is presented as an ideal 
typical case of one in touch with the sacred. If Needham's analysis 
is correct, then the relationship between the private apprehension 
of religious phenomena and the public expression of the same 
cannot be ignored as a factor in the meaning of religiosity itself. 
While it is possible to agree with him that individuals are 
'subjected to opacity' in their mutual relations, it does not 
necessarily follow that an essential 'misunderstanding' attends 
. . 1 
all human communlcatlon. 
It can be argued phenomenologically that this opacity is 
necessary because each individual is a unique centre of 
creativity and not simply a tabula rasa programmed by socialization 
and largely through language. Language might better be understood 
as serving to unite discrete persons in as common a group as is 
possible given the individualistic basis of human life on the one 
hand, and the necessity of social interaction for co-operative life 
on the other. If it becomes apparent that there is a resistance to 
language when it is used to investigate private psychological states, 
then it is quite possible to adopt a positive interpretation of this 
1. Ibid, p.246. 
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fact in terms of the uniqueness and intransigent creativity 
of the self, rather than embrace a sense of hopelessness of 
ever understanding anything about man. Theoretically speaking 
it may be said that the opacity of the individual is but one 
restraint acting upon language as a tool of analysis. Language 
can indeed more easily be used to further the ends of a rational 
discourse than of emotional awareness, but poetry, for example, is 
one of several literary genres which encourage care in such a rash 
assertion. Thus it is important to give some place to symbolic and 
ritual acts when evaluating an overall study of religious p ~ e n o m e n a ~ ~
though care must be taken as much over the interpretation of ritual 
as of language for implicit assumptions can easily pass unnoticed. 
At least Needham's presuppositions are clear and open to critical 
evaluation which is not always the case in the study of religion. 
Ernst Benz, for example, in a paper which shows fine insight 
into the problem of translating from one language to another falls 
foul of the tendency to assume a general religiosity on the part 
of mankind. The problem of lecturing through a Japanese translator 
he compared with being assailed by an enemy. In the lesser task of 
translating from German to English he 'found that the very 
structure of language itself seems to impede understanding,.l This 
sentiment resembles Needham's basic hypothesis but Benz leaves the 
issue unexamined. It is his final comment that is note-worthy for 
he comforts himself with 'the thought that we carry within ourselves 
the most essential condition for the understanding of other religions'. 
1. Benz, Ernst. 1954. In Mircea Eliade and J.M.Kitagawa 
1959:117. 
1St! 
This intuitive faculty turns out to be nothing less than 
'a tradition of earlier forms of religious experiences and of 
earlier stages of religious consciousness'. By some means which 
remains unexplained this primal knowledge is located in 'the 
structure of human personality', and serves as the means by 
which one religious man from one culture can grasp the 
religiosity of a person from a completely different cultural 
1 background. As far as hermeneutics is concerned this sort of 
assertion is useless and leads to the anthropological refusal 
to treat history of religions seriously. 
A much more satisfactory argument over the relation of 
the individual to the group has been offered by Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith and has already been alluded to earlier. In returning to 
his hypothesis that a distinction should be made between the 
cumulative tradition of a religious movement and the personal 
faith of individual devotees, emphasis is placed upon Smith's 
view that it is the individual who is confronted by and who 
is 'the locus of an interaction between the transcendent, 
which is possibly the same for everyman, and the cumulative 
2 
tradition which is different for everyman'. Why the trans-
cendent should be the same for all men is difficult to judge 
apart from the fact that Smith operates from an implicit 
Christian tradition which postulates an essential uniform 
character of God. Be that as it may, the prominence he gives 
to the faith of the individual which is 'unfathomable, too 
profound, personal and divine for public exposition' provides 
1. Ibid, p.130. 
2. Smith, W.C. 1963:186. 
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a valuable basis for considering the problem of meaning and 
significance in religious persons. l Smith is certain that there 
are differing aspects of religiosity, some being essentially 
private whilst others are open to the observer for inspection, 
but he is content merely to assert the fact of the private 
dimension without having to lay it bare or to regret that it 1S 
inviolable. His view can be seen to be similar; to that of the 
phenomenologists of knowledge, at least in the way he 
describes the process of growth in understanding, and his notion 
of cumulative tradition could, itself, be interpreted in terms 
of the notion of the 'stock of knowledge' in plausibility 
theory. The fact of individual creativity which justifies human 
opacity is well exemplified in his assertion that 'each person 
is presented with a cumulative tradition. From it and out of 
the capacities of his own inner life and circumstances of his 
outer life, he comes to a faith of his own,.2 
These deliberations serve to show that the problem of 
interpretation in religious studies is inextricably associated 
with the level and kind of analysis which is deemed proper within 
each academic tradition. Perhaps the most fundamental difference 
in orientation which has been encountered concerns this emphasis 
upon individual and group. It is a major problem in this present 
study inasmuch as the question of salvation needs to be expressed 
1n terms of its sphere of operation. Is the notion of salvation to 
be understood as a personal and private experience, or is it 
1. Ibid, p. 170. 
2. Ibid, p.187. 
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restricted more to the ideals of a social ,group and with the 
co-operative action initiated to bring about the desired state 
of affairs ? 
Needham's study was introduced as a test case of the 
notion of plausibility on the grounds that if no sense of meaning 
and reality could be posited for the individual, then the notion 
of plausibility and of salvation defined in terms of it would be 
severely impaired. The argument brought against Needham has 
suggested that there is no serious challenge offered to the 
general paradigm of meaning by his analysis of psychological 
states and their relation to public concepts. As long as a 
difference is maintained between the significance of private 
and public states of meaning, or kinds of meaning, there is 
but little difficulty. A problem only emerges when an 
analytic device is used in realms where it is basically 
inappropriate, and in this connection it has been argued that 
the notion of human individuality and creativity provides a 
sound basis of defence against any expectation that a univocal 
relationship between public and private concepts ought to exist. 
As far as the history and phenomenology of religions are concerned, 
and the same point needs to be made for anthropology, the prime 
object of study is the sphere of inter-personal relationships 
within which language does serve positive functions. It will 
be perfectly legitimate to develop categories to accommodate 
states of private sensations even though it will be i ~ p o s s i b l e e
to elucidate upon their precise nature. This has well established 
precedents in the history of religions - in the case of Buddhism 
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for example, where there have been many discussions of the notion 
of enlightenment even though it is acknowledged that any full 
comprehension of the state can only be obtained by one who has 
attained it. 
One aspect of Needham's argument merits a final comment 
for it adds a further dimension to the general paradigm of 
meaning, albeit unintentionally. In the light of his analysis of 
language and concept formation Needham's final evaluation of man 
is that the solitary individual is 'divided within himself by 
his very self-consciousness, yet with no guarantee of his own 
integrity,.l This assertion is not unlike the Murinbata model 
of man considered earlier, and it raises again the question of 
whether the ultimate notion of meaning can incorporate an 
element of doubt. Needham's assessment of the role of language 
in self-understanding tends to be nihilistic: whereas the 
Murinbata appear content with the knowledge that reality offers 
conflicting statements which admit of no resolution, Needham 
reacts in a kind of philosophical desparation. This re-emphasizes 
the need to understand meaning as possessing both cognitive and 
affective factors. Although Needham is careful in his analyses of 
affective states it still is the case that priority is given to the 
dimension of reasoft. This study, by contrast, has argued that from 
a phenomenological perspective it is perfectly proper to assert the 
necessity of meaning in human life and religiosity in the full 
realization that the affective dimension of ritual, myth and 
symbolism can produce a sufficient level of durable plausibility 
1. Ibid, p. 245. 
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despite the fact that no perfectly consistent logical 
explanation of problems is forthcoming. This being the case 
something must be said on the logical status of the term 
'belief' as a justification for some of the studies engaged 
in by historians and phenomenologists of religion. 
Basic categories used in religious studies must be 
able to incorporate both the historical development aspect 
and the phenomenon of individual religious v i r t u o s i t y ~ ~ which 
is but one form of the public and private division of 
religious phenomena. This does not mean that a simple 
construction of paired terms such as Cantwell Smith's tradition 
and faith is all that is required. It means that whatever terms 
are employed should be able to withstand the demands made by 
both dimensions of religion. Needham's study is a classic 
example of how to analyse a concept which 'straddles the border 
between private states and public appraisal,.l It is just such 
straddling terms which require careful identification because they 
can be expected to manifest peculiar properties such that they 
may not admit of rigorous explication when viewed soley in the 
context of either private or public life-worlds. The word 'belief', 
for example, may be reduced to a complete lack of specificity 
by means of linguistic analysis, yet it possesses a remarkable 
power in its normal usage. This not only means that philosophers 
of language make demands on a particular word which it is not 
required to bear in ordinary usage, but that its very significance 
lies in the power to unite person and group within a single 
1. Ibid, p.235. 
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communication event. The very word 'belief' can thus be seen 
as charged with emotive significance which alone enables it to 
fulfil its task. Needham sees his argument as having uncovered 
the confusions introduced into man's thought by words themselves. 
Talking of words he says that 'we cannot think without them, 
but they make it hard for us to think with them,.l The confusion 
which some words seem to introduce into discourse may, in fact, 
be necessary as a blurring of concepts apart from which a 
particular activity would be impossible. Most especially might 
this be true as far as religious phenomena are concerned. 
Along with the word 'belief' are several others which 
bear a family resemblance to one another in this respect. They 
include 'the sacred', 'transcendence', 'myth', and 'symbol'. 
Indeed the word 'religion' may itself share in the paradoxical 
quality of these words, a quality bequeathed by merit of the 
fact that they have to do with the most personal and private 
aspects of life on the one hand, and with the nature of the gods 
or of society on the other. To place the notions of god and 
society together is not, by the way, to engage in the Durkheimian 
reduction of the one to the other, but simply to draw a distinction 
between the internal life of men and the external realities they 
perceive as present to their consciousness. The word 'salvation' 
also belongs to this category for it too serves to unite personal 
sentiments and the doctrinal schemes of religious traditions. Both 
as a term used in the meaning ascribed to it by specific religious 
1. Ibid, p.228. 
1 ~ 4 4
traditions, and by plausibility theory 'salvation' remains 
a means of linking public and private meanings. This category 
of 'straddling' or 'bridging' words shares in the 
characteristics of that group of terms called performative 
utterances, at least to a certain degree. Needham refers to 
performative utternaces but does so to demonstrate that the 
assertion 'I believe' like such other usages as 'I promise' 
does not refer to any special emotion or psychological state. 
In other words Needham asserts the public nature of these 
assertions and in this he is correct, but not entirely so. 
Our reason for using the notion of performative utterance 
is not that ploy mentioned by J. L. Austin in his original paper 
on the subject when he bemoaned the fact that 'people are apt 
to invoke a new use of language ... to help them out of this, 
that, or the other well known philosophical tangle,.l Rather 
it is employed in an attempt to describe a category of 
phenomena by means of analogy. It is not that the words 'belief, 
religion, salvation, sacred, myth', and 'symbol' are themselves 
performative utterances, but that the general category to which 
they may be said to belong itself resembles the general category 
of performative utterances. Austin's basic intention in coining 
the name performative for this category of words was to stress the 
fact that people actually did something by using them rather than 
simply say something: an action is performed by means of the words 
which describe the nature of the act itself, as in the cases of 
, I apologize', or 'I name this ship'. What is more, this 
1. Austin, J . L. 1961:221. 
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category is not concerned with issues of truth and falsity of 
assertions, even though there may be what Austin calls 
'infelicities' associated with the use of performatives. The 
similarity between performative and straddling categories lies 
not only in the fact that their truth or falsity is not the 
prime concern of the scholar, although he needs to be aware of 
the appropriateness of context in which they are used including 
potential infelicities, but in the observation that, as Austin 
pointed out for performatives, there are utterances whose proper 
status is to be discovered more in their 'force' than in their 
. . 1 
strlct meanlng. 
It is precisely because Needham avoids this distinction 
that he fails to do justice to the full effect of belief 
terminology. Needham pursues the rather philosophical interest 
in 'the old doctrine about meanings' , as Austin labels this general 
position, rather than seeing the more significant 'new doctrine 
2 
about all the possible forces of utterances' . If this idea of 
force may be legitimately applied to the religious phenomena of 
myth, ritual, the sacred, salvation etc., they can then be 
described as performative phenomena. This .. new category can be 
directly related to the general paradigm of meaning for it marks 
the kind of inquiry which is appropriate to the phenomena 
themselves. In continually emphasizing the affective and cognitive 
dimensions of the notion of meaning throughout this study we have 
been, albeit implicitly, advocating this notion of force which is 
a characteristic feature of many religious phenomena, and without 
1. Ibid, p. 238. 
2. Idem. 
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which little understanding can be gained of the actual function 
they effect both in religious traditions and in the personal 
dimension of faith. One vital implication of this suggestion 
is that it is unnecessary to adopt any particular religious 
stance in order to emphasize the distinctive features of 
religious phenomena in human life. The identification of 
a category such as this one of-· 'straddling terms' can assist 
in coping with notions which appear to demand a peculiar 
response on the part of d e v o t e e s ~ ~ It also enables the observer 
and analyst to maintain a more neutral stance. The mere 
construction of a category does not, of course, reduce the 
significance of questions concerning ultimate truths or of 
the existence of God, but it does enable the phenomenologist 
to attempt an adequate explanation of phenomena without 
feeling that he has to subscribe to special doctrines. In other 
words, some categories facilitate description by removing the 
necessity of reductionism. 
In the light of these hermeneutical considerations it is 
now both possible and desirable to return to the earlier theme 
of plausibility theory and salvation, and to apply these 
theoretical arguments to actual cases of religious phenomena. 
We first consider aspects of primitive religions to show that they 
are not different in kind from the so called world-religions, and 
then turn to one eastern and one western religious movement to 
demonstrate that the general paradigm of meaning does possess a 
significant hermeneutical power. 
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Chapter Six Salvation in Preliterate Societies. 
A major defect of most studies of religion, whether in 
the tradition of anthropology, phenomenology, or the history 
of religion has been the scant attention paid to the idea of 
salvation in primitive societies. In the case of nineteenth 
century scholars this fact is easily understood in terms of 
the predominating influence of evolutionary th6ught which 
viewed the religions of preli terate groups as representing 
a relatively undeveloped form of religiosity. Later forms 
of religion, especially the so called world-religions, were 
seen as the outcome of many phases of development which had 
resulted in the idea of salvation. It was assumed that one 
would search in vain for this late product in any early forms 
of primitive religion. Robertson Smith expressed something of 
this outlook in his Burnett Lectures of 1888 when he said that 
ln its earlier stages 'religion did not exist £or the saving 
of souls but for the preservation and welfare of society,.l In 
Max MUlIers influential Gifford Lectures of the same year 
there is no concern over salvation at all, not even in sections 
devoted to the definition of religion. 2 A similar picture emerged 
in E.B.Tylor's treatment of religion and its emphasis on the 
nineteenth century specialities of soul, spirit possession, worship 
. f. 3 and sacrl lce. F.B. Jevons provides further evidence of the 
preoccupation with taboo, magic, fetishism, ancestor worship, 
and mythology, in his introductions to comparative religion. 4 
1. Smith, W.R. 1894:29. 
2. MUller, M. 1898. 
3. 
4. 
Tylor, E.B. 1958. 
Jevons, F.B. 1896, 
1908. 
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Of the early twentieth century scholars Andrew Lang 
in his Making of Religion, and Rafael Karsten in his 
Origins of Religion , demonstrate a similar lack of interest 
in salvation which is shared in addition by R.R. Marett. l 
E.O. James, whose work extended into the nineteen sixties 
and whose interests betray a resemblance to the somewhat 
antiquarian concerns of the intellectualist scholars of the 
Victorian period, did address himself to the sUbject of 
salvation but did so less in order to explore its theoretical 
significance than as a basis for approaching Indian religions. 2 
More recently W.G. Oxtoby has expressed surprise at 
this general lack of theoretical interest in the notion of 
salvation during what he calls the first phase in the development 
3 
of the history of religion up to 1915. He suggests that the 
term salvation was too theological for currency at a time when 
theology was not a popular pursuit among academics, but as we have 
already shown this is a less likely explanation than that which 
sees the emphasis upon evolutionism as tending to reduce 
expectations of finding such developed phenomena in primitive 
structures. During the decade of 1960 there was a growth of 
interest in the notion of salvation among historians and 
phenomenologists but, as Oxtoby points out for the two key 
volumes expressing this concern, it was more pragmatic than 
. 1 4 theoretlca . The same criticism could be levelled against other 
1. Lang, A. 1900. Karsten, R. 1935. Marett, R.R. 1929,1933. 
2. James, E.O. 1933, 1938, 1962. 
3. Oxtoby, W.G. 1973:32. 
4. Abel et. ale 1962. Brandon, s.G.r. 1963. 
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standard works in the history of religion. Even the editor of 
one important collection of studies which represented the papers 
given at a world congress of the International Association for 
the History of Religion could admit that no theoretical scheme 
1 had been advanced or typology advocated. While it is most 
appropriate that assent should be given to Oxtoby's observation 
that it was in the period following the first world war that a 
growth took place in religionswissenschaft and in the academic 
interest in salvation, it must be added that this concern was 
almost entirely philological or philosophical and was certainly 
directed towards the great religious traditions of the world. 
Where comparisons have been made they have usually followed the 
plan of discussing functional equivalents in the meaning of 
salvation ideas. There has been but little concern with more 
theoretical issues, a fact which may be explained by the 
tendency for anthropological and sociological studies which 
normally engage in more abstract theorizing, to follow different 
lines of interest from the history and phenomenology of religion 
which themselves favour discussion of the formal systems of thought 
of religious movements.,. 
The very fact that the methods employed by these traditions 
vary reinforced the notion that primitive religiosity and that of 
world religions were of significantly different types. But the nature 
of this difference is not easy to establish in fact. Eliade in the 
history of religions and Levi-Strauss in anthropology have both 
1. Werblowsky, R.J. Zwi. and C.J.Bleeker, 1970. 
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established powerful arguments to the effect that, as the former 
puts it, 
'the metaphysical concepts of the archaic world 
were not always formulated in theoretical language: 
but the symbol, the myth, the rite, express on 
different planes and through the means proper to 
them, a complex system of coherent affirmations 
about the ultimate reality of things, a system 
that can be regarded as constituting a metaphysics,.l 
So if there is no essential difference in the ability to 
conceptualize, there is a difference over the current content of 
thought. In terms of Eliade's general thesis this could be expressed 
as the essential sacred ethos of the life-world and therefore of the 
thought world of primitives on the one hand, and the desacralized 
world of western, urban man, on the other. 
The fact that a more abstract consideration of salvation is 
now possible results from the necessary association of anthropological 
and history of religions perspectives in recent studies of world-
religions at their local level of pragmatic expression. In order 
to see how such vital questions are forced upon the observer it 
will be useful to begin with Kenelm Burridge's study of millenarian 
movements. This work is quite exceptional in developing an abstract 
notion of salvation for a preliterate religion but precisely because 
it is not concerned with any world-religion tradition, it can serve 
as an example of how to treat abstract ideas resulting from a 
pragmatic context. In order to avoid an overly ethnocentric frame 
of reference Burridge adopted a definition of religious activities 
hased on the idea of power relations in society. Accepting as basic 
1. Eliade, M. 1959:3. 
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postulates that men seek power and prestige, much as Edmund 
Leach had done in his study of highland Burma, and that they do 
so through systems of obligation in social interaction, he 
defined religion as a , 
'redemptive process indicated by the activities, 
moral rules, and assumptions about power which, 
pertinent to the moral order and t a ~ e n n on faith,not 
ady enable a people to perceive the truth of things, 
but guarantee that they are indeed perceiving the 
truth of things,.l 
Here the notion of redemptive process serves as a broad 
category applicable to movements from many parts of the world. 
It is firmly located in the Durkheimian t ~ a d i t i o n n of sociology 
and avoids the older definitions of religion which stressed the 
nature of belief and the objects of belief. It also implies a 
shift of emphasis from more static functionalist models to a 
dynamic conception of religious institutions. The particular 
significance of this as far as the present study is concerned 
lies in Burridge's assertion that underlying millenarian 
movements there is a feeling of 'dissatisfaction with the 
2 
current system'. In other words, we have here a phenomenon 
which corresponds to the notion of perceived implausibility 
and also a responsive movement which can be classified as a 
soteriological response to evil. 
The dissatisfaction once formulated and preached, usually 
by a prophetic figure in the case of millenarianism, provides the 
basis for the description of the forces and powers at work on men, 
1. B u ~ r i d g e , , K. 1969:6. 
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and which the ordinary member may grasp as a way of explaining 
his own plight. A new redemptive process emerges as men act in 
accord with the new system of power and prestige, but the new 
order only becomes viable when the former state of things 1S no 
longer able to carry the undivided approval of society. This 
situation may well arise during periods of cultural contact 
between groups as the processes of both westernization and 
sanskritization demonstrate, and this we will show later.Burridge 
argues that in periods of internal developement of society 
people may feel their current pattern of beliefs is no longer 
able to explain or to cope with the changing situation. In order 
to maintain integrity and status as individuals they feel the 
need to change belief so that they may act in accord with the 
altered power relations of the new order. Burridge regards the 
redemptive process as involving three major areas of life and 
thought, the actual experience of social reality being the first, 
the working assumptions about that reality the second, and lastly 
'the assumptions we call faith,.l It is when the level of actual 
experience is found to be in conflict with the working assumptions 
or even more significantly with the basic beliefs, that a new 
system is sought. Burridge's emphasis upon that period of a group's 
history 'when faith belies experience' corresponds to the stress 
we have placed upon areas of implausibility which constitute the 
. . . 2 I initial phase of rel1g1ous change and of salvat10n movements. n 
terms of plausibility theory Burridge's reference to circumstances 
under which there is 'an unsatisfactory redemptive process' would 
1. Ibid, p.14. 
2. Ibid, p. 5. 
correspond to a state in which a sufficiency of durable 
plausibility no longer exists. l 
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Burridge's distinctive contribution to the analysis of 
the idea of salvation consists in his view that salvation has 
to do with social obligations. Human life is social life and 
as such inevitably involves many reciprocal obligations. The 
redemptive process is one in which men seek to discharge all 
their obligations: this is the essence of religious activity. 
So salvation is understood in terms of unobligedness, and this 
is regarded as being a future state which can only be experienced 
during life to a very limited extent, accordingly Burridge identifies 
the saved state with the notions of heaven and nirvana . In terms 
of the history of religions this view could be extended quite 
markedly to embrace present experiences of salvation in a more 
realistic way than is possible when the prime focus is upon 
millenarian movements which, necessarily, restrict the terms 
of theoretical reference. It is because Burridge deals with 
those movements that he is concerned with social change and 
instability in power and prestige systems, the issue of obligedness 
assumes a different and smaller proportion in societies of a more 
stable kind. For these it is more appropriate to talk of salvation 
as consisting in satisfactory expectations of mutual respect 
grounded in established and maintained sets of values, but that is 
a separate question. As far as Burridge's analysis is concerned 
it would seem that his notion of power is cognate to the concept 
1. Ibid, p.171. 
of meaning which has already been extensively argued. The 
similarities between the two notions are quite instructive 
as far as the general paradigm of meaning is concerned, 
inasmuch as power is used to describe a wide variety of 
human activities and thereby demonstrates that religious 
phenomena should not be sought in isolated spheres of human 
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life, but in the broad areas of social life. Further, Burridge 
sees the search for power as associated with the process of 
developing personal integrity as a social actor. In so doing 
he makes the realm of psychological questions an open one for 
anthropological analysis even though he does not himself pursue 
it to any great length. He assumes that in the quest for power . 
and integrity human beings act in a basically rational way. This 
agrees with the notion of meaning as a general goal in life, but 
gives a useful redirection to it in the sense that to talk of power 
is to refer to emotional desires and ambitions. To stress this is 
to substantiate that aspect of this thesis which asserts the 
affective dimension of the paradigm of meaning. Burridge sees this 
assumption of a state of rationality among those studied to be in 
accord with the similar assumption underlying sociological analysis 
to the effect that social life is potentially intelligible. l 
In slightly less theoretical terms the interesting feature 
of millenarian movements is that the desire for meaning emerging 
within a changing social structure is implemented by means of a 
reconstructed social order. In developed societies, by contrast, 
change in plausibility tends to occur relatively slowly and to a 
1. Ibid, p.7. 
1 
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limited extent. If a segment of the population requires a more 
radical change -as the result of deeming their present conditions 
unsatisfactory- then it may establish a new group or community 
as the basis for the new way of life. Burridge's work is most 
useful in emphasizing the relationship between between beliefs 
and the actual social networks within which they are enacted. 
Such restraints and lack of restraints upon change may well 
explain in large measure the reason why some religious groups 
have adopted the. response of migration in association with the 
growth of changing doctrinal perspectives vis-a-vis wider 
society. For example, the nineteenth century emigration of 
Mormon converts from Europe to Utah had the explicit and manifest 
function of preparing souls for the second coming of Christ; but 
one of its crucial latent functions lay in the possibility of 
constructing anew a society of saints freed from the obligation of 
interacting with gentile neighbours. In this case Burridge's 
dictum that salvation is unobligedness can be seen as a quite 
appropriate description of the process of Mormon adventism. But 
Burridge's thesis requires qualification for the Mormon case is 
also an example of many religious groups which stress the significance 
of service and commitment to other persons. For these it is not the 
case that 'redemption itself can only be realized at or after that 
appropriate death which brings to an end an appropriate mode of 
discharging one's obligations'. Burridge is not suggesting some 
subtle reading of these words which might imply a death to self 
and a new life of dedication to others: he is stressing the entire 
processual nature of redemption which continues during earthly life. 
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Phenomenologically speaking it would be wiser to employ a 
more subtle understanding to enable the idea of service to be seen 
as an integral part of the state of salvation itself. What this 
involves is a twofold notion of power: one relative to the ordinary 
social world and the other directed towards the religious ideal 
of inversion of status. The New Testament concept of the first being 
last and the last first would furnish an example of this concept 
f d t d h '1° 1 o power un ers 00 as uml lty. It is then in the fellowship 
of the saints that the devotee experiences his new found sense 
of power and personal integrity, a perspective which is the 
complete opposite of his previous life. Victor Turner has, indeed, 
gone some way in considering this condit ion by means of his concept 
of humili tas. 2 
The desire for communitarian groups in the early phases of 
some sects expresses the rationale of attempting to unite in one 
entire and self-contained realm the practical aspect of living with 
the ideal of the doctrine. Utopias are willed because of the 
feeling that there should be no dichotomy between theory and 
practice. The ritual of millenarian movements is often the 
ritual of change, both the perception of the need for change, and 
the accommodation of belief systems to apparent changes. The 
trance, vision, and as far as the prophet is concerned, the ability 
to understand what others find confusing - these are the important 
things. The ritual of stable societies tends to be more redressive 
and seeks to relate the ideal and the actual states of religious 
, M'atthew ': 19. xxx . 
..i. 
2. Turner, V'. W • 1969:166. 
1 ...." I I 
life within the context of existing social patterns, a function 
often fulfilled by sacrifice. At the level of religious 
functionaries a difference can be established between the 
prophet who calls men into a radically new form of life, and the 
priest who seeks to remove the dichotomy between spiritual ideal 
and the failure of life engendered by social interaction. A 
classic example of the association of prophets with change 1n 
social order under pressure from external sources is provided 1n 
Evans-Pritchard's study of the Nuer. There the priests are 
identified as the maJor religious functionaries and the prophets 
as relative latecomers emerging late 1n the nineteenth century 
in response to the disruption caused to Nuer life by Arab slave 
1 traders, Mahdists and by Anglo-Egyption rule. It is during such 
periods of culture contact that the system of indigenous meaning 
and power is called into question, and what is clear from this 1S 
that religion is inextricably associated not only with the 
fundamental social structure, but also with human integrity at 
the level of the personality. It is precisely because of this 
fact that the notion of affectivity cannot be omitted from any 
model of meaning used heuristically for religious traditions. 
The case of millenarian movements compared with religions 
of more stable societies demonstrates the sense of conflict 
present in the human perception of social relationships. Rather 
than supporting Burridge in his argument that redemption means 
freedom from obligation, a more widely applicable notion may be 
I . Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1956:309. 
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established if it is accepted that what men seek is a particular 
quality of relationship, rather than any relationship. The 
reference to Christianity and the notion of joyful service 
could be developed to show that it is the way service is 
understood that makes the difference between the sense of 
obligation conceived as an undesired necessity, and that 
service which is perfect freedom. As will be shown later the 
Mormon Church is a fine example of obligation as a central 
feature of salvation. 
What Burridge's example clearly shows is that in the 
particular social world which engenders millenarianism there 
is a strong feeling of conflict and negative evaluations of 
reality which extends to social relations as to everything else. 
In other religious contexts a movement may maintain - and the 
basic argument of this thesis is that it will maintain- a strong 
negative evaluation of some aspect of reality. Just what factors 
are singled out for judgement is a question which. has been 
taken up in the sociology of sects which will be considered in 
a moment. The millenarian example however can finally be referred 
to as a typical case of religious identification of evil. Peter 
Worsley's conclusion on Melanesian cargo cults affirms that the 
precondition for their emergence lies in 'a situation of 
dissatisfaction with existing social relations and of yearnings 
for a happier life,.l Such a generalization can, as might be 
expected, find application in religious movements other than 
preliterate ones, and so it 1S that Norman Cohn has demonstrated 
1. Worsley, P. 1970:251. 
that the millennium became the hope for many European groups 
of socially deprived persons existing in a marginal relation 
to a more stable society.l 
This form of deprivation theory has been most clearly 
expressed by Vittorio Lanternari in his analysis of messianic 
movements which argues that it is when primitive societies feel 
oppressed by the conservative pattern of social life that 
millenarian responses occur. The sense of oppression meets with 
a desire for new conditions and if a suitable prophetic figure 
emerges, who is able to initiate a break with the past, then a 
messianic movement is likely to occur. 'Salvation (is) the 
purpose of all religbns', says Lanternari, and freedom from 
oppression . h' 2 lS W at constltutes a saved state. While many 
movements seek escape from tensions arising within their natal 
societies as with the Tupi cults of pre-colonial Brazil, the 
Tafari movement of Jamaica as well as the Mormons and Sikhs who 
will be considered later, others result from culture contact and 
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pressure from outside sources as with the Moaris and North American 
Indians along wi th the Polynesian cargo cults. Lanternari 
identifies this response of 'religious escapism' with 'the quest 
for a way out of the earthly confines' experienced by many for 
whom it may be said that it 'is inherent in the nature of religious 
experience that temporary evasion from the world can be achieved 
while awaiting the final hour of redemption,.3 
1. Cohn, N. 1970. 
2. Lanternari,V. 1963:321. 
3. Ibid, p.314. 
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Both to do justice to the wealth of religious data and to 
recall the general paradigm of meaning it must be said that 
Lanternari fails to see the implied critique of reality present 
in messianic movements as also a major component of non-messianic 
religions. He tends to presuppose that established, world religions 
which serve members of stable societies and which validate the lives 
they lead, do not serve a judgement of negative evaluation upon that 
world. While it is true that world religions are not usually religions 
of the oppressed they can be so, but what is more important is that 
they do contain within their cosmology or theology an analysis of 
evil. Lanternari is correct in wanting to argue that 'it is not 
possible to separate the world of the so-called primitive peoples 
from the world commonly described as historical', and if he had 
extended his theoretical perspectives in accordance with this view 
it would not be necessary to issue the caveat on this question of evil.l 
Despite the fact that both Burridge and Lanternari entertain 
the notion of salvation for the very specific forms of religiosity 
they focus upon in preliterate groups, they imply that some 
significant difference obtains between those groups and others which 
belong to the traditions of the world religions. This is somewhat 
less true for Burridge but even so the way these studies have been 
presented has not exerted any significant influence upon the history 
of religions or upon the general corpus of theorizing in religious 
studies. As has already been implied this is unfortunate since 
Burridge's use of the notion of power and obligation, which may be 
interpreted as one application of the general paradigm of meaning, 
1. Ibid, p.vi. 
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possesses wide theoretical significance both for sociological studies 
and for those of a more theological or phenomenological interest in 
the attributes of human beings. The way in which he adopts a non-
theological perspective enables the whole study to inform theologians 
about a range of materials and human actions which they can, if they 
so wish, employ as part of their own theological discussion. This 
rather desirable approach differs significantly from that of 
Dhavamony who has commented upon the notion of salvation in primitive 
religion but whose approach, despite the fact that it is supposed to 
be phenomenological, appears to be influenced by Christian theology. 
His particular systematic approach lead him to discuss the 
significance of the standard phenomena of religion for each maJor 
tradition and also for primitive religions. This means that it is 
likely that he had no particular interest in the notion of primitive 
salvation, or in the issues involved in discussing them, but simply 
that the structure of his study inevitably led him to comment upon the 
ideas of cosmic regeneration and cyclic fertility which is how he 
handles the idea of salvation among such peoples. His definition of 
salvation exhibits his theological bias: 
1. 
'The fundamental structure of salvation seems 
to be a liberation from the senseless and 
never-ending play of human passions and desires 
and from servitude of sin, and a hope for 
reconciliation and integration with the divine, 
and an attempt to realize the divine. All the 
attempts in religions to remove the evil and to 
become united with the divine once and for all 
constitute the ways of salvation and the final 
attainment of this goal is salvation itself'. 1 
Dhavamony, M. 1973:315. 
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Dhavamony makes no significant contribution in this 
introductory volume and it is cited to show that even when the 
subject of primitive salvation was raised in this phenomenological 
context its discussion remained at the level of non-theoretical 
interest. This shows how great the need is for a theoretical model 
of the paradigm of meaning kind in the study of religion. 
By way of contrast to the work of these anthropologists and 
phenomenologists the studies of Max Weber in the sociology of 
religion are even more theoretical and provide an important example 
of material manifesting close affinities with the general paradigm 
of meaning and which may assist in relating the more social 
perspective of Burridge with the more individualistic outlook of 
Dhavamony. This will be useful inasmuch as these two men may be 
taken as representatives of those rather different, though 
potentially complementary, approaches. The theoretical basis of 
Weber's approach is grounded in the analysis of the variety of 
responses to the world adopted by religious groups in so far 
as they affect practical activity in thernorld. l This concern 
with ideology and action lead Weber to construct a set of types of 
responses espoused by world religions as a means of attaining 
salvation. He postulated three central areas in which soteriological 
action could be identified as a response to particular needs. The first 
involved the disprivileged, or those who in terms of deprivation 
theories turn to religious activities and other-worldly goals to 
compensate for their lack of material satisfaction in the mundane 
world. It is this category which embraces the case of millenarian 
1. Weber, M. 1963:149. 
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movements since the experience of culture contact with those 
possessing an abundance of desired goods results in a sense 
of personal privation and in actions which seek to overcome it. 
The second area relates to the middle classes who do not 
experience any sense of lack as far as possessions are concerned, 
but who seek a legitimation of their well-being. For such groups 
the desired psychological reassurance that all .is as it should be 
makes blessedness of mere contentedness. It is to the third category, 
however, that further attention must be given for it comes closest 
to expressing the central theme of the paradigm of meaning. 
Whereas the disprivileged and the middle classes seek salvatbn 
in response to their life-experience in the world of action - so that 
Weber can say that the concomitant types of salvation are 'products 
of the practical way of life' - there is yet another type of person 
possessing a distinctive style of thought which he calls the 
'intellectualist' group.l This category denotes those engaged in the 
life of the mind and whose 'metaphysical needs' drive them to 
reflection upon ethical and religious questions. The basis of this 
intellectual application is not one of social deptivation, nor does 
it emerge from a psychological need for legitimation of the life 
context. It is, rather, grounded in man's 'inner compulsion' both to 
'understand the world as a meaningful cosmos' and to adopt an 
appropriate attitude towards it. This particular need identified by 
Weber might be said to subsist both at the level of thought and of 
intentional action. Weber's sociology of religion can be seen as 
an elaboration of this theme of world understanding and of the action 
1. Ibid, p.117. 
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which it initiates, yet he seems but little concerned to analyse 
the basis of the drive or to relate it to other theories of 
knowledge. The very fact of meaning and the processes whereby it 
is constructed are accepted on an a priori basis. This aspect 
of Weber's work is well known and constitutes a certain 'ad hocness' 
as Talcott Parsons called it, yet it is offset by a weight of 
erudition without which his discussions might appear far less 
satidfactory. In the light of more recent studies in the sociology 
of knowledge it is possible to contextualize the notion of drive 
for salvation within a framework which can reduce the ad hoc nature 
of Weber's work. This is precisiy what the notion of plausibility 
theory sets out to achieve. The general paradigm of meaning suggests 
that the response to sensed deprivation and the desire for legitimation 
are not essentially different from the intellectualist pursuit of 
meaning, once it is admitted that cognitive and affective dimensions 
are necessary for any full notion of meaningfulness. 
Alongside this drive for salvation must be included the 
idea of what Weber called 'the problem of the world's imperfection,l. 
This is directly related to the present study and to its emphasis 
upon the perception of evil as the basis of salvation processes. Weber 
identified three kinds of imperfection which correspond to his three 
categories of salvation. For the disprivileged imperfection r e p r ~ s e n t s s
the state of desiring but being unable to obtain certain goods or 
services, for the middle classes it is the fact that they desire 
validation for what they already possess, while for the intellectualist 
group imperfection is manifested in the lack of unity and total 
1. Idem. 
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explanation of the world which they so desire. From this it can 
easily be argued that the notion of imperfection, as a description 
of a mode of perception of the world, relates both to intellectual 
dimea3ions-and to affective concerns. Weber distinguished between 
these poles In terms of 'inner need' -experienced by the intellectual 
who is also one of the privileged classes - and 'external distress' 
thought to be more indicative of non-privileged classes. I Such a 
strict dichotomy ought to be qualified in the light of earlier 
discussions on the notion of meaning since both groups are ultimately 
involved in both cognitive and affective dimensions. This point 
must be emphasized because Weber writes as one who accentuates the 
realm of thought by the very style of argument he chose to adopt. 
A similar caveat could be introduced with regard to Talcott Parsons 
who is well aware of the necessity of discussing affectivity both in 
ordinary social life and in religious contexts, yet treats of what 
he clearly calls the 'problem of meaning' in religious acts In a 
way which subsumes emotional factors to intellectual ones. He speaks 
of religious ideas as answers to the problem of meaning possessing 
'cathectic and evaluative' f . 2 levels 0 explanatlon. It is just 
this kind of emphasis upon the ultimate rational basis which makes 
such sociological analysis unacceptable to historians and to some 
phenomenologists of religion who regard it as a form of reductionism, 
despite the fact that in its o ~ ~ ~ terms of reference it is not so.3 
1. Ibid, p.124. 
2. Parsons, T. 1970:367. 
3. Ibid, p.6. 
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So it is that the difference in kind which Weber tries 
to establish between privileged and disprivileged groups in their 
perception of evil and drive for salvation is more a difference of 
the degree to which rational procedures are resorted in the 
process of constructing a satisfactory explanation of the 
mundane contradictoriness of life. While Weber is correct in arguing 
that it is 'the intellectual who transforms the concept of the 
world into the problem of meaning', he is not justified in his 
implication that there is no problem of meaning for the non-
intellectual. l Existential questions of the broadest kind obtain 
for all men even though they may be couched in symbolic, ritual 
or mythic forms, as was shown in an earlier chapter for the Murinbata, 
rather than as explicit philosophical arguments. Indeed philosophical 
speculation may serve only to state problems in clearer form rather 
than to solve them. Religious traditions, by contrast, attempt not 
only to formulate the nature of evil -whether as a philosophical 
argument or as a mythical account- but also to provide solutions 
acceptable at the emotional level of action in the world. 
Despite the fact that Weber himself was not concerned with 
psychological factors in the strict sense he was preoccupied with 
the way systems of thought related to the actions of individuals 
and this is as true of religious actions as of any other type of 
behaviour. The instructive aspect of his work lies in the fact 
that he does not enter into that kind of individualism which was 
seen in Dhavamony's study, nor does he reify a single concept 
such as that of obligation as in the case of Burridge. His notion 
1. Weber, M. 1963 
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of meaning, if qualified in the ways already suggested, marks a 
fundamental contribution to a general paradigm of meaning from the 
area of sociology. This contribution is to be seen in the 
influence of Bryan Wilson in areas of investigation which were 
not his own, notably the problem of salvation in primitive religion. 
From his earlier publications in the sociology of religion Wilson 
employed the notion of orientation to the world as a basic 
theoretical concept for analysing differences between religious 
institutions in the process of constructing typological 
1 
classifications of sects. It was in his later volume entitled 
Magic and the Millennium that the idea received a fuller treatment 
and was developed so as to apply to non-Christian religious groups.2 
A particulr feature of that study lay in the fact that Wilson 
explicitly associates the idea of orientation to the world with 
the notion of salvation. He assumes, again on an a prioristic 
basis that 'men seek salvation in a world in which they feel 
3 the need for supernatural help'. This 'demand for salvation' is 
a human response to the world perceived as evil, indeed the 
fundamantal meaning of the word 'world' cannot be divorced 
from the notion of evil which is universally present and which men 
4 
everywhere seek to overcome. 
One major criticism or qualification of Wilson's study is 
appropriate here despite the similarity between it and the burden 
of our own argument. It may be introduced through the sub-title 
1. Wilson, B. R. 1959. 
2. Wilsob, B. R. 1973. 
3. Ibid, p.19. 
4. " 
Ihid. p.492. 
~ ~
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of the study which refers to 'religious movements of protest 
among tribal and third-world peoples'. Here Wilson treats these 
movements as rejections of and protests against established 
cultural goals, much as sects used to be viewed as protest 
movements against the established church. This is a perfectly 
legitimate view to adopt as long as it is realized that those 
very established systems do themselves advocate a means of 
identifying and coping with evil. If the assertion that 'men 
apprehend evil in many different ways, and thus look for relief 
from it in different forms of supernatural action' and 'the 
various responses to the world embrace different conceptions of the 
source of evil and the ways in which it will be overcome', is taken 
to apply to all religious traditions then no objection can be 
. d 1 ralse . But Wilson is not saying this: on the contrary he draws 
a firm distinction between the established cultural norms and those 
of protest groups. A critical passage will make his intention on 
this point clear. 
'There appear to be eight basic supernaturalist 
responses to the dilemma which men face in asking 
how they 'might be saved. The dominant position is 
that of acceptance of the world, the facilities 
it offers, and the goals and values that given 
( ~ c u l lture enjoi.ns upon men. This orthodox response 
(whether secular or religious) concerns us only 
as a base-line. Concern with transcendence over 
evil and the search for salvation and consequent 
rejection of prevailing cultural values ,goals ,and 
norms, and whatever facilities are culturally provided 
.. d' , 2 for man's salvation, defines rellglous eVlance. 
1. Ibid, p.21. 
2. Idem. 
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Wilson obviously makes some allowance for the existence 
of processes of salvation within the established religion of a 
society since he is counting one of the supernaturalist responses 
to evil as the dominant one of cultural orthodoxy. Yet he says 
that concern with evil, with its transcendence and with a rejection 
of normal cultural values is what characterizes religious deviancy. 
This seems to imply a qualitative difference of perception of evil 
by those within the established culture and others who are set upon 
a course of social protest. To what extent it is possible to press 
this criticism it is difficult to say because Wilson admits that he 
is not directly concerned with the established pattern of culture 
but only with the protests against it. Even so Wilson appears to 
treat salvation as a scarce commodity which is differently 
evaluated by 'deviants' and by the orthodox. This is a question 
which could be discussed at some length for each particular case 
of protest but the point to be made here is that such protest groups 
are not engaged in any signi.t,icantly different endeavour, at least 
as far as a general paradigm of meaning is c o n c e r n e d ~ ~ from the 
religious evaluations of orthodoxy. In terms of the definition of 
salvation offered earlier such deviants merely find the institution-
ali zed formularies insufficient as means of conferring durable 
plausibility. Wilson's interest may, however, lie in saying something 
different which involves a qualitative judgement upon the ~ a t u r e e
of the religious system against which protest is intended. It is as 
though 'the very dilute thaumaturgy of Christian orthodoxy' which 
has 'long been culturally accommodated' is viewed as having 
. l' . f 1 Th' forfeited its r1ght to act as a re 1910US process or men. 1S 
1. Ibid, p.503. 
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would apply not only to thaumaturgy but to all religious forms 
of action, for Wilson sometimes writes as though the fact of 
secularization must be accepted along with all its consequences, 
including the fact that some established religions cannot be 
treated with the seriousness they appear to demand. It was in 
this spirit that he wrote of denominations and churches as 
having fallen into a state of coolness and tepidity from one of 
passionate love and fervour. l Having made this tentative 
criticism of the possible influence of a particular concept of 
secularization upon Wilson's study, it remains to acknowledge 
the significance of his work, especially that of Magic and the 
Millennium for its concern with the notion of salvation among 
tribal and third world peoples. 
Wilson's sociologically grounded approach frees his 
classification from theological overtones even though the 
dogmatism of secularization is not without significance. Even so 
Wilson and Burridge have shown the necessity of attempting a non-
confessional position, and more than this have shown the 
inevitability of engaging in discussion on negative factors of 
perception. This is important for it shows that what might be called 
phenomenologically descriptive accounts of the nature of religious 
groups concur, to a certain extent, with the theological assertions 
of religious traditions in emphasizing the significance of the 
perception of evil, or of implausibility as a central motivation 
in human thought and action. To this it will be necessary to return 
In the conclusion. 
1. Wilson, B. R. 1970:242 
The major theoretical problem remaining with Wilson's 
argument is one which must be mentioned in the light of this 
generalization, and before we proceed to a case which would 
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be difficult to accommodate within Wilson's scheme. It concerns 
the difficulty of relating the perception of evil in established 
religions to the apparently more accute awareness of evil in 
protest movements. The seven kinds of response to evil which 
he identifies as typical of protest movements can easily be 
read as a typlogy of evil, but this typology would not suffice 
to handle the evidence of primitive societies. The reason for 
this, theoretically speaking, is quite simple and rests upon 
the tautologous nature of definitions. Wilson is concerned with 
movements of revolution and protest whereas most primitive 
religions documented in ethnographies are not in a state of 
radical change or transformation. This is not to say that they 
exist in some timeless realm of changelessness, but that the 
transformations at work are natural to that particular society. 
In terms of the three broad classes which embrace his 
seven responses the 'objectivist' group of revolutionist, 
introversionist, reformist, and utopian perspectives would seldom 
apply to primitive societies for this particular reason. The 
'subjectivist' group of conversionist outlook and the'relationist' 
class of manipulationist and thaumaturgist views might, however, 
1 be open to an interpretation which could admit of tribal cases. 
The Murinbata, for example, might be said to encourage a change 
of outlook in the minds of initiates which befitted adult members 
of their society. So too some of the features of witchcraft and 
1. Wilson, B. R. 1973:27. 
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magic which have already been considered for the Azande could be 
regarded as possessing manipulationist and thaumaturgical elements. 
The theoretically important point here is that protest movements, 
whether they be tribal or part of urban, western societies, exhibit 
similar responses to evil which is conceived in a particularly 
emphasized manner. This is useful information because it provides 
another reason for advocating that primitive and advanced societies 
ought not to be distinguished in terms of fundamental differences 
in their religious structures. The real issue concerns the way 
ln which evil is perceived within either kind of tradition during 
periods of ordinary social life on the one hand, and periods of 
fundamental social change on the other. This is why some caution 
was expressed over Wilson's emphasis upon evil in protest movements 
which suggested that it was a different species of evil from that 
found in the orthodox and relatively stable social context. The 
determining feature which governs the significance of evil in any 
movement is the degree to which the existing system of plausibility 
1S able to contain the perception of negative factors on the part 
of its members. 
Because societies are seldom completely closed systems there 
may well occur moments when external factors bring about a situation 
which cannot be met by the more normal means. It may even be the 
case that the evil which is regarded as operative upon people is of 
an essentially new kind. Millenarian responses of the cargo cult 
variety can be such noval reactions to formerly unheard of 
circumstances, but even when this is the case the underlying processes 
which work towards a new resolution, are the same as the ones for 
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ever active in stable societies. So the plausibility theory of 
salvation can be seen to be applicable in both cases. 
The necessity for greater theoretical precision . 1n 
connection with the idea of salvation will become even clearer 
in the case to which we now turn. It 1S an example which lS all 
more useful because it also demonstrates the problematic nature 
of another hermeneutical issue in religious studies, that of the 
relation between primitive and advanced religions. The case is 
that of Burmese village religion as studied by Melford Spiro and 
the precise problem of hermeneutics is how to relate a so called 
the 
I 
world religion to specific, local examples of the same. These two 
issues of primitive and advanced religions on the one hand, and 
world and village religions on the other, are closely connected. We 
may suggest that village religion can be equated with the religions 
of preliterate societies which are completely unrelated to any of 
the major religious traditions of Islam, Christianity,Hinduism or 
Buddhism. In anthropology at least this would seem to be an acceptable 
assumption, as E.R. Leach makes clear in his editorial introduction 
to the significantly titled D i a l e ~ t i c c in Practical Religion 2. There 
he argues that grave misunderstandings had developed in the study 
of comparative religion because the distinction between the philosoph-
ical expression of a r ~ l i g i o n n and the religiosity of ordinary 
believers had not been sufficiently recognized. Accordingly the pure 
and true form of religion, say Buddhism, was thought to be found 1n 
the classic texts and the philosophical exegeses of them, while the 
religious life of village Buddhists was said to be deeply influenced 
1. Spiro, M. 1967. 
2. Leach, E.R. 1968. 
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by animistic survivals or Hindu superstitions. The title 
'practical religion' was used in order to emphasize the mundane 
and pragmatic dimension of religiosity, and it would be true 
to say that since the late nineteen sixties, when Leach's volume 
was published, there has been a growing realization among 
historians and phenomenologists of religion that this area is of 
fundamental importance. 
The significance of this distinction between what might be 
called the world and village levels of a religion for the notion 
of salvation will be immediately apparent, and Spiro's study will 
serve to bring it into sharp focus. Spiro's ethnographic evidence 
makes the question of the two levels of a single religion and their 
relation even more complex because he finds that the village 
Buddhists also embrace to a certain extent another form of religion 
under certain conditions of their everyday life. This was a religion 
involving the idea of spirits called nats hence the term Nat 
religion. Arguing against the notion that Buddhism is merely a thin 
veneer overlying indigenous animistic religion, Spiro seeks to 
demonstrate that both Buddhism and Nat religion are important for 
the Burmese villagers, and that ultimately Buddhism is given primacy 
of place as far as religious power is concerned. He prefers to 
describe Burmese religion as permitting 'dual religious adherence' 
rather than manifesting some form of syncretism, and this duality 
is related to the two central concerns of his study, namely the 
idea of salvation and the fact of suffering. In anaysing the 
relations existing between these, both in theoretical and 
theological, as well as practical and sociological terms, he 
portrays an interaction between what he calls Burmese Buddhism 
and B.rmese supernaturalism. Buddhism is primarily concerned 
with salvation while Nat religion is taken up with problems of 
man's preoccupation with things causing him pain and difficulty 
in his everyday life. This supernaturalist religion expresses 
man's immediate existential concern which results in the desire for 
a present solution to his problems. Spiro distinguishes between these 
proximate goals and the more distant ones of Buddhism, the former 
being contrary to Buddhist teaching which relegates the desire for 
pleasurable states to an unworthy outlook which is antipathetic to 
the true religious path and to its ultimate goal. 
Spiro begins his analysis of Burmese religion by saylng 
that religions function to help devotees in their experience of 
suffering both by 'offering an explanation for suffering, and by 
providing techniques by which suffering may be avoided or its 
burden diminished,.l It might be thought appropriate for him to 
apply this statement to Nat religion in a direct and straight-
forward way such that its explanation of illness and the methods 
of cure through offerings and exorcism might be regarded as a 
central religious tenet. He does not do this, however, but chooses 
to emphasize the idea that 'for the Burmese religion means the 
Path to salvation, and the nats are totally and completely irrelevant 
2 
for even finding, let alone walking along the Path'. Salvation is 
thus taken as a notion pertaining essentially to Buddhism. Indeed it 
is 'on the crucial dimension of salvation (that) the distinction 
between these systems is absolute,.3 'As a religion of radical 
1. Spiro, M. 1967:2. 
2. Ibid, p.267. 
3. Ibid, p.266. 
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salvation ... the Buddhist attitude to the world is unambiguous, 
the world is to be renounced.' 1 Thus the real:TI of worldly 
existence, lokika, is for Buddhism the world of illusion and 
represents the sphere of samsara and recurrent rebirth which 
results from a persistent desire for things and for personal 
well-being. But this is also the very world of supernat1Jralism, it 
is the realm of the nat cultus, of witches, possession, and 
exorcism. Contrasting with this is Buddhism's 'concern with 
lokuttura, the reality grounded in escape from illusion, and with 
the extinction of desire in the attainment of nirvana. It is the 
world of lokika which is both the barrier to Buddhist salvation 
and also the dominant concern of the lay Burmese. At best their 
Buddhist religiosity seeks the attainment of a better rebirth in 
their worldly existence. 'Contrary to Buddhist teaching in which 
these pleasurable states are but temporary way stations on the Path 
to its ultimate goal, most Burmese take these stations as their 
ultimate goal. ,2 In interpreting the relationship between these 
forms of religion Spiro tends to accept as the central and determining 
feature of what constitutes true religion in this context the Buddhist 
notion of salvation. For an anthropologist this is an unwarranted 
assumption and demonstrates the continued influence of nineteenth 
century presuppositions about religious orthodoxy. It might be 
justified if the ethnographic data showed that interpretation was 
impossible without making such a claim, but on the evidence of 
Spiro's own material this can be seen not to be the case. He 
actually says that 'Buddhism in both its Theravadist and Mahayanist 
1. Ibid, p.263. 
2. Ibid, p.269. 
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forms is never the exclusive religion of its lay devotees' and 
that such as assertion can be accepted almost as a truism in 
Buddhist cultures. l If this is so, and if, for example, rites 
concerning spirit possession and exorcism are of positive 
significance in the life of a people, then it is unwise to 
enforce a conceptual orthodoxy upon them when other explanations 
are readily available and which do not presuppose any religious 
norms. 
If the plausibility model of salvation is employed in this 
context it makes better sense of Spiro's own material and in 
particular of his assertion that 'man seeks for meaning even more 
2 than he seeks for order' . In terms of the Burmese Buddhist laity 
this means that illness which is thought to be caused by spirits 
and which can be cured by exorcism is what causes an immediate 
loss of meaning in the world as far as a state of general plausibility 
is concerned. It may well be part of the overall Buddhist scheme 
of illusion; but the villager prefers to accept an immediate kind 
of meaning than some abstract philosophical scheme of doctrine. 
There may be s c o n t ~ a d i c t i o n n between the nat religion and that of 
Buddhism propounded by the monks, but the villager opts for the 
immediate relief rather than for a future state of bliss. ~ : h a t t this 
means is that the salvation they require or demand is not always in 
agreement with what, in orthodox terms, they actually need. It is 
more realistic to ·discuss the notion of salvation in one way for 
the Buddhist laity and in another for the monks. The Buddhist goal 
of relatively ascetic detachment and the attainment of merit 
1. Ibid, p. 2. 
2. Ibid, p.8. 
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sufficient to achieve nibbana is the prerogative of the sangha, 
and in this context it is perfectly appropriate to employ the 
orthadox "religious notion of salvation. Then the plausibility 
. Vlew of salvation can be applied to the doctrine as such with 
evil being grounded in tanha , or the desire for things which 
emerges from the perceived self, and salvation as the cessation 
of this desire that itself causes pain and transmigration. So too 
the sangha can be understood as that context within which the 
necessary state of plausibility may be achieved. The total frame 
of reference necessary to understand what Buddhism means for the 
monks must include the role of the laity who actually support them. 
Spiro's approach can be read as evaluating the laity as somewhat 
parasitic upon the monks in terms of wanting to achieve merit from 
them so that their own future lives will be happier. Even if thS 
is true, and the ethnographic evidence would suggest that it is, it 
ought not to lead to a view of the laity as being failed Buddhists 
who could not manage the life of renunciation. Rather it should be 
seen as demonstrating a far more complex situation in which the 
monks could only set about their duties directed towards nibbana 
because the laity possessed such an attitude to merit that it 
resulted in their supportive role. The fact that the laity could 
be regarded as inconsistent Buddhists is quite irrelevant to 
anthropological analysis. If the facts of the case are that the 
belief in nats 'permits the Burmese to obviate the painful 
consequences of a consistent belief in karma' , the question must 
be asked as to whether the notion of salvation can play any part 
evaluating the role of religion in their lives. In terms of the 
plausibility model the answer is an unequivocal yes, for within 
In 
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the limits of the social and ideological conditions In which 
the Burmese find themselves they employ notions and rites of 
the nat religion to complement aspects of Buddhism in such a way 
that they possess a sufficient state of durable plausibility 
such that no alternative is sought. The model of Buddhist 
renunciation is ever present in the sangha, but the continuous 
presence of pragmatic trouble is also experienced as a present 
reality, and to that area of life, perceived as evil, Buddhism 
has no immediate practicable solution. 
This case throws into sharp relief the problem of what 
might be called two dimensiDns of religion and what was earlier 
referred to as the world and viTIage levels of religiosity. The 
reason why the distinction is especially prominent in Spiro's 
case is because the nat supernaturalism appears to belong to 
a different species of religiosity when compared with the 
Buddhism of the sangha. Yet both dimensions coexist for the 
Burmese layman in his life-world. If only the Buddhist dimension 
is thought to be, potentially at least, capable of effecting 
salvation, then the nat supernaturalism is categorized by default 
along with other primitive religions, which offer no explicit 
soteriological hope, as a phenomenon of an essentially different 
kind. Yet what seems to be the case is that within a single 
community different groups identify evil in such divergent ways 
as to react to it in a non-uniform manner. To presuppose that 
the religiously orthodox way is the right one is to import 
evaluative criteria which should be alien both to the anthropologist 
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and to the historian of religion. What Spiro's case shows 
clearly is the tendency to classify the so called world -
religions differently from religiosities which do not belong 
to such a clear historical tradition. 
This methodological error has also been prevalent in 
similar cases but has been identified in rather different terms, 
namely those of 'the grand literary tradition' on the one hand, 
and 'village religion' on the other. 1 S.J. Tambiah's study on 
•. a similar theme to that of Spiro, namely Buddhism and the Spirit 
Cults -albeit in north-east Thailand- provides an admirable basis 
for considering this problem. After outlining the backgroillld to the 
theoretical problem Tarnbiah offers his own analysis of the inter-
relation between kinds of religiosity in a way which is much more 
in accord with anthropological tradition and which also contributes 
to methodology in religious studies. Tambiah identifies the major 
contributors to the discussion as Robert Redfield and his Chicago 
school's approach which refers to the great-tradition and little-
tradition opposition in Indian society on the one hand, and to 
Dumont and Pocock who utilize the notion of Sanskri tic Hinduism 
and popular Hinduism on the other. Both perspectives presuppose that 
some kind of two-level distinction is necessary, they differ in the 
way they wish to relate these elements to one another. The fact that 
these authors are concerned with Hinduism while Tambiah was working 
on Buddhism presents no problem as far as the theoretical issues at 
stake are concerned. Indeed it accentuates the fact that when 
1. T ambiah, S. J . 1970: 367. 
practical studies of religion involve the maJor religious 
traditions of the world similar problems have t ~ ~ be dealt 
with. Tambiah locates the various terminologies of this 
debate very firmly in relatively recent studies, largely 
from the nineteen fifties; even so the inherited perspective 
of nineteenth century scholars still seems to exert some 
influence upon what is thought to count as religion. If this 
is so then the problem is less one of having to distinguish 
between a discrete literary form of a religion and an actual 
popular or village manifestation of it than it is one of 
realizing that it has become customary to think in terms of 
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the two levels as a result of the two kinds of religious study 
which now influence the approach of scholars of religion. In 
Srinivas's work, cited by Tambiah, there is ample evidence of 
the more c l a s ~ i c a l l style of Indology informing his conceptual 
categories. At least this is a factor which must be entertained 
as a theoretical possibility, for Tambiah cannot be completely 
accurate in saying that the notion of two levels 'is a fabric-
ation of anthropologists which they have bequeathed to the 
modern Indian consciousness', if only because scholars like 
Max M ~ l l e r r stimulated Indian scholars to think of their own 
1 
religious history in terms of systems and texts. Furthermore, 
the existence of indigenous notions of religiosity cannot be 
ignored, and both Hindu and Buddhist religions contain dynamic 
traditions which are aware of their mutual distinctions. The 
problem of levels of truth and religiosity cannot for these 
1. Ibid, 371. 
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reasons alone be regarded as the product of anthropological study 
and theorizing. Indeed, this is something which Tambiah ought to 
have seen more clearly; for in arguing against the two-level 
model he admits that it is 'frequently inapplicable to the 
anthropologist's field data and experience'. 1 
Tambiah's wish is to treat the notion of two-levels ln 
terms of the relation between 'historical religion and 
t 1 ·· ,2 con emporary re 19lon. Contemporary religion, which is the 
dimension of practical and lived religiosity, would include 
the historical factor in the sense of texts, ritual traditions 
of the priesthoods as well as temples. The basic requirement 
is to develop a way of handling the fact of continuity between 
the past and present. When the society concerned is of an 
homogenous type this approach will be relatively easy to adopt, 
but when there appear to be several sorts of religion present it 
becomes more difficult. Tambiah's analysis of the mutual inter-
relation of Buddhist and Hindu functionaries in Thailand provides 
a model example of how to set -about studying such a complex issue. 
The case is made more difficult still when one element in the 
contemporary religious life bears no direct relationship to the 
more distinctive historical tradition, as is the case with Buddhism 
and the spirit cults. Yet as far as the phenomenologist and 
historian of religion are concerned it would be methcdologically 
improper not to treat all the elements present in a society with 
equal validity and seriousness. As far as the notion of sa17ation 
1. Ibid, p.372. 
2. Ibid, p.374. 
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. 
18 concerned this involves a much more complex form of 
analysis. No single theological stance can be adopted when the 
evidence shows a variety of indigenous views on evil, as well 
as several responses to it. It is precisely in this kind of 
situation that plausibility theory is most applicable, for it 
would not be inappropriate to regard exorcism in the nat cultus, 
for example, as one aspect of the soteriological process 
directed towards the elimination of an immediately perceived 
ill, despite the fact that it might contravene orthodox Buddhist 
teachings. Such recourse to spirit agencies not only provides 
an explanation of troubles but also makes available the means for 
resolving them. This being £0, it could be said that while the 
nats may be irrelevant for walking the nirvanic path they are more 
than relevant for making sense of the life-world of the Buddhist 
laity. In phenomenological terms the fact that the life of the 
monks is markedly different from that of the peasantry would 
suggest that different explanations and means of coping with problems 
might be expected. 
Spiro agrees with this point indirectly for he views the 
supernaturalistic aspect of Burmese religiosity as one way by 
which that dimension of the Burmese personality which he calls 
the Dionysiac comes to be expressed in a form that permits Buddhism 
to remain uncontaminated by the non-renouncing excess of cultists. 
It is precisely in reaction against the ascetic ideal that the 
nat cult with its ceremonies involving emotional release and 
licence finds acceptance by the laity and, as Spiro says, 'permits 
the Burmese to obviate the painful consequences of a consistent 
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belief in karma,.l The actual life-world of the laity does not 
easily fall to a simple analysis and Spiro himself provides 
evidence which belies his rather rigid view which espouses 
Buddhist norms. This becomes particularly clear in that part 
of his work where he draws upon culture and personality 
perspectives to aid his interpretation. The psychological 
model he adopts views the individual as one seeking resolution 
of inner conflicts and tensions resulting from frustrated 
desires. Unresolved frustration results in states of unconsciousness 
in which the personality is overwhelmed, while 'hallucinatory 
and dissociational behaviour' is viewed as another 'defence 
mechanism by which (this) inner conflict is expressed or 
2 
resolved'. What this psychological model implies is that both 
emotional and intellectual factors are involved in the relationship 
between the personality and society, a dual factor which has 
already been stressed as a fundamental presupposition of the 
plausibility theory approach to the study of religion. The 
postulated conflict can itself be seen as a form of implausibility 
involving the emotional desire of the person and the cognitive 
evaluation of those social norms which prevent its realization. 
Rituals of exorcism and theories of witchcraft are thus 
indicative of the attempt to remove the emotional dissonance 
reSUlting from the clash of behavioural norms originating in 
Burmese folk tradition, on the one hand, and Buddhist morality, 
on the other. It is precisely because they have plausibility 
generation as their goal that these phenomena merit consideration 
as soteriological phenomena. 
1. Spiro, M. 1967:256. 
2. Ibid, p.169. 
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From this discussion it will be clear that if the notion 
of salvation possesses any social significance within the context 
of the world religions, then religious effects which may be 
observed in societies not associated with them could also, 
potentially at least, be d i s c u s s @ ~ ~ in terms of salvation if 
those effects manifested similar functions. Since the function 
of religious institutions as "_ meaning construction devices is 
postulated as of fundamental importance and since in the case of 
Burmese and Thai religion the establishment of meaningful life-
worlds in the face of perceived evil is what is taking place, it 
would seem eminently appropriate to expand the notion of salvation 
to embrace religions outside the great traditions of the world. 
Because this notion of salvation is not dependent upon anyone 
theOlogical meaning, its sociological context, and the new meaning 
in terms of plausibility which is being ascribed to it, must be 
explored in some detail for particular examples of religious 
phenomena. 
In attempting this task it will be necessary to portray 
what might be called the relational nature of the notions of 
evil and salvation, or of plausibility and implausibility, in each 
particular case considered. This point is often ignored. Yet it 
lies quite central to the notion of meaning in religious systems, 
especially when the approach is of a phenomenological kind. The 
basic distinction which needs to be drawn is between the nature of 
phenomena as they are in and of themselves, and the nature of 
phenomena in relation to each other. If, for the sake of argument, 
it be accepted that Western thought in general and Christian theology 
in particular emphasizes the nature of things in and of themselves, 
206 
while, for' example, Indian thought focuses upon the nature of 
the relation existing between e n t i t i e s ~ ~ then there would be available 
between essentialist and relational definitions which could provide 
the basis for a categorization of evil. What is thus being sought 
is a phenomenological description of ideas including notions of 
evil and salvation, which shows how they are related one to another. 
Such patterns of ideas, or configuration of doctrines, may Hell 
differ in content. That remains to be seen, but it is likely that 
they will manifest similarity in form in terms of the appropriateness 
of relation between perceived implausibility and the postulated 
mode of its resolution. 
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Chapter Seven Evil and Salvation in Sikh Religion 
Throughout the preceding discussion there has been a 
constant emphasis on this notion of evil and on the fact that 
the common experience of men is that the world is other than 
they would have it to be. For Turnbull it was 'the one really 
imperfect thing in life' as far as the Mbuti were concerned, 
Furer-Haimendorf referred to it as the 'fact of human imperfection', 
while van der Leeuw saw it as the 'malicious inadequacy of all, the 
'irrationality at the basis of life,.l Stanner in his study of the 
Aborigenes talks of the 'intuition of the integral moral flaw ln 
human associations', while Worsley identified man's state as a 
, situation of dissatisfaction with existing social relations and 
. f h . l'f' 2 a yearnlng or a appler 1 e . Max Weber simply refers to the 
, problem of the world's imperfection'. 
The purpose of citing this list is to introduce the suggestion 
that, phenomenologically speaking, there are certain phenomena which 
may be called structures of implausibility. Any discussion of the 
notion of salvation must relate these structures to their complementary 
structures of salvation. The necessity of carefully relating the one 
to the other arises from the fact that a single phenomenon, and here 
we take the case of a single symbol as our guide, only comes to 
reveal its significance and full meaning when understood in the 
context of other complementary phenomena. To discuss the notion of 
salvation ln its sociological sense of plausibility without also 
referring to the negative aspects in relation to which alone it makes 
sense is to commit a methodological error grounded in a lack of 
1. Cf. cap. 2. 
2. Cf. cap. 4. 
.. 
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awareness of the context-dependent nature of phenomena. While 
this is quite obviously true it has often been the case that 
a significant variation of the assertion has often been ignored, 
namely that to discuss the notion of evil, as exemplified by 
studies in witchcraft, spirit possession and some forms of magic, 
without also referring to its positive aspect or that goal towards 
which it relates is to fail to appreciate the symbolic whole of 
which negative features are but a part. 
Why it is that experience of negative phenomena occursin 
the first instance is a question beyond the scope of the present 
1 
stUdy. Our immediate concern is less with the essential nature 
of human imperfection, a question which must be answered from a 
committed religious or philosophical standpoint, than with the 
pattern of ideas of evil and good in specific societies. What 
is more, it is precisely because such configurations of symbolic 
expressions of positive and negative features vary significantly 
from group to group that some kind of higher-order analysis is 
required to help discover their basic rationale. Hence the recourse 
to plausibility theory as a means of describing structures of 
implausibility and their associated modes of resolution which may 
be called processes of salvation. 
Irrespective of why notions of negative factors emerge in the 
first place it is true to say that they possess great power in the 
lives of men. The earlier reference to the relational nature of man 
becomes significant at this point in the sense that attention must 
not simply be given to the way in which ideas of good are related to 
1. Answers could be sought from a variety of sources from the 
realms of idealism through psychological debates on integrated 
fields of perception as advocated by Gestalt theorists to a 
pragmatism grounded in evolutionary ideas of the human animal 
ace)\iB8 an orderlLmental as well as physical environment. 
- ~ ~
.. 
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those of evil, but to the actual life-contexts in which men 
are related to, or perceive themselves to be involved with 
negative phenomena. To say that man is related to evil is 
only to describe his nature of relation to a class of 
phenomena in much the same way as he has been described in the 
numerous titles ascribed to him by the social sciences; he is, 
for example, Homo economicus, faber, convictus, without mentioning 
the more usual epithets of sapiens and religiosus. 
This wide variation in the use of Homo nouns, as we shall 
call them, indicates the breadth of man's relational nature as 
much as it identifies anyone essential attribute of his being. 
This particular process of categorization proceeds by means of 
isolating distinctive kinds of human activity, what the present 
argument seeks is to perform a similar function as far as his 
religious actions are concerned. This involves a more sociological 
kind of phenomenology, more in the tradition of Alfred Schutz than 
of Edmund Husserl, and means that the categorization of a phenomenon, 
In this case evil, involves a consideration of human action as much 
as of human perception. l It is precisely for this reason that 
anthropological perspectives are taken to be fundamentally important 
in determining the significance of religious phenomena. The 
significance of this dynamic perspective wil± be explored at 
greater length in the conclusion, but one consequence must be 
stated here, and that is the supposition that a complex inter-
relation exists between sources of evil and the perceivers of evil. 
1. Roche, M. 1973:33. 
Like Peter Berger and John Bowker we argue that the 
meaning 'poured into' or the 'cues' provided for man by 
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the external world are not always of a positive kind. We may 
then suppose that the sense of evil which is so widespread is 
the product of sources of implausibility which confront human 
perception. These sources may change and need in no sense be 
regarded as uniform, and it is certainly not supposed that they 
provide any justification for arguing the existence of a devil 
or any other theologically grounded concept of evil. If the 
systematic theologian wishes to use such data for his own arguments, 
in the way Bowker urges the notion of cues of meaning to imply the 
existence of God, that is quite appropriate, but it would be out 
of place in a phenomenological study. 
These theoretical arguments should not remaln at an abstract 
level of significance, but must be applied to actual religious 
phenomena so that their potency may become apparent. The first case 
chosen for study is that of Sikh religion which will afford an 
example of eastern religiosity, and the second is drawn from the 
Mormon religion which presents a peculiar type of western religion. 
The hermeneutical considerations of chapters four and five underlie 
this present analysis, and in addition a firm historical perspective 
is adopted so that the emergence of different configurations of 
ideas of good and evil can be clearly traced. 
Contemporary Sikhs possess an image of their own history 
which serves a kind of mythological function within the Sikh 
community. Sometimes this folk history is also used as more concrete 
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historical data by Sikh scholars and others which leads to the 
inevitable question of validity and historical reliability.l To 
say this is not merely to comment on contemporary issues in Sikh 
studies but to bring to clear focus another more significant 
point, namely, that there are elements of the past which Sikhs 
regard as necessary for existence in the present. The problem 
posed for Sikh scholars lies in the fact that certain of these elements 
which are, at present, of deep significance to Sikh religiosity are 
idealized and projected into the past as a form of history even though 
, 
it is practically impossible to establish them as historically valid. 
It is often the case that the idealized notion of the past is very 
different from that constructed by historical scholarship. There is 
nothing surprising in this for similar divergences of view may be 
found in most religious movements: it is mentioned here only because 
the past is a most significant dimension in Sikh thought and enters 
into the notion of evil as will be shown below. 2 It would not be 
completely inappropriate to say that Sikh religion is historical 
in a way that resembles the historical character of Christianity, 
though care is vital in making this generalization since Sikhism 
1S not bound by any doctrine of historical incarnation, nor could 
it be said to possess any form of salvation history in a direct 
sense. Nevertheless, unlike its parent Hinduism it is committed to 
its own past in a particularly concrete way. 
The nature of this commitment is twofold, consisting on the 
one hand in a devotional attachment to the historical gurus from 
Nanak (1469-1539) to Gobind Singh (1666-1708) , and in a 'patriotic' 
1. Cole, o. and P.S.Sambhi. 1979. 
2. Ling, Trevor. 1973:93. Ling suggests that such projections 
have been made with respect to the 'conversion' of Gautama. 
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zeal which binds the individual Sikh to his comrnunity,on the other. 
The problem of historical c ~ i t i c i s m m of Sikhism lies in the way the 
form of community which emerged during the lives of the last two 
gurus in particular, and which has contributed to the ethos of 
contemporary Sikhism, is projected into the earliest period and 
is regarded as normative even for guru Nanak. While this process 
could be identified in many religions, and in Christianity would 
take the form of folk religiosity assuming that contemporary 
Protestant practice was normative even in New Testament times, 
or that Martin Luther's spirituality was just like that of some 
contemporary church leaders perhaps even to the habit of tee-totalism, 
in Sikhism it possesses the distinctive feature of legitimizing 
present action. It does this by teaching the essential unity of all 
ten historical gurus, speaking of the first, second and third 
Nanak etc., as well as referring to them by their proper names of 
Nanak, Angad, Amar Das and so on, and by presuming that the 
essential truth incorporated in the identity of the first guru 
was transmitted to the others and was ultimately deposited in the 
continuing Sikh community. This khalsa brotherhood of 'pure' and 
initiated disciples along with the volume of sacred scripture 
containing the devotional poetry of the gurus constitutes the guru 
in the world today. So according to Sikh ideology the very nature 
of the guru, which itself constitutes the central element in Sikh 
thought, is now to be identified with the essential reality of the 
continuing community. The present cannot thus be understood apart 
from the past. Indeed, it gains its very meaning from the historical 
origin. 
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But the present also contributes to the earliest guru 
period of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century ideas 
which historical criticism cannot validate as truly pertaining 
to that era. This problem can be illustrated by the two models 
Sikhs use to describe their religion, or more correctly, the 
true characteristics of Sikh individuals. These models portray the 
Sl·kh as a 'sal·nt' d 'ld·' b . h rnb· d ·f an as a so ler, ut ln t e co lne motl 
of saint-soldier. This kind of internal-observer's model provides 
an instructive insight into the self-evaluation of Sikhs in terms 
of the idea of evil and salvation, as well as offering a way of 
seeing how Sikhs interpret their own past. The period of the 
first five gurus is, characteristically, that in which the idea 
of a devoted band of pious disciples constitutes the picture of 
the Sikh religion. l It would not be truly accurate, however, to 
see this period from 1500, when Nanak's public ministry was 
beginning to be effective in creating a popular response, until 
the first decade of the seventeenth century, when, after the death 
of the friendly emperor Akbar, his successor Jehangir set about 
attacking the Sikh population which had grown in size and sense 
of identity since Nanak's day, as being a completely 'spiritual' 
age in which devotees hung on the sublime words of their gurus. 
1. The dates of the ten historical gurus are given as . . 
Nanak 1469-1539. Har Govind 1595-1644. 
Angad 1504-1552. Har Rai 1630-1661. 
Amar Das 1479-1574. Har Krishan 1656-1664. 
Ram Das 1534-1581. Tegh Bahadur 1621-1675. 
Arjan 1563-1606. Gobind Singh 1666-1708. 
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Change inevitably took place and each of the early gurus contributed 
to the emergence of that Sikh population which was later found to be 
preadapted for a militaristic response to the new conditions of 
hostility from both Muslim and Hindu sources. Nanak's teaching that 
'there is no Hindu, there is no Muslim' , was without a doubt a 
significant factor in providing an aspect of Sikh identity which was, 
later, to constitute a fundamental element in Punjabi identity. 
Kushwant Singh's admirable study of Sikh history is correct in 
evaluating this ideal of nonconformity as being essential to the 
• 
rise of 'Punjabi consciousness and Punjabi nationalism', but it 
required the political changes which followed long after Nanak to 
make this latent feature manifest its powerful implications. l In 
no real sense can it be argued that the political ideal was 
dominant- and perhaps it was not present, in any significant sense, 
during Nanak's lifetime. The same can be said for guru Angad's 
enthusiasm for physical fitness and organized games among his 
followers. While all this was far removed from military training 
some sixty years later when such exercises became necessary under 
the leadership of guru Har Govind the practice was not completely 
alien to the Sikh outlook on life. Indeed it could be argued that 
one of the features of early Sikhism lay in the provision of a pool 
of potential orientations which served as a ready source for later 
use, and which enabled subsequent Sikh generations to feel a sense 
2 
of continuity with former brothers in the faith. 
Inevitably, this first period of Sikh history saw the 
emergence of many of its basic doctrines, and may be said to 
have emphasized the more obviously religious factors which 
1. 
2. 
Singh, Kushwant. 
D a v i e s ~ ~ D.J. 
1977. Vol. 1, p.48. 
1972:28. For idea of potential orientations. 
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would justify the accent being placed on the saint model as a 
description of the activity of this era. The third guru, Amar 
Das, established the institution of the free communal kitchen 
and dining facilities called the langar, which sought to 
establish equality of status among Sikhs as a contrast to the 
commensality prohibitions of the Hindu caste system. Guru 
Arjan, as fifth Nanak, provides one of the most clearly 
identifiable models of the saint figure after Nanak himself, and 
also serves to provide an historical marker, for after him 
conditions changed in a way which led to an increase in political 
activity. Arjan built the renowned golden temple at Amritsar which 
was to become the centre of Sikh religious life, and there in 1604 
was installed the complied writings of his predecessors. This work 
called the Granth Sahib not only expressed the devotionalism of 
the gurus' teachings, including those of Arjan, but also 
symbolized the relation between Sikh, Muslim and Hindu as one 
of spiritual amity. Nanak's religion had started as one example 
of the North Indian nirguna sampradaya or Sant tradition which 
stressed the attributeless nature of God and the necessity of 
meditating upon His reality through song and poetic recitation. 
Caste and idolatry had been abandoned for the free fellowship 
of likeminded seekers. With the establishment of the Hari Mandir 
OT Golden Temple at Amritsar the religion attained to a significant 
level of institutionalization; and this temple, with its sacred 
book enshrined at its centre, constituted another example of 
preadaptation within the pool of potential orientations which was 
to prove invaluable as a means of organizing the Sikh community when 
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it finally abandoned the idea of living gurus. Meanwhile the 
saintly religiosity was concretely expressed by the devotion 
shown to the words of the gurus and to the ideal of life 
contained within them. 
The change of emphasis which brought the soldier motif 
to the fore was a consequence of the change of political events 
ln India. Just as the goodwill of Akbar had facilitated developments 
within the Sikh communities of the Punjab, so the malevolence of 
Jehangir his successor in the high office of Emperor, precipitated 
the emergence of the militaristic ethos among the Sikhs. l Guru 
Arjan serves as a kind of transition stage between these emphases 
of saint and soldier, which themselves involve rather different 
notions of good and evil, and this not only in an historical sense, 
but also in a structural way inasmuch as his imprisonment and death 
while in Muslim custody first initiated the idea of martyrdom ln 
Sikh religion and culture. This category of religious action prepared 
the way for that of outright heroism and military gallantry which 
assumed its fullest expression in the last guru, Gobind Singh. From 
the moment of Arjan's death his son Har Gobind became the leader of 
the Sikhs both in the spiritual and political realms. Perhaps the 
clearest example of the transition in the ethos of Sikhism represented 
through his leadership may be observed in the fact that whereas Arjan 
built the Golden Temple as a focal point of Sikh religiosity and 
installed the scriptures ln it, Har Gobind built another structure 
at the temple, namely the Akal Takht. Despite its meaning of throne 
1. Binyon, L. 1932 :.110. 
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of the eternal one, this edifice served a most temporal purpose 
as political and military headquarters of the guru. Within it as 
a throne-room the guru became increasingly more like an emperor 
or district ruler with military intentions and resources. The 
large number of Jat caste f a r m e ~ ~ who had entered the Sikh follow -
ship under Arjan's ministry were not slow to see the advantage" of 
serving the gurus in a military capacity, and from this time on the 
question of a Punjabi community comes to the fore. As Kushwant 
Singh says of Ha.r Gobind, 'the change of emphasis from a peaceful 
propagation of the faith to the forthright declaration of the right 
to defend that faith by force of arms proved to be extremely 
1 popular' . The force of Mughal power, however, forced him into 
retreat and after his death in 1644 guru Har Rai continued living 
in the mountains of eastern Punjab. His s o n ~ ~ and successor in 
office Har Krishan, had not escaped the attention of the emperor 
Auranzeb quite so easily and died while under a not very strict 
house arrest in Delhi. Tegh Bahadur had been named as the next in 
line of guruship but, rather like Har Rai, was more of a saint 
than a soldier, and it was only after Auranzeb began a programme 
of destroying temples and removing Sikh organizations in the Punjab 
that he was recalled to the Punjab from Bengal where he lived with 
his family, and began to provide a focus and rallying point for the 
oppressed Sikhs and Punjabis. As a result of this he was summoned 
to Delhi, sentenced to death and executed. This act of martyrdom, 
as it was understood by Sikhs, led to his son, Gobind Singh who 
was then only nine years of age, becoming guru leader and, as it 
turned out the absolute idealization of Sikh warriorhood. 
1. Singh, Kushwant. Ibid, p.66. 
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Gobind Singh led the Sikhs along with many other low 
caste groups against the Islamic powers, a first victory taking 
place in 1686 at Bhangani. The history of the next twenty years 
is complex but the significant outcome was that Gobind Singh 
ended the line of living gurus anti transferred the guru authority 
both to the scriptures, which he edited to include the work of 
later gurus, and also to the community of the khalsa. In the dual 
concept of Guru Granth and Guru Panth is expressed the two-fold 
nature of Sikh culture, with the Granth expressing the saintly 
aspect and the Panth the soldierly nature of community commitment. 
It is only through a historical analysis that this dual expression 
of the notion of guru can be appreciated. While it might be argued 
that the Panth represents the older notion of sangat ,or the 
assembly of saints in which the divine praises were sung, it is 
more likely to be true that it mirrors the later Sikh experience 
of that unified community possessed of a distinct identity which 
had emerged around the scriptures and ideals of the earlier gurus 
but which had corne to a definite form only as a result of the 
pressure exerted by military hostility. The major new element 
which entered Sikh thought as a result of the seventeenth century 
hostilities was that of the identifiable community. The experience 
of the subsequent centuries, and particularly the bloody partition 
of the funjab in the nineteen forties, has served only to reinforce 
this identity and to make the religious aspect of Sikh culture 
something different from what it had been during the earliest 
period of Sikh history. 
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Before attempting to show the precise influence of this 
historical development of Sikh society upon the notion of evil 
it will be as well to present an analysis of this notion from 
two other perspectives - firstly, in a way generally espoused 
by historians of religions, offering a formal description of 
evil as presented in the Sikh scriptures, and secondly, a view 
of evil from the more strictly anthropological perspective which 
demonstrates how the notion of evil is understoed in a life-context. 
The first of these comments is from a timeless perspective of texts 
and the second from the rather timeless perspective of ethnography. 
Both dimensions find a place in the historical analysis which has 
already been initiated and a final comment on which will conclude 
this chapter. 
Allusion has already been made to the spirituality to which 
guru Nanak was heir, this Sant tradition of North India, which 
rejected Brahmanic tradition ln both scripture and ritual much as 
Gautama Buddha had done some two thous-and year before, provided the 
all pervasive ethos out of which the devotional piety of Sikh 
religiosity was to emerge. The Sants , and in this too they 
resemble Gautama, rejected Sanskrit and used the colloquial 
languages for teaching their interested followers who were largely 
of rural, low caste status rather than the more urban elite group 
1 
which constituted early Buddhism. The Sants, and Kabir is often 
cited as an example of this outlook, insisted upon the freedom of 
the individual to grasp, through methods of devotion and 
meditation, the sense of a god who was nirguna, without attributes, 
1. Ling, Trevor. 1973:59 if. 
. '. .. 
but who could be experienced directly through an intuitive 
love relationship grounded in meditative devotionalism. One 
of the great facts of love, as the reflective knowledge 
resulting from this union might be called, was that god was 
but seldom truly found by men. The nirguna sarnpradaya 
or Sant tradition, and after it the Sikh tradition, came to 
possess what might be called a negative evaluation of ordinary 
life, or at least of ordinary states of consciousness. Most men 
were regarded as existing in an undesirable fashion -not only 
the masses who paid but little attention to god but also the 
priests and supposed religious virtuosi of Hinduism and Islam. I 
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Nanak's religion thus involved a radical critique of established 
religion and advocated a path to salvation which depended more 
upon the subjective state of a man than upon his social status. 
In this too he resembles the Buddha's teaching. The one who 
truly knows Brahm is the Brahman. Mere caste membership is not 
b . d 2 to e relle upon. Indeed, the Vedas themselves contribute but 
3 
illusion to the one not truly given to the inner praise of the Lord. 
In general terms the Sikh view of evil follows the broad 
Indian notion of maya, and regards man as existing within a form 
of consciousness which represented things as they appear to be 
and not things as they really are. The best way of portraying this 
phenomenon is by describing the way in which the self is related 
to other entities. In other words, a relational mode of explanation 
1 . Adi Granth. Siri Rag; mahala 111.I.Ghar.III.XXXVI. 3. (p.42). 
2. VI. XXII 8. (p.94). 
3. Gauri; IV.XXII. I. (p.333). 
.'. Bracket references to Ernest Trumpp's translation of 1877. 
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is best suited to a phenomenon which is itself concerned with 
qualities of relations between things. The self in Sikh though 
is called the man. This is the centre of individuality and 
includes both the dimension of thinking and of feeling and 
motivation: it cannot be divided into distinct cognitive and 
affective aspects. 1 What is more it cannot be defined in and 
of itself, but must always be seen in terms of that to which 
it is related. Accordingly mankind may be divided into two 
categories depending upon the object to which consciousness 
or the man is directed. The majority may be described as 
manmukh and are directed towards themselves in an attitude of 
self-will, self-love and pride. In this condition an individual 
may be said to be under the influence of haumai, a concept closely 
related to that of maya in Sikh religion. 2 It describes that 
condition which exists when the man is directed to objects and 
goals other than the ultimate and transcendent god or guru. It 
is the normal and usual condition of life in which most men live 
most of the time. As a state of life it is to be contrasted with 
that condition which comes into existence when the individual 
undergoes a change of attitude, in which the man becomes 
focused upon the true guru, and is said to be gurmukh . This 
transformation involves a reorientation to the world itself. 
For Sikhism the world is not mayic in the sense that it 
is total illusion. It certainly exists as a reality to be dealt 
1. 
2. 
Adi Granth. Majh; mahala Ill. XXlll.XXlV. 
Siri; 1. XIV. 
7.(p.174). 
1. (p. 29) . 
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with but the view of it held by the manmukh . person 1S 
inaccurate and false, and only by a transformation into 
a gurmukh status does a true perspective upon reality 
emerge. The deceived manmukh individual becomes gurmukh 
by means of disiplined meditation and the dwelling upon 
the name of the true guru. In practical terms this means the 
recitation of the words of the scriptures, but in the early period 
of Sikh history before the compilation of the Adi Granth it 
meant singing the compilations of the gurus themselves. Such 
recitation is both private and public, and the public form is 
particularly important since the sense of corporate fellowship 
in pursuit of the divine union has been a central component of 
Sikh spirituality from the earliest times. But the disciplined 
activity of the devotee will not ensure freedom from haumai 
unless the true guru, or god himself, admits the seeker into 
the realm and court of his presence by an act of benevolent 
incorporation. This notion of the grace of the guru, or 
gurprashad , is central to Sikh notions of salvation, and 
reinforces the point already made concerning the relational 
nature of self-identity in the process of spiritual advance. 
In classical Sikh thought those things are evil which 
prevent meditation on the true name and which hinder that 
divine union which 1n Sikhism, as in all bhakti religiosity, 
is the ultimate goal of man. In one sense it is :inappropriate 
to refer to such hindrances, or indeed to any problem area, 
as constituting a 'problem of evil' in Sikh thought, for that 
phrase possesses such a specific meaning within Christian theology, 
particularly so since there is nothing which could be called a 
problem of theodicy in the strict sense as far as Sikhs are 
concerned. Responsibility for evil 'is firmly identified with men 
even though the very world of illusion in which they live is 
regarded as being part of the divine play and intention. It is 
for the individual to discover within himself the yearning after 
the Lord, and to set about finding that blessed union which the 
Lord will himself be pleased to consummate. It is quite improper 
to import as a hermeneutical device the Christian issue of whether 
salvation results from the labours of the disciple, or whether it 
is the free and unconditioned act of the guru. It is much more 
appropriate to see the issue in terms of a feedback or mutual 
interaction between the parties. So it is that Sikh thought does 
not recognize the category of natural evil, and in order to account 
for natural catastrophe, illness, death and misfortune, recourse 
is taken to the notion of karma - that cosmic process of merit 
accumulation or loss by which men receive in anyone existence and 
life that which accrues to them from the experience of former lives. 
But Sikh religious thought does not simply hold to this rather 
impersonal model of causation, for it employs the idea of the divine 
will or hukam which introduces the element of freedom on the part 
of the true guru or god in his relation with men. In this respect 
Sikh thought follows Islamic rather than Hindu traditions, and 
probably marks the Sufi influence upon Guru Nanak and his successors. 
The apparent evil which befalls man is thus to be 
understood both ln terms of the dessert of the individual 
and of the will of god for him. In analytical terms it could be 
said that the personification of causation, whether in terms of 
good or evil, might be expected within essentially devotional 
traditions. Unlike the more logical schemes of Vedanta where 
personalized conceptions of deity are undervalued, the bhakti 
traditions operate on a model of relationships rather than one 
of conceptualizations. This being so it is perfectly natural 
for the Sikh tradition to speak of divine knowledge in human 
destiny. Whatever form evil takes, be it natural disaster, 
illness or moral evil, the ultimate Sikh recourse is to 
consciousness, and to the application of that mental intention 
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to the words of the true guru. This characteristic response leads 
to a corresponding lack of interest in theories of m a t e ~ i a l l
reality so that, for example, no theory of creation has been 
generated to any significant extent. Similarly it is not possible 
to talk of doctrines of creation and salvation in Sikh religion 
as in Christian theology. What Sikh thought does is to offer a 
practical solution to the implausibility of the life-world,through 
meditation and the focusing of life on god. The outcome of this is 
sahaj, or the psychological and spiritual fruit of union with the 
divine. To a person so settled in an awareness of the true guru, 
who is gurmukh, all circumstances can be borne with equipoise. 
What is required is such a transformation of the self that its 
Vlew of adverse circumstances is altered in such a way that the 
ultimate demands of being of god take the preeminence. 
Again the main factor is the quality of relationship obtaining 
in the partners involved in the act of perception. Perhaps the 
simplest way to understand the nature of both good and evil 
as it affects men is to specify the quality inhering in each 
partner as they are related now in a context regarded as evil, 
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and now in one which is essentially soteriological.This clumsy 
form of expression may be better understood through an example 
which might be drawn from Christian theology. Faith on the part of 
the Christian may be said to correspond to grace on the part of 
God; they are attributes similar in kind and serving a particular 
end. So too there are qualities of relationship in Sikh thought 
both as far as evil and the saved state are concerned. 
It is necessary to preface a further comment on maya 
in this way because of the apparently paradoxical element in it 
which locates maya within the province of activity of god himself. 
As W.H. McLeod says, 'maya is, of course, the work of God, for 
it consists in the creation and is inseparable from it' ; 0ut when 
he goes on to add that 'even evil is from God and is to be regarded 
as an aspect of man's opportunity', he slips into the essentialist 
kind of definition which is ill-suited to an understanding of what 
Sikh thought is striving to express. l The doctrine of maya and its 
cognate haumai might be said to be a definition after the event, 
in the sense that the essentially negative evaluation of the world 
which it advances follows from the changed perspective of the one 
who has achieved the enlightened union with god. This means that 
1. McLeod, W.H. 1968:187. 
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haumai in the individual life and maya in the world itself 
comprise a matching pair of evil categories which contrast with 
the positive categories of man as released from haumai and god 
perceived as entirely good and gracious. This last pair of 
categories is normally referred to only as the fact that the 
individual is gurmukh, in other words it emphasizes the union 
existing between the two partners. If the first pair is also seen 
in this relational way then the question of how god initiates 
maya never arises. Indeed so to phrase the point is to express 
the ethnocentricity of a Christian theology rather than truly to 
reflect the manner in which the Sikh scriptures portray the problem. 
That there are verses which assert that 'the infatuation of maya 
is made by the Lord' cannot be denied, but the whole context in 
which they are used shows that the question is not understood in 
terms of aetiology, and there is no developed issue of theodicy 
1 
as a result. That the world is deluded, infatuated, and 
encircled by maya is but one way of expressing the fact that 
individual men are themselves captive to haumai which is a kind 
2 
of thirst, filth, and passion of the self. The Sikh concern is 
always with the necessity of exchanging one set of these conditions 
for the other, rather than on seeking to explain the nature and 
origin of evil, or even of good. 
This account of evil and salvation constitutes a classic 
expression of the way historians of religion approach religious 
phenomena. Many more texts and authorities could be cited to 
1. Adi Granth. Siri Rag; mahala Ill. V. XXII. 1. (p.93). 
2. V.XXXVlll.l.(p.43). 
VII. XL. 1. (p. 44) . 
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demonstrate the formal system of thought underlying Sikh 
notions of religious values, but these few will suffice. While 
this kind of study is perfectly acceptable in itself it goes 
only part of the way as far as a full understanding of evil 
in Sikh religion is concerned. This is so because the phrase 
'Sikh religion' embraces more than the texts and formal 
explanations provided of them by Sikh scholars. So, in 
accordance with the methodological arguments advanced earlier, 
it is wise to give some account of the phenomenon of evil at a 
more pragmatic level if any balanced description of the reality 
of Sikh religion is to be forthcoming. 
In 1974 P.S.Jammu published one of the first 
anthropological studies of what might be called village Sikhism, 
in the Journal of Religious Studies of the University of Patiala 
ln the Punjab. Both the content of that study and the identity of 
the publishers are important facts in the history of Sikh religion 
inasmuch as they herald an acknowledgement that Sikh religion 
exists not only as some ideal form of religiosity, but as a rather 
mixed practical religion. The influence exerted by respected Sikhs 
on this act of publishing may be viewed as a significant step in 
the direction of a more critical self-evaluation of the religion as 
it is as opposed to what it is often said to be. The interesting 
fact about Jammu's 'Religion in a Malwa Village', at least as far 
as the present argument is concerned, is that while it is not 
explicitly directed to the issue of evil as such, it still 
. 1 possesses numerous references to eVll phenomena. In fact the 
1. Jammu, P.S. 1974. 
228 
article could have beeh written with that as its focal p o i n t ~ ~ or 
so its content would suggest. What this fact illustrates is that 
a study which set out to document a village religiosity could 
not avoid the people's concern with practical perceptions of evil. 
The kinds of rituals referred to might be broadly 
classified into three major groups, with each reflecting a 
distinctive life-concern with evil defined in terms of 
implausibility. The first concerns death and the welfare of 
the deceased soul. After the death of elderly persons a week 
long reading of the Granth Sahib takes place, but after the 
death of childless or single persons -whose remains are buried 
under a tree- offerings are made to the dead by women. These rites 
of saptahik path, the recital of scripture, and marhi lippna, 
or the offerings, both serve to aid the progress of the dead and 
to protect the living from any evil influence exerted by the 
departed. The second group of rites relate to human well-being, this 
time in the form of avoiding illness. Here the rite of offerings 
made to the female deities serves to protect women from chhaya 
or possession by spirits, while that paid to gugga the snake 
deity serves to guard against snake-bites. The third and last 
group of rites concerns animal welfare and aspects of husbandry, 
factors which obviously relate to human success. The basarias 
rite, for example, is performed by women in offerings made to 
female deities for the health of cattle and for good milk yields. 
Other rituals which are not so much concerned with the above 
categories but which are d i ~ c t e d d more specifically at human 
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relations with spirits and spirit power also Occur. Jammu briefly 
mentions the tara lahuna and sive jagauna rites but unfortunately 
does not provide sufficiently detailed ethnographic data to make 
any real analysis possible. It must suffice to say that the latter 
rite uses mantra chanting, a form of activity used in many Sikh 
contexts,and which shows the dominant symbolic role of verbal 
ritual in Sikh culture. This is largely due to the high evaluation 
placed upon the sacred scriptures and the reading of them in 
Sikh religion which, in turn, reflects the earlier respect paid 
to Vedic scriptures. The precise extent to which Islamic emphasis 
upon the Quran has affected such forms of rural Sikhism is hard 
to assess, yet it can hardly be of an insignificant nature. 
Another issue which anthropological study has brought to 
light in the Punjab, but which bears no obvious relation to 
classical and scriptural Sikhism, is that of ritual purity in 
social relations between the sexes. Without developing Paul 
Hershman's good ethnographic analysis mention should be made 
of the two basic ideas he identifies as underlying Punjabi moral 
and social values - firstly, that man is essentially pure while 
woman is impure. The concept of impurity arises largely from the 
physiological processes of intercourse, menstruation, birth and 
lactation. Secondly, that fertility is a dominant concern of 
Punjabis since it is only through birth that a woman becomes a 
. 1 
mother and achieves full status as a member.of soclety. 
What both these ethnographic studies clearly demonstrate 
is the distance which might be said to exist between the f o r r n a l ~ ~
doctrinal ideas of Sikh religion - as expressed in the systematic 
1. Hershman, P. In loan Lewis, Ed. 1977. 
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expositions of Sikhism- and that form of the religion which is 
actually practised by members. This reinforces the point that 
any satisfactory analysis of a religion ought to consider both 
the classic and folk aspects of religiosity, for either taken 
alone presents only a partial picture of the reality as it is. 
That there should be a complex relationship between the formal 
and pragmatic dimensions of religions is not surprising, but 
that either one of these aspects should be omitted from 
comprehensive studies can only be regretted in terms of 
hermeneutics whether in the history or phenomenology of religions. 
The abiding fact is that religions are historical phenomena, and 
where that history is known then it must be incorporated into any 
study so that the formal definition of the theological system, 
which has usually emerged under specific historical conditions, 
can be related to contemporary religious structures. It is 
precisely because many preliterate societies did not possess 
any documentary or archaeological history that their religions 
were studied in a fundamentally different way from that which held 
for the established and historic faiths. 
What the historical study of Sikh religion shows is that its 
emergence among a relatively small group of devotees of devotional 
persuasion in fifteenth century Punjab led, after some two hundred 
years, to a militaristic and relatively distinct cultural group which 
may now be'identified as the Sikh community. The implications of this 
transformation are many and various, but one of the important issues 
emerging from it concerns the change in the doctrine of evil which 
accompanied the social transformations. 
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The essentially new element which entered Sikh thought 
as a result of the seventeenth century hostilities was that 
.. 
of the identifiable community. To say that it was essentially 
novel is to comment more on the qualitative nature of the group's 
self-identity than upon the existence of a group as s u c h ~ ~ for from 
the earliest days the gurus had possessed bands of devoted 
followers. But the very experience of aggression served to 
forge a sense of identity which had not obtained before and which 1n 
later years was to grow even stronger through events like the 
partition of the Punjab in the nineteen forties. Because of these 
changed social conditions the older Sant notions of evil expressed 
as haumai must be complemented by reference to the important fact 
that evil, again viewed as structures of implausibility, came to 
assume different meanings as the Sikh community grew and as political 
pressures were applied to it. This might be expressed in terms of 
the evil of oppression and the resulting response of desired freedom 
from such restraints. Accordingly, consideration must be given to 
the role of membership in the khalsa , to the potential evil in the 
sense of political aggression which this involved, and also to the 
responsibilities attendant upon such membership, if any sense is 
to be made of the relation of evil to salvation in later Sikh 
history. A useful way of doing this is by considering the question 
of ethics in the life of the Sikh community. 
The emergence of the expanded Sikh community in eighteenth 
century Punjab led to an unprecedented interest in the question of 
d . One of the best exemples of this social order, welfare, an ethlcs. 
being furnished by the Prem Sumarag, a document written by a near 
contemporary of Gobind Singh and attributed to him. It outlines a 
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theory of society and social order applicable to, and needful 
for a Sikh state and, as J.S. Grewal has pointed out, its 
prologue seeks to encourage the khalsa in the defence of Sikh 
religion and resistance to external hostilities. 1 The treatise 
includes the moral duties of Sikhs, their attitude to those of 
other groups, to women and to caste, all of which are concerns 
indicating the dominant interests of a group gaining autonomy of 
political and social power, while also experiencing a far reaching 
search for self-identity. Nevertheless it was not until Ranjit 
Singh assumed power as Maharaja of the Punjab in 1801 that such 
ideals could find practical expression within an established and 
extensive Sikh community, for he supervised the development of a 
nation state from disparate groups of Sikhs. This newly ordered 
community in which the Maharaja maintained close relations with 
the ordinary people through the style of life he adopted, was 
thought of as built upon an authority vested not in Ranjit Singh's 
intrinsic power of conquest, but in the fact that he had been 
chosen by the panth khalsaji , or the venerable Sikh congregation 
itself, and acting upon divine principles of decision making. All 
of this is somewhat far removed from the simple sangat , or small 
groups of disciples surrounding guru Nanak and singing the 
divine praises which conferred enlightenment. This emergent 
society provided the basis of all future Punjabi political 
thought as well as the moral code of the individual Sikh to which 
be 1 t when dl· scussing the notion of it will necessary to return a er 
Sikh identity and the process of mission to the community. 
1. Grewal, J. S. 1965. 
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In the light of this brief historical analysis it lS 
possible to see that the Sikh internal observer model of 
soldier and saint can also be usefully employed by the non-
Sikh student of the religion. Not only can this model serve 
in its d ~ d e d d form of saint and soldier motifs, as an ideal 
, 
typical expression of particular historical periods - with the saint 
element portraying the first five gurus and their disciples' style 
of life, and the soldier element the last five, with Nanak and 
Gobind Singh providing pivotal models of each type- but they may 
also be seen to express aspects of contemporary Sikhism. What is 
more significant as far as the present discussion is concerned lS 
that they may be evaluated in terms of the notions of salvation 
implicit in each of them, ideas which are themselves not very 
closely related. In terms of the history of religions this is a 
point of some importance for it indicates how an idea of salvation 
can be subject to change under the influence of altered social 
conditions, conditions which ought not to be thought of as purely 
external influences. In the case of Sikhism such would be Mughal 
hostility or the earlier influence of Sufism, but as including 
internal factors which are the product of the change in structure 
of the institution itself. Thus the large number of Jat peasant 
farmers entering the guru's band during the late sixteenth and 
especially during the late seventeenth century resulted in a 
positive emphasis upon a more militant attitude and, ultimately, 
contributed to the emergence of an ethnic Sikh community. Once a 
movement attains such a status involving a fixed geographical 
homeland which can easily become the basis of a definite subculture 
then its interest in political activity is assured. In one most 
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significant sense this is what occurred in the Punjab, and it 
heralded a quite new departure in Sikh history inasmuch as it 
necessitated political involvement in social relations with other 
subcultural groups as well as in its own future planning. This 
meant that 'religion' which, for the early saint gurus and 
Sikhs, was an endeavour carried out while one lived one's 
life in the workaday world now became inextricably associated 
with that world. In other words, the saint model of religiosity 
presupposed a life-world within which the individual sets his 
mind on gaining intuitive knowledge of God, while the soldier 
model united that religious quest with the ordinary pressures 
of daily life, including its political dimension. In the first 
case religion and society are rather distinct entities, while in 
the latter they merge together. 
As far as the notion of salvation 1S concerned the most 
significant difference between these types is to be found 1n 
the fact that whereas the earlier tradition had presupposed a 
personal commitment to the living guru, who taught as much 
by his presence as much as by his actual words, it now involved 
the individual as a member.of an established social institution 
which itself possessed goals other than the specifically pietistic 
and supernatural. While it would not be completely true to say 
. . . h former system was achieved while in the that rel1g1ous status 1n t e 
latter it was ascribed, such as assertion would nevertheless be 
suggestive of the way in which the notion of salvation was 
developing 1n the emergent ethnic group of Sikh Punjabis. 
This point must be made cautiously because it could 
be argued that both the saint and soldier models exist in 
contemporary Sikhism, and that they provide the paramp.ters 
for religious and social action. It could also be said 
that they function as ideal types even for those who do 
not act upon them. So it is that contemporary ideas of 
salvation are related to earlier ones but with the addition 
of significant new dimensions born out of the social history 
of Sikh society. The dual nature of the contemporary Sikh 
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ideal is clearly expressed in Punjabi gurudwaras or temples, 
especially the larger ones which serve as major religious 
centres. There the presence of armed attendants at the entrance 
represents the soldier motif whereas the granthis who read 
the sacred book represent the saint ideal. The ritual of 
initiation also presents a dramatic lesson to the young, with 
the five members of the khalsa who serve as initiators representing 
the historical first five members of the khalsa and incarnating 
the soldierly ideal. But at the same time the centrality of the 
sacred book draws attention to the devotional and saintly life 
of the Sikhs. It would thus appear that Sikhs have a choice which 
is always readily available to them and which is able to provide 
legitimation for different kinds of life activity. Political 
engagements, for example, can readily be validated by means of 
the soldier theme and in the politics of the Punjab this Is done. 
Similarly in Britain and other peripheral areas problems of 
community identity, especially when related to opposition from 
the dominant non-Sikh culture, are readily couched in term3 of 
military aggression. But at the same time these political 
. 
endeavours cannot be divorced from a religious meaning, for 
they are often interpreted as the means of maintaining Sikh 
cultural values, and thereby the truth of the sacred guru 
teaching. In terms of popular Sikhism, for example, Gobind 
Singh stands as the perfect guru and as the model for 
imitation in every Sikh's life. Nowhere is this better seen 
than in the literature produced for Sikh children in Britain. 
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In one of the best known little books published by the British 
Sikh Missionary Society entitled The Saint-Soldier there is 
an explicit identification made between the two priciples. 
'Like Guru Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh attached the utmost 
importance to purity of life; but on a level wi th it he 
placed brave deeds and devotion to the Sikh cause. There was no 
higher duty for a Sikh than to die fighting in the defence of 
his faith,.l Large pictures of Guru Gobind Singh are often found 
in Sikh homes, and the values enshrined in them inform many 
Sikhs in their sense of social responsibility. It might be said 
that the pool of potential orientations of a religion is largely 
constituted by the person of Gobind Singh as far as Sikh 
religiosity is concerned. This source provides a ready supply 
of differently emphasized doctrines which can be selectively 
utilized as occasion demands. Political activism, community 
concern, devotion to parents, love of the khalsa, sincerity, as 
well as learning and knowledge, are all said to be found in Gobind 
Singh's life. Indeed the children's book furnishes some hundred and 
twenty six adjectives are provided as apt descriptions of this Guru. 
1. Sidhu, G.S. et. ale 1974:56. 
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This discussion has thus demonstrated that the structures 
of implausibility which predominated in early Sikh tradition were 
those of wrqng consciousness, and similarly that the process of 
salvation lay in gaining release from the illusion of self-vIiII 
through me,ditation on the words of the guru. The company of 
disciples which constituted the institutional plausibility 
structure was merely a means of fostering the company of the 
guru and striving to attain the blessed state of union with 
God. The growth of the khalsa as a military power and then 
as an ethnic community brought about significant changes in this 
scheme so that evil came to represent not only the darkness of 
the mind but also the very existence of enemies who challenged 
the Sikh community. The various verses composed by Gobind Singh 
attest to this and address God as the sword who smites the enemy.l 
The notion of salvation thus experienced a shift in meaning 
and came to embrace a social dimension of group membership. In 
order to develop the implications of this assertion as far as 
plausibility theory is concerned it will be useful to consider 
the growth of the Sikh community in Britain, and to show how 
the notions of evil and salvation depend for their meaning 
upon the precise context of their usage. In particular it will 
be instructive to show that these notions bear special connotations 
as products of ethnic religions. In order to show the theoretical 
importance of such issues another and rather different case of 
ethnic religiosity will be drawn upon , that of Mormonism.Both 
will now be analysed by means of the phenomenological category 
of mission to make even clearer the meaning of salvation and evil 
understood in terms of a general paradigm of meaning. 
1. Radhakrishnan, S. 1960:270. 
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Chapter Eight Identity and Mission in Sikh and Mormon S . 
_ oterlology. 
In this chapter we provide another example of how the idea 
of salvation varies according to the way in which evil is understood. 
But at the same time we develop the paradigm of meaning by showing 
how the important concept of identity is itself an aspect of the 
process of plausibility generation. Identity is the personalized 
aspect of plausibility, it provides the basis for individual 
legitimation and is thus inextricably associated with the state 
of salvation as we have defined it. Philosophically speaking one 
could say that identity is to ontological questions what 
plausibility is to epistemological ones. 
Here we are investigating the ontological issues associated 
with membership in ethnic religious groups on the assumption that 
such groups are not unlike the closed societies of a preliterate 
nature. The concept of mission is explored to see how it can be 
related to the phenomenon of salvation in such groups, and in 
particular to see how it can be understood as a way of describing 
religious groups as systems of communication. Here we adopt both a 
historical and phenomenological perspective on Sikh and Mormon 
religions and utilize an anthropological concept, that of rank 
concession, to show that despite apparent differences between the 
groups very similar processes are at work in them which can best 
be interpreted through a general paradigm of meaning. 
Despite the apparent differences between Sikh and Mormon 
religions in terms of their Eastern and Western origins their 
phenomenological similarities are striking. Each possesses an 
239 
identifiable charismatic leader, guru Nanak and the prophet 
Joseph Smith; distinctive geographical centres in Punjab and 
Utah serving as foci of subcultures, at the heart of which 
exist important temples, at Amritsar and Salt Lake City. Both 
possess sets of scripture believed to have come directly from 
god and lacking any error due to scribal transmission -the Guru 
Granth Sahib and the Book of Mormon. Both were founded movements 
emerging in periods of religious zeal and have manifested 
considerable change in prectice and belief during the five 
hundred year life period of Sikhism and the less than two 
hundred year duration of Mormonism. Other similarities will 
now be considered as each religion is considered in some more 
detail, and with particular regard to the phenomenon of mission 
and ethnic salvation. 
Mormon Mission 
Conceived during the religious revivalism of New York 
State in the eighteen twenties, and officially born in eighteen 
thirty, this religious movement reflected the book-based 
millennial ideals of several protestant parents as well as the 
notion of priestly status, authority, and church structure of 
Roman Catholic origin ( for that church too was engaged in active 
. ) 1 
revivalist work on the American Frontler . Not the least significant 
family resemblance was that with American Freemasonry whose 
initiatory ritual provided the basis for Mormon temple ritual at a 
later date. For Joseph Smith and his successors these foundations 
1. Dolan, J. P. 1978. 
of belief constituted the rationale for mission. The basic 
proclamation involved the necessity of emigration to a place 
appointed by the Lord for his imminent return to America. Temples 
were built wherever the Mormon community happened to reside, and 
as they were driven out by local popular opposition they built 
new ones until they finally arrived in the relative security of 
the Salt Lake Valley. These temples served as foci of the 
adventist hope, and can be interpreted in terms of the idea of 
sacred space which was intimately associated with sacred time. 
During the last decade of the nineteenth century the Mormon mission , 
which had been established in Europe from about eighteen forty, 
was producing far fewer converts, and of these fewer still actually 
emigrated to the American Zion. The great stream of Scandinavian 
and British converts which had largely populated Utah had now become 
a mere trickle. I have shown elswhere how the doctrine of an imminent 
return of Christ now began to be less influential at the same time 
as many of the economic and social ills which had influenced many 
d . . 1 a doubting convert to emigrate also declined in number an ~ n t e n s ~ t y . .
Some few Saints maintained a languishing Mormon community in Europe 
but it was scattered and disorganized. The first great mission period 
was over, but it had produced a f l ~ u r i s h i n g g Mormon sub-culture in Utah. 
This picture remained largely unchanged until after the 
second world war when a new mission programme, instituted as early 
as nineteen thirty, was implemented by the sending out of pairs of 
young missionaries to serve two year periods of evangelism in many 
parts of the world. During the first quarter of the new c e ~ t u r y y some 
1. Davies, D.J. 1973. 
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central aspects of the millennial doctrine had changed so that the 
divine kingdom was no longer expected to descend from the heavens, 
but would emerge as the church extended its institutionalized 
structure accross the world. As a result of this the message 
preached by the missionaries was very different in effect from 
that of their nineteenth century counterparts. Converts were 
encouraged to remain in their homeland, there to establish holy 
Zion. The subsequent building of temples in Europe, New Zealand 
and elsewhere symbolized the shift in significance of the notion 
of Zion, for they represented the sacred space of Utah's Zion now 
located accross the world in the midst of the world's evil. In 
them the faithful received rituals which were of soteriological 
power having been performed by the Melchisedek priests. 
Not onl.y did this new mission venture result in 
revivifying the l.anguishing Mormon communities and in creating 
new ones, but it also contributed most significantly to a 
revitalization of Utah Mormonism, inasmuch as the mission period 
served a kind of reflexive purpose in converting the missionaries 
themselves, in an affective way, to the very doctrines they preached 
to the so-called Gentiles. Many of these young missionaries came 
from rural Utah townships and could be called nominal Mormons who, 
through the process of mission and its attendant experience of 
opposition from those canvassed, as well as the equally 
psychologically reinforcing experience of seeing people come to 
faith, become convinced and converted Mormons. There, in turn, 
provided many of the personnel for the central ~ h u r c h h bureaucracy 
and were totally convinced of the necessity of the mission 
period for the youth of the church. 
The mission period thus served a major function in the 
process of creating a self-identity among the missionaries 
themselves, and this was inextricably associated with the 
phenomenon of salvation. It was often through this mission work 
that young people entered into a sense of the truth of their 
religion in an affective as well as an intellectual way. More 
than this, the mission period has served to establish the 
identity of the whole church as a missionary minded body. In 
1978, for example, some 2,000 missionaries were operating in 
Britain with its Mormon population of 104,000 while accross the 
world there were 26,000 missionaries in the total church 
population of 4,000,000. 
The phenomenon of mission in the Mormon religion can 
usefully be approached by considering the individual missionary 
as a phenomenological category. He or she, viewed as an ideal 
type, may be regarded in Victor Turner's phrase as a polysemic 
symbol, one which which expresses a series of meanings at different 
levels of abstraction and in different contexts. 
1 
At the family 
level the missionary represents the ideal son or daughter who puts 
the concerns of the gospel before any personal considerations in 
completing the two year period away from home. On returning home 
marriage tends to follow quite quickly and the young person assumes 
the status of husband and father, one highly desired by his own 
parents. The mission period is thought to prepare people for 
1. Turner, Victor. 1967. 
marriage in the sense that it aids personality development 
through the experience of bearing church responsibilities. 
This experience also serves as preparation for office in the 
home church, so the missionary bears a powerful meaning as a 
potential leader in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. 
Not only at the ecclesiastical level but also in historical 
terms the missionary expresses a basic aspect of the church; 
for he manifests an activity (that of proselytizing) which has 
been a major endeavour of Mormons from the beginning. This 
traditional aspect has the further twist of significance in 
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that it represents a kind of reverse emigration, for whereas 
their ancestors may have come from Britain to Utah it is to 
these native shores that the missionaries now return to propagate 
their message. In one sense, then, this activity is a kind of 
pilgrimage for the young person. 
In and through these levels of meaning the missionary 
demonstrates the nature of Mormon spirituality. He may indeed 
be viewed as an expression of what the idea of Homo religiosus 
can mean for Mormons. This is especially true in mission areas 
where the missionary is more socially visible and plays a larger 
part in the running of services than he would in established areas 
of the faith. Even in terms of body symbolism it could be said 
that the well-groomed missionary manifests the submission to 
the structured doctrine and authority of the church which 
guarantees salvation to those who, likewise, will adopt that 
identity which involves faithful acceptance of the church and its 
'ordinances'. The identity of being a Mormon is much mort=:> specific 
than of merely being a Christian. That f aspect 0 sectarianism 
deemed to be exclusivist is fully operative in this case, for 
the revelation deposited in the church is quite unique and 
thought to be necessary for final salvation. To be saved in 
the eternal world involves being identified as a Mormon in 
the temporal world of temple ritual and ordinary social life. 
Enough has been said here to show that the sense of meaning 
which constitutes Mormon status cannot be divorced from the 
Mission process which involves a distinct sense of identity 
in terms of belonging to an exclusive group possessing access 
to a unique body of truth. It can thus be argued that the 
message and the messenger bear a particularly close relation 
to each other, so truth and self-identity are concepts which 
are inextricably linked in the entire scheme of salvation. 
The nature of mission is determined to a large extent 
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by the precise message and by the sense of self-identity obtaining 
among those propagating it. The phenomenologist needs to pay 
particular attention to the content of the message and to its 
means of propagation as well as to changes which take place in 
both areas. Having already shown how Mormon doctrine on'the last 
things' changed we may now go on to analyse processes of mission 
by means of a communication theory, or in other words, by viewing 
those engaged in mission and their message as units being 
exchanged between partners. Indeed the way the various partners 
in mission are identified directs the kind of communication 
event they deem appropriate. The Mormon case quickly established 
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itself on an in-group, out-group basis of Saint and Gentile. 
Initially at least this relationship was accompanied by aggression 
and hostility as the Saints sought converts and as they migrated 
to Utah. The Sikh example resembles this Mormon case in several 
respects and it will be as well to document these before presenting 
a final analysis of both religions. 
Sikh Mission. 
As in the case of Mormons, the Sikhs have also engaged 
in a variety of relations with their geographical neighbours 
during the course of their history to date. Some of these can 
be interpreted in terms of the notion of mission, and more 
particularly in terms of mission as an aspect of the development 
of a self identity. 
The social context of medieval Punjab was very different 
from that of frontier America. The nirguna sampradaya or Sant 
tradition which W.H. McLeod has done much to establish as the 
basic soil from which Sikh religion emerged was certainly not 
millennialist; the focus was upon the individual grasp of the 
d . ... 1 . 1 one go ln an lntultlve ove-grace unlon. If the activity of 
guru Nanak is categorized as a form of mission then it ought 
to be identified more as the mission of mystic necessity to express 
a deeply located experience of god than as a vital proclamation to 
be rapidly conveyed to men for their response and salvation. The 
very notions of karma and samsara rather than the Christian notion 
of one life after which comes judgement, introduces a significant 
difference to the process and to the study of the logic of mission. 
1. l ~ c L e o d , , W.H. 1968:151 if. 
In practical terms Nanak's mission led to the formation 
of a group of seekers whose fellowship constituted the context 
of religious experience of the divine. Whether his religion 
would have become the birthright of an entire sub-culture solely 
on the ethos and teaching of Nanak is questionable. What is 
historically sure is that after the fifth Nanak, guru Arjun, and 
the rapid growth in numbers of the guru movement due to the 
incursion of large numbers of Jats its religious aspect could 
no longer be separated from political issues of Moghul power 
and Punjabi interests. By the time of the eighth, ninth and 
tenth gurus, and especially after the formal establishment 
of the khalsa warrior community in 1699, the message of the 
gurus is as much a group demarcator of Punjabi culture as it was 
a ship in which, by God's grace, the terrible ocean of existence 
might be traversed. This brief background is necessary for 
understanding the major aspects of Sikh mission to which we now 
turn. 
The trickle of emigrant Punjabis leaving India during the 
Briti.sh Empire period increased somewhat after the second world 
war as single men, or married men without spouses made their way 
to America, Britain, Canada and parts of East Africa. Seeking 
the patronage of the host community in terms of jobs many 
abandoned the turban, long hair and beards. Few gurudwaras 
existed, but since weekly attendance at them was hardly an 
established custom in the Punjab the British pattern of non-
. ·f· l·n evaluating changes in religiosity. attendance was hardly slgnl lcant 
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Despi te the difficulties surrounding any attempt to categorize 
periods of history, the later nineteen sixties may be identified 
as one wr ; ,-:h marked a change in Sikh religion cutside the Punj ab, 
and especially in Britain. To a large extent this was due to the 
immigration of Sikh women and children coming to join their 
husbands who had arrived earlier. The immigration statistics 
for Indians, the majority of whom were Sikhs, demonstrate this 
change with the increased numbers of the mid-sixties representing 
incoming families of resident immigrants. 1 This period resulted 
in the establishment of Sikh homes which replaced the earli2r 
and utilitarian 'dormitory' use of houses for workers. This 
demographic change resulted in an increase of Sikh social 
visibility, and resulted in a renewed sense of group identity. 
Indedd it was this factor which was so important in the apparently 
minor debate as to whether Sikhs should be forced to wear crash-
helmets for driving in place of the customary turban which men 
were, by now, wearing more than previously. 
At the same time growing numbers of gurudwaras provided 
centres of worship, instruction and political activity. They 
served as important community centres for the largely Punjabi 
speaking and tradition bearing womenfolk. These also found in them 
the therapy of a home-land institution amidst the potentially 
confusing new reality of urban Britain. The Sikh Missionary 
1. Number of Indian Immigrants corning to Britain. 
1958 6,200 1965 18,800. 
1959 2,900 1966 18,400. 
1960 5,900 1967 22,600. 
1961 23,800 1968 28,300. 
1962 21,100 1969 12,300. 
1963 1,800 1970 8,400. 
1964 15,500 1971 6,600. 
Society in Britain, founded in 1969, may serve as a clear 
expression of this new zeal for Sikh values and culture, and 
which resulted in language classes for the children as well 
as a growth of literature aimed at conveying the richness 
of the cultural heritage. This institution and others like 
the Sikh Research Centre of Canada, which was also founded 
in 1969, came to function as agencies of social solidarity 
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and applied themselves to the question of how the Sikh teaching 
could be expressed in western, urban, contexts. The Sikh 
Students' Federation of Britain, for example, which was 
established in 1977 has taken up the issues of caste status, 
the elimination of marriage of convenience for immigration 
purposes as well as party divisions among Sikhs. 
In all these issues the community is clearly the 
focus of concern, and it is just this self-directed factor 
which offers the clearest distinction between Mormon and 
Sikh notions of mission, understood as the planned diffusion 
f .. 1 o rellglon. Theoretically it might be said that the focus 
and the object of the message are different in one important 
respect, namely, that while for Mormons the missionary is the 
focus and the gentile community of unbelievers is the object 
of the teaching, for the Sikhs the khalsa is both the focus 
and object of the guru teaching. In other words a relatively 
small number of dedicated Sikhs have sought to maintain their 
religion and culture amongst the larger number of resident 
immigrants. In addition to this direct service to the Sikh 
1. Heise, David. 1967. 
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community in an attempt to maintain it as a community with 
distinctive features of language and religion, there is what 
might be called an indirect service which members can provide 
through their relations with non-Sikhs, and that is by 
attempting to establish the status or identity of the khalsa 
in the eyes of the host population. In this aspect of mission 
there is no attempt to make converts to the religion - indeed, 
most Sikhs deny any intention of so doing. What is more, the 
very notion of a convert is difficult to handle in Sikh 
religious terms since Sikh life presupposes to a very large 
extent membership in Punjabi culture. A positive discontinuity 
in cultural attachment is involved in conversion as is aptly 
demonstrated by some American converts who have adopted Punjabi 
dress and language. This reference to white American Sikhs 
leads naturally to the second major aspect of Sikh mission, 
namely mission to non-Indians. 
While only a few Britons have converted to Sikh religion 
America has seen a more substantial interest shown in the guru 
teaching, as might be expected in the wake of interest in 
eastern thought associated with the counter-cultural attitudes 
of the nineteen sixties. The establishment of Sikh Dharma, a 
religious movement grounded in the guru teaching and medi tati ve 
practice, indicates this interest while also demonstrating some 
1 
interesting features of American religiosity as such. For 
f h ratl'onale underlying the creation of example, one aspect 0 t e 
Sikh Dharma in America was the belief that punjabi Sikhism was 
1. The movement 'Sikh Dharma in America' publishes a 
magazine entitled 'Beads of Truth'. 
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entering a decadent phase under the impact of western mater" I" la l S ~ , ,
and that just as Buddhism had emerged and virtually vanished in 
India to be continued elsewhere, so would Sikh religion vanish 
and reappear elsewhere. The American championing of the Sikh 
tradition made of it something quite new. On the one hand it 
produced yet one more religious group for people to choose if they 
wished. This exemplifies the denominationalizing tendency of 
American religion. On the other hand, it sought to cavass members 
from among unbelievers, a practice which conflicts with the more 
usual Punjabi reflectiveness in the religious life. But these 
are only aspects of a much broader and more significant lssue, 
that of the relation between the idea of mission and that of 
ethnic religiosity. To this topic we now finally turn because it 
raises in another form the question of salvation as a state of 
sufficiency of plausibility grounded in a clearly identified group_ 
No historian of religion would ever think of discussion 
the notion of mission with respect to a primitive society and its 
indigenous religion, yet in many ways that kind of relatively 
closed society with its group related and restricted religiosity 
resembles groups which are normally viewed as ethnic communities 
but which are neither preliterate nor remote. While some of these 
ethnic groups are also not generally regarded as mission minded, 
- H- d - th re can as in the case of Judaism and also largely In In Ulsm, e 
be cases of ethnic mission. Both Mormonism and Sikhism offer 
interesting examples of what might be called mission processes, 
though some care is required in the way in which the term mission 
is used in each case. 
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When religion is one aspect of a total culture religious 
status and social status tend to be coterminous. It is for this 
reason that Judaism is as non-conversionist as Punjabi Sikhism, 
rural Utah Mormonism, or parochial Anglicanism. Conversionist 
movements presume that the world in which most men live is other 
than it should be. There is, in other words, a fundamental 
judgement served upon the generally accepted life-world, and this 
perspective is essentially different from that of ethnic religions 
which validate the way things are. Notwithstanding this difference, 
there remains an underlying similarity in the concern for meaning 
and the creation of a sense of identity in both types of religiosity. 
This fact makes it easier to understand the community validating 
aspect of the Sikh Missionary Society, as it does the conversionist 
outlook of American Sikh Dharma which is, essentially, an 
American conversionist perspective applied to an Indian meditative 
tradition. In this case, as is also true of the Hare Krishna 
movement, the question of identity lies with the converts who 
seek a personal sense of identity apart from the one immediately 
given them by their natal society. While mission could be said 
to serve the purpose of changing an individual's identity in 
conversionist movements, in ethnic groups it serves to reinforce 
the traditional identity. This is not to say that only conversionist 
religious movements bring about radical changes in individual lives. 
The earlier discussion of Aboriginal religion stressed the change 
which took place through the process of initiation, similarly 
the change in Mormon missionaries themselves could be paralleled 
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to the sense of growing commitment to the traditional ideals 
of Sikh religion and culture which some Sikhs report in Britain 
and the Punjab. Whether or not the same term -mission- should 
be employed in discussing both ethnic and other religions will 
remain a moot point; but the significant fact,which the present 
argument wishes to bring to the surface by so adopting it for both, 
is that there are similar processes operating in the direction of 
creating a sense of identity which is itself intimately associated 
with the state of salvation as already defined. 
That salvation is a concept worth using for ethnic religions 
will become clearer if we utilize the anthropological concept of 
rank concession in a further analysis of mission and identity. 
This concept of Martin Orans relates as much to psychological 
as to sociological aspects of life and in this respect resembles 
the width of application found in plausibility theory.l In the 
present context the sociological dimension is stressed but only 
because the object of concern is the way in which one social group 
evaluates another. 
Both mission as the action of a religious group and 
conversion as the reaction of the proselytized population involve 
the process of rank concession. In his ethnographic study of the 
Santal tribe of India, Orans analysed the complex reactions of the 
Santal to urbanization and rapid industrialization. In particular 
he showed how they began by conceding rank to the superior and 
dominant Hindu ethic and religion which resulted in the Santal 
1. Orans, Martin. 1965. 
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emulation of Hindu abstinence from beef eating and excessive 
alcoholic indulgence, an emulation which involved a radical 
rejection of the traditional Santal emphasis upon ' p l e a s u r ~ ' . .
The Santal initially adopted what Orans calls an economic rank path, 
through which some individuals made considerable personal 
advantage at the expense of community solidarity. The political 
changes which were associated with movements towards Independence 
in India made it possible for the Santal to engage in concerted 
action for political status as a distinct group in the new 
government. This involved a switch from the economic to political 
rank paths. The change increased internal SOlidarity and facilitated 
the reconstruction of a tribal identity, a process which included 
the creation of an alphabet, codification of religious ideas and 
of former tribal customs. 
We may now ask to what extent rank concession may be 
identified with religious phenomena. Primarily, it might be 
suggested in response, in the way one group evaluates the truth 
claimed by another and responds to it. As far as a conversionist 
religious group is concerned it tends to presume possession of a 
truth which confers upon it the right and duty to propagate a 
particular teaching and style of life. In doing this a lower 
status is ascribed to the target population, at least as far as 
religious ideas are c o n c e r n e d ~ ~ though this act of devaluation 
may be extended to the economic and political life of the group 
concerned. The success of a proselytizing mission depends not only 
on this evaluation of the 'pagan' by the missionary, but also, 
and perhaps more significantly, on the way in which the tarf,et 
population evaluates him. It is precisely in this context 
that the concept of rank concession becomes significant, for 
mission becomes feasible only when rank is conceded to the 
missionary; when, that is, the message and often the style 
of life associated with it are seen as desirable goals. 
According to Orans, concession of rank leads to the adoption 
of a particular rank path which enables the desired goal to 
be attained. Such paths vary in a complex way and involve several 
possible combinations of responses. The fact that rank has been 
conceded does not mean that only the path preached by the 
missionary will be followed -though Orans's basic postulate 
is that rank concession produces a tendency to emulation. Here 
the Santal ethnography is informative for it shows that the 
later, political, rank path adopted by them led the Santal back 
to their own culture and to the construction of a 'great 
tradition' of their own. This involved a strong assertion of their 
tribal identity against that of their neighbouring Hindus. 
The implications of this example for both Sikh and Mormon 
religions are instructive. As far as the Sikhs are concerned the 
situation within the Punjab differ from that obtaining in Sikh 
communities elsewhere. From the period of Partition in 1947 Sikhs 
in the Punjab followed a political rank path with the goal not of 
emulating Bri tish, Islamic, or Hindu patterns of life, but of 
establishing a Sikh State. The historical fact that Sikhs already 
possessed the historical example and precedent of t'iaharaja Ranji t 
Singh in the early nineteenth century as one who ruled the Punjab 
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as a Sikh, made it difficult to concede rank in any submissive 
sense. The political rak path which they did adopt was more a 
reaction to the fact of lost power than any acknowledgement of 
basic powerlessness. Following the success of Indian Independence 
many Punjabi Sikhs became set on economic improvement and 
assumed an economic rank path. This was to be associated with 
that emigration of workers which has already been discussed and 
which resulted in much money being invested in the Punjab economy 
by those resident abroad. The fact that there has been no 
$ignificant decline in Sikh solidarity in Punjab as a result of 
economic pursuits is probably the result of the proximity to 
P ~ < i s t a n n and to the aggression engendered over the period of 
Partition which resulted in a strong sense of Sikh community 
solidari ty. 
In Britain the process of rank concession with respect 
to mission is clearer. In the period of Sikh residence and work 
leading up to the nineteen sixties an economic rank path was 
assumed. The Sikh men conceded rank to the host community whose 
patronage was sought for work. In this process the life-style of 
the dominant society was emulated in the sense that turbans were 
abandoned and long hair was cut. From the mid sixties and following 
the advent of relatives and the consequent replacement by homes of 
mere dormitory-like accommodation, the nature of the rank path 
adopted changed significantly. Though money remained a major goal 
the issue of Sikh community identity in the maintenance of 
Punjabi language and social values led to the assumption of a 
political rank path. This was apparent in the erstwhile 
--::rivial 
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episode of whether Slokh h ld s ou wear turbans while riding motor-
cycles. We suggest that the question was one of whether rank 
should be conceded on this issue or not by contrast with the 
early Sikhs in Britain who shaved their beards, the general Sikh 
opinion was that their present status shoUld be respected and 
recognized. As a result of this internal solidarity increased 
and the whole process of mission came to represent a reinforcement 
of Punjabi identity. That there was a strong emphasis on calling 
the khalsa to live up to its high ideals cannot be doubted during 
this period, and visiting holy men and politicians from the Punj ab 
fostered this vocation. Just as the Santal experienced a revival 
of their traditional beliefs and practices following political 
success, so the Sikhs came to focus upon their religious heritage 
during this period of cultural integration. Indeed the major concern 
of Mission was the solidarity and identity of the community. The 
new situation was one in which a satisfactory level of plausibility 
was experienced by khalsa members. It was a period and state of 
salvation. This notion of self-identity in association with the 
development of group solidarity resembles a process also to be 
found in the Mormon religion. 
From its inception in 1830 Mormonism has been preoccupied 
with the question of its status and real significance as a social 
movement. The preaching of Joseph Smith led to a rapidly growing 
community of believers, and while Smith's initial concern was with 
h · f a rellOglOous message he was soon taken up the simple preac lng 0 
with the problems attending the organization of an expanding social 
group ° This group was opposed by non-tiormons on many occasions for 
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the growth in Mormon power was thought to endanger the free do IT: 
of the wider community. Throughout th· h e nlneteent c e n t u r ~ v T T r';ornons 
adopted a political rank path with respect to the American 
government. Joseph Smith had been mayor of S p r i n g f i ~ ~ Illinois, 
while Brigham Young had been territorial governor and church leader 
simultaneously. The decade of eighteen eighty witnessed direct 
political confrontation between church and nation, and was overtly 
focused on the question of polygamy. It resulted in the formal 
abandonment of plural marrlage in 1889. Throughout this period 
there was a growth of internal solidarity among Mormons whilst 
they also greatly improved their economic status. In this case 
it would appear that both economic and political rank paths entered 
into the r10rmon response to their immediately given social world. 
The full significance of the corporate identity of Mormons for their 
doctrinal system has yet to be demonstrated, but it may be said that 
their notion of salvation is directly related to their view of 
their own social structure. For the moment our concern lies with 
the difference between Mormon and Sikh religious structures In 
terms of rank paths. It is important to appreciate that Mormonism 
did not develop dispersed groups of an ethnic type. Dispersed 
Mormonism, if the world-wide congregations may be so called, was 
largely convert Mormonism; and what differentiated these members from 
their neighbours was their peculiar form of religious adherence.For 
them the religion was the focal point of acti vi ty and life. It was 
d d Od the secondary function so central to primary an l not possess 
Sikh groups of establishing and reinforcing community identity. In 
the light of this difference it would seem useful to make 
a formal distinction between rank paths involving religious 
features as a secondary concern and those in which religious 
factors are of primary importance. 
The central meaning of mission which has emerged from 
this brief comparison of two traditions is that of the self-
conscious awareness of the religions in applying their 
understanding of truth to their immediate social context.In 
terms of the history of religions this might be expressed as 
the desire to communicate the idea of the holy, the precise 
nature of that notion being conceived in millenarian terms 
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by Mormons, and as intuitive union with god by Sikhs.Mission, 
understood as the self-conscious action resulting from a notion 
of having gained possession of a significant truth, is thus 
inextricably associated with the process by which a sense of 
self-identity is gained. The fact that in the Christian traditions 
this process is often aligned with that of proclaiming the message 
to non-believers should not prevent a similar process Being 
identified as operating in non-Christian cultures. Inasmuch as 
the message possessed relates to the state of salvation it has 
been shown that such a state needs to be maintained within a 
group as well as being extended to others. When the notion of 
salvation is interpreted in terms of plausibility theory the 
maintenance of community or ethnic identity by reference to 
religious ideas can be readily viewed as a mission by parts of 
the group to the whole group, with salvation being the desired 
state of total group integration. Just as the notion of rank 
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concession involves an act of J'ud t b gemen etween parties concerned 
(and in proselytizing mission this means that the proclaiming 
group deems others to be lacking in certain fundamental respects) 
so in ethnic communities it is possible for one interest group 
to deem the community as a whole as being in need of transformation. 
It is in this sense that the Sikh mission can be understood as a 
mission process. 
Finally we must consider the negative factors which are 
associated with the process of identity formation and soteriology. 
This necessity arises from the point just made that religious 
groups serve various kinds of judgement upon the world, for while 
this study has e m p h a s i z ~ d d negative factors in religions the case 
of Mormonism presents an apparently contradictory example. As it 
stands Mormon theology presents a clear case of an optimistic 
world-view coupled with a world-affirming way of life which seems 
to cornradict the basic proposition of this study. In trying to 
explain this apparent exception in terms of plausibility theory 
it will also be possible to show the necessity of such a 
perspective in integrating one rather exceptional Christian 
viewpoint with the broader tradition of its origin. 
Theologically speaking Mormonism rejected the established 
doctrines of both Catholic and Protestant traditions concerning 
original sin, predestination and grace. Though the word 'fall' 
retained Joseph Smith made no mention of the Pauline view of the 
was 
event in terms of shame and catastrophe. He developed the doctrine, 
not as might have been expected in the direction of the felix culpa 
theme, but in terms of man being offered the opportunity 
for sense experience and fuller potential for enjoyment. Had 
Adam not sinned by indulging in sexuality itself then no 
children would have been produced, and pleasure would have 
been impossible. The Fall itself thus served a positive end, 
and the humanity resulting from it enables pre-existent 
sould to prove their allegaince to god while they aBo gain 
experience by inhabiting material bodies on earth. This too 
benefits them in their own future state. Every living man comes 
into an earthly existence because he has already demonstrated 
his worthiness in the pre-existent world of SOLJS. Man thus 
begins life in the flesh with a history of success already 
behind him. What is more, he is under no influence or 
contagion of sin resulting from a historic fall of man from 
grace. While the orthodox Mormon does believe in a historic 
event through which evil entered the world this does not mean 
that all the descendents of Adam are implicated in the evil 
there perpetrated. On the contrary, Adam alone is responsible 
for his personal act of disobedience, and that no evil consequences 
befall other men is assured by the doctrine of general salvation. 
To all men, irrespective of whether they seek it, there comes 
the benefit of Christ the Redeemer's work, as a consequence of this 
all men are free to live as they will. 
Mormon theology inevitably finds itself in something of a 
dilemma at this point in its soteriology since it wants to lay 
claim both to human endeavour and to the Hork of Christ. Whi10 
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this paradox is never truly resolved it is the case that in 
exegesis of the Bible and the Book of Mormon the emphasis 1S 
laid upon individual activism which is thought to be a 
worthwhile commitment of the individual because of the 
preparatory work of Christ. It is as though Joseph Smith saw a 
clear distinction between the doctrines of just3_fication by faith 
and salvation through works, and desired to transform the former 
into a version of the latter. Accordingly each man was made 
responsible for acquiring for himself salvation from his personal 
sins by means of trust in Christ's work and the ritual processes 
of the church. Salvation results from 'obedience to the laws 
and ordinances of the gospel', as the third Article of Faith 
expresses it, and by ordinances 1S meant faith and the rituals 
performed in the temples without which salvation is impossible. 
Even a brief consideration of some aspects of this ritual 
will clearly show how significantly different the Mormon religion 
is from practically all other traditions of Christianity when it 
comes to soteriological issues. This is largely due to a distinction 
drawn in Mormon theology between salvation and exaltation, a term 
which introduces a radically different element. In this complex 
notion is to be found a resolution of the paradoxical treatment of 
faith and works already referred to as one of Smith's central interests, 
but more significantly than this, in describing the ideas consti tuting 
the doctrine of exaltation it is possible to show how the entire 
Mormon system is a salvation process grounded in and arising from 
negative factors. 
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As is the case with any cultural system Morro' . on1sm 1S more 
than a mere sum total of its constituent parts, parts which were 
drawn from contemporary sources of religious activity. Protestantism 
is represented by the intense emphasis laid upon the written word 
which is thought to be devoid of any error because of the 
contemporary nature of divine revelation to Smith. By producing 
the Book of Mormon and later the Inspired Version of the Bible 
Smith circumvented that biblical criticism which fixed upon 
errors of translation and text and caused so many difficulties 
in Christian churches from the later nineteenth century. 
Moreover, his rewriting and rephrasing of certain paradoxical 
sections of scripture made the written word even more self-
authenticating to the Mormon community which accepted that these 
changes were of divine origin. l Another fundamentally Protestant 
notion which he developed with much success was that of the 
priesthood of all believers. In Smith's formulation the 
essentially private and personal dimension of this doctrine,which 
asserted the immediacy of relationship conceived to exist between 
god and man, was transformed into a charter for operating within 
the church bureaucracy. Each person was given the right to 
inquire of god with respect to his role within the church organization. 
By means of this idea Smith retained his position as the foremost 
prophet, but permitted others an intimacy with god so far as their 
formally appointed office in the church required it. This example 
of Max Weber's notion of the routinization of charisma shows how 
Smith both protected his own status and allowed all church members 
a sense of immediacy of contact with god. 
1. Inspired Version. J
ohn.l.i- iv . Hebrews.5.vi-vii. 1965. Cf. 
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Along with these Protestant motifs Mormonism carne to 
contain some d ~ t i n c t i v e l y y Roman Catholic features. Their 
inclusion tended to reduce the I ·b·l·ty f P ausl 1 1 0 Catholic criticism 
of the new movement and further validated it in the eyes of converts 
from Catholic and Anglican traditions who were taught to view these 
elements as 8spects of their old religion which had been freed 
from error' by the miraculous intervention of god through the 
ministry of Joseph Smith. Foremost among such factors was the 
idea of priesthood. This came to be the focal institution in the 
church and contained within itself both metaphysical and pragmatic 
meffi1ings. It combined features of the Catholic doctrine of 
authority vested in men through the indelible power of ordination, 
with the immediacy of access to god already referred to as a basic 
protestant belief. The ritual of ordination was believed to have 
been r e ~ r e d d to earth by the biblical figures of John the Baptist, 
Peter, James, John, and Jesus Christ, and it functioned on an 
ex opere operato basis. The context of its use carne to be restricted 
to the temples and to the action of the Melchizedek priests, in fact 
the power of priesthood was thought to underlie the entire life of 
the church in this world and the next. The line of succession in 
the priesthood was carefully maintained and itself validates the 
process of salvation in which church members are involved. It also 
calls into question all other priesthoods and ministries possessed 
ny other churches. It is just this kind of act of censure which 
Smith passed upon the religions of his day which indicates the 
significance of negative features in the growth of the ~ 1 o r T l l o n n
religion. 
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As far as Joseph Smith and those who first accepted 
his message were concerned evil could be defined as much in 
terms of the conflicting truth claims of the fI'ontier religions 
as in the more accepted phenomena of moral and natural e v ~ l . .
Joseph Smith's own perception of implausibility began with 
his inability to decide which church preached the truth. His 
desire for salvation, whatever else it contained, included a 
yearning for an assured way of knowing the truth and of having 
a determined way of following it. Salvation and certainty were 
two closely allied notions for him, and in that fact is manifested 
the orthodox Christianity of his environment; for there was no 
place for doubt in the life of faith. Doubt constituted the unsaved 
condi tion and was represented by the competing truth claims of 
religions known to him. In personal terms t h ~ s s meant that Smith 
was not prepared to concede rank to any religious group in fact 
he did just the opposite and deemed them all to be imperfect. The 
fact that many of the elements he incorporated into his own 
formulation came from these very religions may be counted as an 
example of emulation, but one which involves a radical. 
reinterpretation of the doctrines and rites so borrowed. 
In the Mormon case t h e ~ i s , , then, a twofold perspective 
which can be adopted with respect to the problem of evil. The one 
concerns the movement as a sociological phenomenon, while the 
other emphasizes the actual doctrines held by the church. As far as 
. d . b n that the problem of evil is the former 1S concerne 1t can e see 
no simple matter whenany single religious movement is concerned. for 
ln this case it is the very existence of ways of salvation, for that 
is how the religious movements of Smith's day regarded 
themselves, that proved to be the stumbling-block to him. 
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This example is not the only one of its kind. The analysis of 
the emergence of Buddhism offered by Trevor Ling suggests that 
the Buddha formulated his prescriptions for the enlightened 
life not only in the light of the traditionally repeated 
encounters he is supposed to have had with sickness and death 
but also in the conflicting presence of competing truth claims 
1 
vested in the contemporary religious environment. A similar 
picture has been outlined for the early period of Sikh religion, 
for Nanak often referred to representatives of Hindu and Muslim 
l'eligions as being deceived by their own religious lives and as 
deceiving others. The teaching of Jesus is also not without 
parallel as his denunciation of the Pharisees would suggest. 2 
This means that while Mormonism might appear, at first sight, to 
be an exception to the rule that religions as salvation processes 
have their focal point in the phenomenon of evil, it transpires 
on further analysis that the entire enterprise was initiated by 
a fundamental perception of implausibility in the confused 
competition amongst frontier religions. The second perspective 
on evil follows from this historical question and concerns the 
actual doctrine of evil. There can be no doubt that as far as 
Mormonism is concerned the doctrine of priesthood is central to 
the understanding of any major doctrine and religious rite. This 
. . . t t history including 1S true even 1n the way Mormons 1n erpre , 
1. Ling, Trevor. 1973:64 ff. 
2 . Matthew, Caps .15, 16. 
2 6 ~ ~
their own h i ~ t o r y . . Briefly, this may be described as the hIstory 
of priesthood, for shortly after the time of Christ this 
priesthood,which had been possesSed even by Adam and other major 
old testament figures, was removed from the earth, and was not 
restored until the time of Joseph Smith. 
The speific identity of the Mormon church arises from the 
belief that it alone possesses the priesthood, and that it is 
only through the power of this priesthood that final salvation 
may be attained. So strong is this sense of identity that the notion 
of salvation is, itself, not thought of apart from community 
membership. Whilst the notion of individuality is emphasized as 
the basis for self-development, achievement and progress, it 
nevertheless occupies a secondary position in the overall scheme 
of salvation, and this is why genealogical work, family gatherings 
and the like are important to Mormons. Salvation is understood as 
a corporate activity, and the rituals performed by the Melchizedek 
priests in the temples is of fundamental importance to the 
creation of an integrated and saved community. Personal endeavour 
is important for it may influence the salvation of another soul 
insofar as the vicarious rites performed for the dead, and these 
include ordinations and marriages as well as baptisms, enable the 
departed to enter the various states of salvation obtaining in 
the eternal world. Priesthood itself is better understood as an 
ontological attribute of persons than as a description of 
institutional office. It is, in fact, a divine attribute. Priesthood 
2 6 ~ ~
is 'the eternal power and authority of Deity by which all 
things exist, by which they are created, governed and 
1 
controlled' . Mormonism knows of no essential difference 
between god and men. Indeed all men are gods in e ~ i l l r y o o and 
only await a sufficient amount of experince before they attain 
to divine functions. Because of this it is not thought 
inappropriate that human action should result in the salvation of 
souls. The power of priesthood is thus the central phenomenon of 
Mormon religion for it determines the scheme of salvation. 
For Mormon theology evil is less the presence and 
influence of malevolence than it is the absence of good. Sloth, 
idleness and similar inattentions to duty are the problems to 
which Mormon teaching directs itself. Smith rejected the emphasis on 
personal salvation of a private kind. For him, every man's merit must 
be fully appreciated and a suitable reward accorded. He developed 
an idea of heaven which made this possible, for in its tripartite 
structure all could receive their due reward. Sociologically 
speaking one could say that this was an example of a millenarian 
sect which appears to hold a universalist doctrine of salvation 
but which made possible an exclusivist attitude to outsiders by 
positing that complete salvation- which it calls exaltation- came 
only to those married Mormon Melchizedeks who had fully responded 
to the Mormon message and participated in the correct rites. 
Just as ritual action works against sloth, so the acquisition 
of knowledge militates againts ignorance and, 'it is impossible 
for a man to be saved in ignorance' 2 Salvation is essentially a 
1. 
2. 
McConkie, B. 1961. 
Doctrine and Covenants. 131:6. 
process and not a state. It involves the eternal group which 
includes parents and children who remain together forever, as 
long as they have undergone the proper rites, and who are 
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ln an ever increasing condition of learning and development. 
The entire scheme of reality is subsumed within the meaning 
of the priesthood, and that priesthood only makes sense within 
the actual community of Saints, and especially in its tempi.? 
ritual. 
What this brief discussion has made clear is that the 
notion of evil, understood in terms of implausibility, is a 
faator which relates not only to the internal value system 
of this religion, but also to the historical context of its 
emergence. It has also demonstrated the fact that the notion 
of salvation cannot be divorced from that of identity. It is the 
Mormon group as such, which is the context within which salvation 
may be found. All this makes clear the further point that the 
notion of evil cannot be discussed simply as a philosophical 
problem, or as a question of theology, but it necessitates a 
discussion of the nature of the community within which the 
idea has been generated. To have argued that the perception of 
evil and the adoption of salvi fie responses cannot be dissociated 
from the process of identity and community membership, whether 
ethnic or institutional, is to have made preparation for the 
Conclusion of this study in which the general paradigm of meaning 
is considered in terms of its hermeneutical and philosophical 
status. 
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Conclusion 
The central concern of this study has been the problem 
of method, and in particular the idea that a general paradigm 
of meaning now seems to characterize much of the work carried 
out in religious studies. An attempt has been made to make this 
paradigm more explicit and to show how it can be utilized in 
the analysing the key notions of evil and salvation. We have 
argued that man is essentially a meaning constructing creature 
and that evil is to be understood as the evaluation he makes of 
those elements in life which frustrate his construction of 
fully satisfactory systems of meaning, while salvation is a 
level of sufficiency of plausibility of such systems which 
gives full weight to the problem of evil. So while the 
argument has focused upon structures of negativity the 
final comment offered here emphasizes that while religious 
systems are those in which man evaluates himself as beset by 
evil they nevertheless include the positive dimension of 
. .1 1 
attempting to explain and cope wlth eVl . 
Despite the fact that negative structures are apprehended 
as restraints upon the task of constructing a flawless system 
of meaning man incorporates these very difficulties into 
overarching sets of significance because he is not only a 
2 
'fundamentally semantic creature' but is also a moral one. Two 
points follow from this. Firstly, the fact that man does possess 
this drive for meaning which involves a moral evaluation of 
1. 
2. 
, ··1 argument on We have already considered Bowker s Slml ar 
religions as route finding activities focused upon th: 
intransigent aspects of reality. Cf. Brian Hebblethwalte 
Crick, Malcolm. 1976:3. 
1976:9. 
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things means that it is particularly appropriate that theologians 
should discuss the case of meaning, order, creation, and salvation. l 
But secondly, this evaluation should be seen as a development of 
the relations existing both within man as a biological organism, 
and between him and his environment. It is here that the general 
paradigm of meaning can be of specific use, especially as it is 
related to the notion of General Systems Theory developed by 
2 Ludwig Von Bertalanffy. Bertalanffy's approach substitutes a 
'perspectivist' outlook for those of a reductionist nature. 
Phenomena are viewed as 'systems of elements in mutual interaction' , 
rather than as isolable units acting in one way causality. The very 
name General Systems Theory indicates the notion that all levels of 
reality - inorganic, organic, social, psychological,intellectual, 
and religious - may be viewed as interacting with each other in a 
homeostatic way to maintain various states in equilibrium. This 
theory can be seen as a quest for a new unity between diverse 
branches of knowledge on the basis of the presumed 'structural 
uniformities of the different levels of reality', and of the 
interaction of those levels with each other. This dynamic view 
of phenomena replaces the more static models, be they evolutionist 
or functionalist, which operated on the notion of a simple cause and 
effect mechanism. Bertalanffy refers to this new perspective in 
terms of a revolution of thought, and as a new paradigm in Thomas 
Kuhn's sense of the word. 
1. According to Augustine order, along with mode a ~ d d f o ~ m m
consti tuted the meaning of good. Cf. Thomas Aqulnas , ~ ) u m m a a
Theologia. lao 103-109. So too with C a l v ~ n n for whom the 
h h h S a restoration restoration of order through t e c urc 1 
of the imago Dei. ef. B.e.Milner, 1970:195. 
2. Bertalanffy, Ludwig Von. 197 
This recognition has been echoed both in anthropology 
and theology though only to a limited extent. Malcolm Crick 
has carefully documented a change from a functionalist 
consensus in anthropology to what he calls the semantic 
anthropological style of investigation. 1 Basso and Selby, 
referring to the American situation, feel unable to identify 
any 'unified official paradigm of meaning', but express their 
opinion that 'if we were to wait until a qualitative 
mathematics is devised for the full and proper axiomatization of 
a general theory of meaning a great deal of necessary work would 
2 
not get done'. In theology the notion of a system of the 
sciences was one of Paul Tillich's early concerns and one of 
the contributory factors entering into his development of a 
system of theology. In a more directly apposite way John Bowker's 
Wilde Lectures presuppose the applicability of this systems 
approach to theological issues and offer a persuasive example of 
3 how to carry out such a programme. This perspective views reality 
in terms of organization rather than chaos. Man is viewed as an 
active personality system always in dynamic interaction with other 
systems, be they biological or social, rather than as some kind of 
robot which acts only when acted upon by some external cause. 
Abner Cohen's discussion of personality and self-hood as open 
4 
systems is one good example of this suggested perspective. 
This 'organismic' revolution has resulted from developments 
1. Crick, Halcolm. 1976:2. 
2. Basso, K.H. and H.A. Selby. 1976:9. 
3. Heywood Thomas, John. In R.W.A. McKinney, 1978:78. 
4. Cohen, Abner. In loan Lewis, 1977:117. 
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in the behavioural and biological sciences and in one sense 
it is possible to say that just as the nineteenth century 
understanding of religion was deeply influenced by evolutionary 
thought, so in the twentieth century it has become possible to 
borrow an organic model and to apply it to religious studies. 
The change that this paradigm makes possible is well 
illustrated in the case of one anthropological writer who re-
evaluated his ethnographic work under its influence. l In 1958 
Gregory Bateson added an epilogue to his important study of the 
Iatmul tribe of New Guinea first published in 1936. He speaks 
of the general change which had emerged in theoretical 
perspectives after the second world war, and in particular of 
the contribution made by cybernetic theory to the interpretation 
of human behaviour. His summary of the transformation is of 
interest not only because it pinpoints the actual ideas involved, 
but inasmuch as it implicitly demonstrates the radical difference 
between this view and that of evolutionism. 'The ideas themselves', 
he says, 'are extremely simple. All that is required is that we ask 
not about the characteristics of lineal chains of cause and effect 
but about the characteristics of systems in which the chains of 
. , 2 
cause and effect are circular or more complex than clrcular . 
It is found that such a system has properties totally different 
from anything which can occur in lineal chains. The notion of 
self-corrective causal circuits thus replaces that of purpose 
and adaptation which involved an insupportable teleological factor. 
1. Bateson, Gregory. 
I' 2. Ihid,. ii,,288. 
1958. Bateson reinterpreted his notion 
of schismogenesis by identifying the 
schismogenic unit as a 'two-person sub-
system', p.297. 
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If we are to formulate a general paradigm of meaning 
which is applicable to religious studies it is necessary to 
relate what we have already said to the notion of man as a 
symbolic animal. Several important concepts are involved 
in this correlation of ideas about meaning systems and 
symbolic systems. The first question which must be posed is 
precisely what is being corrected or maintained by the various 
systems in which man is involved? While it is easy to see 
that the homeostatic systems of animal bodies serve, for example, 
to maintain a constant blood temperature as the creature enters 
into innumerable relations with various environments, and while 
it is possible to talk of other physical systems maintaining 
energy levels, it might seem that no single answer can be provided 
to identify the state sought by human life systems. Yet it is 
perfectly possible to suggest that 'meaning' is just that 
condition with which man in his multiplex involvement in 
systems is concerned. 
So the general paradigm of meaning, when interpreted in 
association with General Systems Theory gives some foundation to 
the increasingly voiced opinion that man and meaning are 
inextricably associated concepts. From the perspective of the 
history of religions for example Werblowsky has said that 
'the notion of man as a builder of systems of meanings is a 
commonplace of philosophical as well as of social and cultural 
anthropology', and similarly Zijderveld has said that 'one of 
the essential insights gained from philosophical anthropology is 
the fact that man bestows meaning upon his environment,.l 
Throughout the earlier chapters we have sought to show just 
how this notion of meaning is developed and maintained among 
various religious groups, and how it is a term -chat must be 
sufficiently broad as to encompass the whole of human life. 
The notion of pragmatic plausibility was introduced in order 
'to explore the nexus which binds together the cognitive and 
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ff t 1 . fbi' t 1 fl' . . 2 a ec ua meanlng 0 sym 0 s , or a east 0 re 19lOUS actlon. 
Unfortunately it has been largely beyond the scope of this thesis 
to discuss psychological dimensions of human meaning systems, though 
the chapter on identity and mission suggests the importance of 
psychological schemes. Nevertheless it is certainly not proposed 
to eliminate psychological factors simply to follow a certain 
anthropological orthodoxy. On the contrary, if the notion of 
general systems is accepted then psychological systems gain a 
new significance. One way that this new significance can be 
appreciated is in the field of symbolism, since symbolic 
processes and meaning processes are inextricably associated. 
Symbols must now, in conclusion, be considered as they constitute 
a major mode of religious plauibility generation, and therefore 
of salvation. 
It is important and instructive to observe that the term 
'symbolism', like 'meaning' and 'salvation', is vague. Crick has 
1 Werblowsky, R.J. Zwi. 1976 :108. 
Zijderveld, A.C. 1970:36 
Cf. Roland Robertson, 1978:84. 
2. Lewis, loan . 1977:2. 
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referred both to Chomsky who said that meaning was a 'catch-all 
term for those aspects of language which linguists knew very 
little about', and to Max Black's notion of the 'extraordinary 
shiftiness of the word meaning' 1 Similarly D a ~ l l Sperber thinks 
it 'impossible to circumscribe the notion of meaning in such a 
way that it may still apply to the relationship between symbols 
d th · . . ,2 an elr lnterpretatlon. Despite the fact that Sperber is 
using the word 'meaning' in a more technical sense here he 
highlights an important point which concerns the actual process 
of meaning construction asi t affects symbolism. As far as he is 
concerned the word should only be used to refer to 'intui ti vely 
perceived relations between signs- that is to say in particalar 
those of paraphrase and analyticity,.3 He disagrees with Levi-
Strauss's procedure of treating myths, as well as social institutions 
such as kinship, as semiological systems in any strict sense. Myths 
are not signs, the symbols of which .myths are composed are not 
'paired with their interpretations in a code structure; their 
interpretations are not meanings' 4 Myths function more for 
individuals than for groups, they are open to idiosyncratic 
understanding. Nevertheless there is a sense in which the 
understanding of myths and symbols can be seen as meaningful, 
namely, that symbolism is the product of a cognitive process 
which incorporates·within itself a tacit knowledge of how to 
interpret a phenomenon, in the way that, for example, analytic 
statements in ordinary usage are accepted as being self-evidently 
1. Crick, Malcolm. 1976: 11. 
2. Sperber, Dan. 1975:13. 
3. Ibid, p.1O. 
4. Ibid, p. 85. 
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true. So it is that 'without explicit instruction all humans 
learn to treat symbolically information that defies direct 
conceptual treatment' . 1 
In saying this Sperber is suggesting that there is WI 
inherent drive to meaning by mechanisms present in the humrui 
process of perception such that factors not capable of 
resolution by ordinary means are relegated to a category of their 
own. While symbolic categorization does admit of idiosyncratic 
understanding it also serves to unite members of a group 
inasmuch as all share the tendency to engage in focalization 
and evocation- the two functions of symbolization according 
to Sperber- on the underlying assumption that sense can be 
made of factors which do not succumb to immediate linguistic 
explanation. 
The embarrassment which some have shown over this fact 
that 'the term meaning has various meanings' can be dispelled 
by the paradigm of meaning inasmuch as man can be placed in a 
class of his own as a meaning constructing animal.
2 
In general 
terms it is possible to describe the activity of these class 
members as creating and maintaining an ordered and integrated 
life. This is to describe the form of their activity rather than 
any particular content. As Gregory Bateson has argued, anthropologists 
'deal with meta relationships between messages' and not simply with 
.. 3 
ethnographic descrlptlons. 
1. Ibid, p.148. 
2. 
3. 
Barnhardt, J.E. 
Bateson, Gregory. 
In his analysis of the Iatmul ~ v i d e n c e e
1977:159. 
1958:293. 
277 
he was helped by making the simple assertion, taken from 
Russell's Theory of Types, that a class cannot be a member 
of itself. This also applies to phenomenological analysis 
and can be applied to the notion of meaning. The evidence 
presented in the earlier chapters of this thesis shows how 
v a r i o ~ s s groups set about constructing plausible universes 
of meaning despite -t-he'-fact that the actual ideas used in these 
constructions vary to a marked extent. The human class IS thus 
one of meaning construction, and in this process man resembles 
very many other classes of phenomena which manifest a system of 
order rather than one of chaos. Because man is a self-conscious 
and intelligent being the nature of the order he maintains can 
be described as meaning, and because he is a moral creature 
this meaning state can be designated as salvific. This salvation 
signifies a state of integrity in which aspects of the environ-
ment are held by the intentional attitude of man. Meaning in the 
class of human subjects would thus correspond to the temperature 
level maintained by a vascular system, but it need not be defined 
in terms of any of the functions of its sub-systems. 
The question which this then raises concerns the relation 
between this class, governed by the general paradigm of me&1ing-
which describes its modus operandi - and the phenomenon of 
religious systems. In other words it is the question of the 
relation between meaning and salvation. One possible solution 
b f Hans Mol 's notion that man invests to this pro lem emerges rom 
with a sense of the sacred whatever serves to confer identity 
upon him. In this sense it is possible to regard primitive religions, 
. h· t wo-nld of experience, as salvation 
which emphasIze t eIr presen L 
2 ~ 8 8
religions, and in fact that has been suggested earlier in this 
study when it was argued that no essential difference could be 
established between the so called primitive and world religions. 
Salvation is then seen as a way of describing a quality of 
plausibility conferred by the individual's social group. 
Another possible solution accepts the fact that the notion 
of salvation is held by certain religions to refer not to any sense 
of ordinary life and to man's security in it but to another order 
of reality, to some transcendent state of being. This theological 
perspective cannot be ignored in any phenomenological analysis;nor 
need it be, for it can be accommodated within a general paradigm 
of meaning. To what extent the fact of literacy must be borne in 
mind in this context it is difficult to say, but it seems likely 
that, as Jack Goody has clearly shown, 'literacy and classroom 
education brings a shift towards greater abstractness, towards 
1 the decontextualization of knowledge'. This means that as ideas 
of significance and legitimation have been subject to increasing, 
systematic abstraction, so the notion of salvation - interpreted 
as a state of ultimate identity and security - has become less 
associated with the ordinary structures of the life-world. It is 
precisely this context which allows Peter Berger to view religious 
ideas as legitimating all other, apparently less significant,values. 
The reason why this perspective can be accommodated within the 
general paradigm of meaning is that the notion of salvation can 
be equated with the basic class of meaningfulness itself. This 
seems to be the position which Mircea Eliade has recently adopted 
1. Goody, Jack. 1977:13. 
in his magnum opus, A History of Religious Ideas. This begins 
with the assertion that 'every rite, every myth, every belief 
or divine figure reflects the experience of the sacred and hence 
implies the notions of being, of meaning, and of truth,.l Te 
what extent particular degrees of complexity of human organization 
restrict the possibility of a satisfactory l ~ v e l l of plausibili ty 
generation or not it is difficult to say. Be that as it m a y ~ ~ this 
thesis has sought to show that irrespective of level of social 
complexi ty, or of complexity of cosmological dualism, the S2lTle 
general principle obtains between perceived irnplausibilio/ 2nd the 
processes for its resolution. 
This study has not adopted any specific theological stance 
and is non-confessional. Accordingly it has sought a non-theological 
framework by means of which to approach basic issues in religious 
studies. A major conclusion is that the notion of salvation is a 
quali tati ve description of a state of being and as such the concept 
may be applied to contexts in which the state of plausibility 
is of a sufficiently durable kind. This may be the case either in 
preliterate groups where such salvation may be more implicit, or 
in the world religions where it is more explicit. 
d ' ., d The obviously elusive character of the wor s meanlng an 
'salvation' in general use can now be seen to be due to the fact 
that they are words which describe broad categories or classes of 
human thought and action. These classes cannot be fully explained 
. . a sub-class without the by means of terms whlch themselves comprlse -
explanation becoming essentially reductionist. 
1. Eliade, Mircea. 1979:2. Original emphases. 
While much has already been said about systems of 
meaning construction it remains to provide a specific 
description of their mode of operation and context of 
functioning. This could be done in two main ways. On the 
one hand the notion of society could be invoked as the basic 
context within which meaning is generated; this 1S the way 
chosen by Durkheim and Berger. Or, on the other hand, the 
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private self may be identified as the source of all significant 
thought and reflection, as was done by Descartes and the whole 
rationalist tradition which, in a sense, culminated in Kant's 
Copernican revolution. It is precisely this kind of awareness 
that makes even the most anthropological study of religion 
subject to philosophical ano theological scrutiny. Yet it remains 
true that the very reason why both these perspectives are 
inadequate is also the very reason why the paradigm of meaning 
should be accepted as the basis for understanding human religiosity. 
The suggestion is that the individual, who will now be called 
the social-person, is the pivotal point at which numerous systems 
might be said to converge. The social-person requires an 
identification of a different order from that gi ven to any 
single system involved in the interaction. Putting the point 
crudely, the social-person is more than the sum total of the 
individual systems contributing to his existence. 
To isolate anyone sub-system of all those that contribute 
to the system of man himself is to engage in that kind of 
reductionism which has been opposed throughout this study. 
t ·cal exponents of this reductionist Descartes and Durkheim serve as yp1 
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fallacy, a fallacy which is only seen to be such in the light 
of a general systems theory and the paradigm of meaning. Descartes 
for example used language as a neutral tool rather ,than see it 
as a social phenomenon. Whereas a contemporary phenomenological 
view regards language as essentially social and as presuming 
the existence of inter-acting persons, Descartes felt able to 
utilize it as the means of his private, philosophical meditations. 
Similarly Durkheim reified the notion of society, rather than 
that of the self, though not without some acknowledged difficulty, 
as his notion of man as Homo duplex indicates. His problem lay 
in relating the individual and social aspects of Homo duplex, a 
task in which he ultimately failed. Stephen Lukes sees this 
difficulty as arising from Durkheim's conviction that there 
was 'an underlying ontological distinction between levels 
of reality' , with individuals constituting one level and society 
another. Lukes also cites Morris Ginsberg's comment on Durkheim 
to the effect that the notion of society 'had an intoxicating 
effect on his mind,.l For Durkheim there exists a firm dichotomy 
between the bodily aspect of persons, which he calls 'the organism' , 
and their social and collective aspect. 2 It is as though this 
latter dimension has been superimposed upon the biological reality 
during the process of evolution. 
It is when either of these aspects of life is made absolute 
that a balanced view of man becomes impossible and any hermeneutics 
d the socl·al-person has been taken unstable. Throughout this stu Y 
. locuS of 'human-being'. The name ~ 1 3 = = been 
as representing the prlme 
1. Lukes, Stephen. 1975:417. 
1976: 16. 
adopted for man inasmuch as it emphasizes both his bodily 
aspect (along with all the systems involved with that level 
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of physical organization) and the social dimension of his life. 
The one enables reference to be made to the affective dimension 
of life while the other makes cognitive reference easy. It is 
this social-person which is the locus of the being of man, and 
in practical terms it is irreducible either to a notion of pure 
self or to that of socia.l role. Partial descriptions of the social-
person as Homo economicus, H. socialis, or H. religiosus, may 
serve useful heuristic functions in restricted cases; but they 
have 'nothing to do with the essence of man' as Ralph 
Dl d .c bt 1 'h dl f 'I . II alren orL says, u on y Wlt mo e s 0 SOCla actlon. n a 
rather similar way Dorothy Emmett has questioned the opposite 
tendency to overemphasize the 'romantic notion of the bare 
subj e cti ve 'I' " 2 Again in a similar vein, though within the 
context of a theological argument Reinhold Niebuhr asserted that 
there was no place for 'individuality in either pure mind or 
3 pure nature'. 
It is precisely because the social-person is the irreducible 
unit of phenomenological analysis, being the point of convergence 
of many systems, that it is appropriate to describe this category 
d ' , t Integrated inasmuch as it is the as integrated an lntranslgen. 
social-person who assimilates environmental systems to his internal 
system, and intransigent because no ammount of reductionist 
explanation can fully give account of the total entity, It is this 
fact of the complex unity of the social-person that makes it 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Dahrendorf, Ralph. 
Emmett, Dorothy. 
Niebuhr, einhold. 
1973:88. 
1966:178, 
1941 
improper to speak of him as, for example, possessing a b o d ~ ' , ,
for that very verb betrays a dualistic, and potentially 
reductionist, tendency to divide between body and mind. 
Rather he should be said to be a body. Similarly the social-
person is best not referred to as one who holds to or believes 
ln some set of social values viewed as idealized and abstract 
systems but as one who manifests them. The level of organization 
attained by the social-person is thus essentially different in 
kind from the nature of all the SUb-systems which contribute to 
the state of human self-awareness and action. 
Two major criticisms could be made of this emphasis 
upon the notion of social-person. First , it could be said to be 
a mere expression of an ethnocentric model of the individual. 
David M. Schneider has, although in a different context, spoken 
of 'the Westen1 conception of the person as a bounded, unique, 
more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a 
dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action 
organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both 
against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background' . 1 This ideal type is, he says, 'hoHever incorrigible 
it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of 
the world's cultures'. The reason for adopting the model of social-
person is not, however, simply to enshrine one cultural perspective 
. k· lable a model wh i ch can 
as true and beyond cavll, but to rna e aval . 
accommodate the actual theoretical perspective which the data demand. 
1. Schneider, D.M. In 
K.H. Basso and H.A. Kelly, 1976:225. 
From the standpoint of the sociology of knowledge it might 
also be added that the socl'al groups h' h h w lC ave come to see 
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man as this type of individual have done so for similar reasons 
which have led to the more technically elaborate views of 
general systems theory. In any case the real reason for adopting 
such a model lies, as has already been shown, in the fact that 
studies in non-psychological areas first suggested the basic 
notion of general systems, while the field of human life has 
simply presented itself as another one in which the seminal 
concept might be fertile. 
The second is more orthodoxly sociological and sees 
culture as the central concept to which individual's need to be 
related. An interesting example of this view is found in Marshall 
Sahlins's recent study and its basic proposition that 'meaning 
is the specific property of the anthropological object', and the 
1 
anthropological obj ect is culture. He then goes on to say about 
culture what we have said here about the social-person, at least 
inasmuch as 'the unity of the cultural order is constituted by ... 
meaning' . 2 Sahlins is aware of an idealist tendency of thought 
which can accompany abstract discussions of concepts like 
culture 
and seeks to avoid it. This 'ts another reason why this 
thesis has 
preferred to focus upon the social-person despite the 
customary 
view that social reality, as Durkheim so fundamentally believed, 
can be viewed as a higher order reali ty than the individual. But 
it needs to be understood that for the purpose of religious studies 
the sociological dimension, whilst of very great importance, as we 
have continually emphasized, cannot be the only perspect i ve 1 , ~ r r . . i tteJ 
1. Sahlins, Marshall. 1976:x. 
2 • uEfhi d, p, 06. 
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for analysis. It is the social-pers·on who remains the integrated 
and intransigent locus of meaning, and not in any simple sense 
as one who straddles the private and public domains as Needham 
suggested, but as one apart from whose existence as a synthesizer 
of sub-systems there would be no such factors to integrate. 
Once this model of man is accepted it becomes possible 
to reconsider many problems within religious studies in the hope 
of avoiding specific impasses. For example, the question of 
world and village religion can be re-examined in terms of the 
individual as one who integrates what he is taught of the formal 
religious dogma with other local forms of religious thought and 
practice, under the influence of particular negative factors and 
the overall drive for meaning. l This kind of view also provides 
a theoretical validation for Cantwell Smith's important suggestion 
in the history of religions that religious man should be seen as one 
who mediates between an accumulated tradition of a religion and 
his own personal faith. 2 Similarly it might help explain why what 
might be called the phenomenology of the religious individual has 
been so important in the work of men like Rudolph Otto and 
Heinrich Heiler, and why some anthropologists such as Stanner and 
Evans-Pritchard have felt that even when a full sociological form 
of analysis has been offered there remains an area to be explained, 
a point at which the services of the theologians have been felt to 
3 be necessary. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Cf. Tambiah, S.J. 
Smith, W.C. 
Heiler, F. 
1970. 
1963. 
1932. 
~ 8 6 6
The burden of this study, implicit within the discussion 
of evil and salvation, and explicit in the methodological 
discussion, is that the phenomenologist should continue with 
the process of interpretatl'on after the anthropologist has 
ceased with his, and also that no simple handing over to 
the confessional theologian should take place. The reason for 
this being that the general paradigm of meaning implies that 
theological systems form part of a continuum of meaning with 
other explanatory schemes. Thus while the mode of argument and 
the content of doctrine may vary, in form theological systems 
are essentially different from any other system of meaning. 
This can clearly be seen in Paul Tillich's definition of religion 
as 'the state of being g r ~ p e d d by an ultimate concern, a concern 
which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which 
itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of 
our life,.l Other theological views of salvation would manifest 
. '1 2 a Slml ar concern. 
The final point of this study may also be associated with 
Tillich and his decrial of those contemporary thinkers who so 
emphasize technical reason that they completely avoid the notion 
of ontological reason. For ontological reason had once embraced 
both cognitive and affective dimensions of human life, and is just 
that category which enables the notion of meaning to include 
the emotional dimension of ritual, symbolism, and myth. It I'las, 
said Tillich, those who 'refuse to "understand" anythinr that 
transcends technical reason' who had made philosophy c o m p l e t e l ~ . , r r
3 
irrelevant for questions of existential concern. 
1. 
3. 
Tillich, Paul. 
Wells, n.r. 
T i l l i c h ~ ~ Paul. 
1963:4 
1978. 
1953. Vol. 1:81. 
For t h· 
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phenomenologist of religion it is precisely this issue of 
existential concern which has to be borne in mind when vieT,-ling 
the notion of salvation as used by theologians, for if the notion 
of salvation is to be understood as part of the explicit reflection 
of a group then it must be approached in terms of the quality of 
commi tment shown towards the meaning offered by a creed or pattern 
of life. This notion of commitment, when associated with 
explanatory systems, may be identified as the determining feature 
of salva.tion a.s a religious phenomenon, and Hhich serves to 
distinguish between mere explanations and means of salvation. 
The theological issues which result from such conclusions 
are far reaching in their effect; for at one level they offer a 
basis for discussing the doctrine of man and the issue of natural 
theology, while they also suggest a fruitful Hay of approaching 
Christology in the Christian tradition. All such deliberations 
presuppose active co-operation between theologians and students 
of religion. This study has merely sought, as a preliminary step, 
to ensure that at least there should be no 'silence lying 
.. ,1 
between anthropology and the history of rellglons . 
1. Douglas, Ma ry . 
1 l V' t t,.; t h.-. notion of the symbolic body is din"ct y r'\"' t ~ V , . l l l
1975: 81. Cf. i'1ary Douglas 19:(_, ' .. JI,Il''? her 
paradigm of meaning and to theology. 
- , ~ - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
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